Uni 


Present 

Day 
Warfare 

Jacques  Rouvier 


PRESENT-DAY  WARFARE 


TWO  FRENCH  BOMB-THROWERS  ABOUT  TO  START  FOR  THE 
GERMAN  TRENCHES 


PRESENT-DAY  WARFARE 

HOW  AN  ARMY  TRAINS 
AND  FIGHTS 


BY 

CAPTAIN  JACQUES   ROUVIER 

OF   THE    FRENCH   MILITARY   MISSION   TO   THE 
UNITED   STATES 


ILLUSTRATED 


NEW  YORK 

CHARLES  SCRIBNER'S  SONS 
1918 


COPYRIGHT,  1918,  BY 
CHARLES  SCRIBNER'S  SONS 


Published  September,  1918 


PREFATORY  NOTE 

MY  idea  is  not  to  write  a  book  on  tactics — and 
interesting  only  to  officers.  I  shall  simply  try  to 
make  clear  to  the  civilians  of  this  country,  whose 
boys  are  "over  there,"  the  conditions  of  warfare 
in  the  present  day. 

JACQUES  ROUVIER. 


2018881 


CONTENTS 

PREFATORY  NOTE  . 


CHAPTER 

I.  A  GENERAL  DISCUSSION  OF  THE  CHANGES 
IN  ORGANIZATION,  EQUIPMENT,  AND 
TRAINING  MADE  NECESSARY  BY  THE 
METHODS  OF  MODERN  WARFARE  ...  i 

II.    MACHINE-GUNS  AND  AUTOMATIC  RIFLES    .      18 

III.  HAND  AND  RIFLE   GRENADES,  THE  ONE- 

POUNDER  GUN,  TRENCH  MORTARS,  BAY- 
ONETS, AND  TRENCH  KNIVES 33 

IV.  THE  ARTILLERY 54 

V.    LIAISON 75 

VI.  AVIATION 82 

VII.  CAVALRY 91 

VIII.  SANITARY  SERVICE 100 

IX.  TRANSPORTATION 108 

X.  FOOD-SUPPLY 120 

vii 


viii  CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  PACK 

XL  LIFE  IN  THE  TRENCHES 124 

XII.  THE  DEFENSIVE  BATTLE 145 

XIII.  THE  OFFENSIVE  BATTLE 159 

XIV.  CONCLUSION 190 


ILLUSTRATIONS 

Two  French  bomb-throwers  about  to  start  for  the  German 

trenches Frontispiece 

FACING  PAGE 

A  British  soldier  at  his  post  cleaning  his  Lewis  machine- 
gun  20 

One  of  the  big  guns  firing 62 

British  soldiers  signalling  between  the  support  and  front 

lines  during  the  battle  of  Flanders 76 

An  immense  R.  A.  F.  machine  ready  to  start  with  its  load 

of  bombs  for  Germany      88 

One  of  the  wards  of  a  British  base  hospital  in  France    .    .     102 

A  French  field-kitchen  on  the  Somme 122 

A  view  of  French  and  German  trenches 130 


PRESENT-DAY  WARFARE 

CHAPTER  I 

A    GENERAL    DISCUSSION    OF    THE    CHANGES    IN 

ORGANIZATION,   EQUIPMENT,   AND  TRAINING 

MADE   NECESSARY   BY  THE   METHODS 

OF   MODERN  WARFARE 

CONDITIONS  in  this  war  are  so  different  from 
what  had  been  expected  that  great  changes 
have  been  made  in  tactics.  These  tactical  changes, 
combined  with  the  use  of  many  new  instruments 
of  warfare,  have  compelled  certain  changes  in  or- 
ganization and  a  very  decided  revision  of  the  meth- 
ods of  training  the  soldier.  Advantage  has  been 
taken  of  every  modern  invention;  the  greatest  scien- 
tists of  the  world  have  aided  in  the  production  of 
means  of  offense  and  defense;  only  the  most  exact 
methods  are  permissible;  the  strictest  attention  is 
devoted  to  the  most  minute  details;  and  the  prep- 
aration for  each  contemplated  movement  must  be 
as  nearly  perfect  as  possible.  As  the  war  develops, 
material  plays  a  more  and  more  prominent  part, 
and,  whereas  we  formerly  emphasized  the  "man 
behind  the  gun,"  we  now  emphasize  the  machine 


2  PRESENT-DAY  WARFARE 

which  is  behind  the  man.  Material  can  be  used  in 
open  warfare  only  to  a  limited  extent  as  it  would 
not  be  practicable  to  furnish  the  great  amount  of 
transportation  which  immense  quantities  of  material 
would  require  even  if  it  were  not  impossible  to  make 
use  of  it  on  account  of  the  rapid  movement  of  the 
troops  under  those  conditions.  This  explains  why, 
when  the  war  started,  none  of  the  belligerents  had 
many  guns  of  large  calibre:  it  was  not  considered 
feasible  to  transport  guns  of  such  great  size  and 
weight.  Of  course,  the  utilization  of  railroad  ar- 
tillery in  open  warfare  is  out  of  the  question  because 
most  of  the  time  there  are  no  railroads  available 
for  the  purpose  near  the  battle-field. 

In  open  warfare  huge  armies  are  expected  to  come 
into  contact  on  a  terrain  where  manoeuvring  is  pos- 
sible; decisive  battles  are  fought  on  extensive  areas, 
and  as  a  result  of  strategical  movements  consisting, 
for  example,  in  bringing  up  on  the  enemy's  flank 
a  great  number  of  troops,  such  stupendous  blows 
are  dealt  the  enemy  that  his  armies  must  retreat 
or  surrender.  Every  effort  is  made  to  be  stronger 
than  the  opponent  at  the  selected  point  of  encounter 
and  at  a  certain  time.  To  accomplish  this  end  sur- 
prise is  necessary  and  changes  of  position  have  to  be 
made  without  the  enemy  becoming  aware  of  them. 
The  secrecy  of  such  operations  must  be  assured  if 
success  is  to  be  attained,  and  this  necessitates  the 


GENERAL  DISCUSSION  3 

completion  of  vast  movements  in  a  short  time,  re- 
sulting in  long  and  tiring  marches  of  the  troops 
engaged. 

In  battles  fought  in  open  warfare,  as  in  the 
battle  of  the  Marne,  no  system  of  trenches  could 
be  built;  when  the  men  found  they  could  not  ad- 
vance on  account  of  the  violence  of  the  enemy's 
fire  they  had  to  construct  shelter  with  the  intrench- 
ing-tools  which  they  carried  with  them,  and  which 
formed  a  part  of  their  equipment.  It  was  no  use 
running  away,  as  the  bullets  would  soon  overtake 
the  cowards,  so  the  troops  who  fought  in  extended 
order  simply  layxlown  and  tried  to  dig  themselves 
quickly  into  the  earth  to  avoid  losses  and  also  to 
be  able  to  hold  their  ground.  Each  man  dug  for 
himself  a  hole  to  afford  him  some  shelter.  It  is 
easy  to  understand  that  the  troops  could  not  live 
under  such  conditions  for  a  long  time  because  they 
could  get  neither  supplies  nor  reinforcements,  having 
no  sheltered  means  of  communication  and  being 
under  the  enemy's  fire.  On  the  other  hand,  such 
lines  of  rifle-pits  are  very  easy  to  defend  against 
an  enemy  attacking  them  in  front,  but  cannot  be 
defended  if  the  enemy  succeeds  in  turning  them 
and  getting  at  their  rear. 

After  the  battle  of  the  Marne  the  French  tried 
to  deliver  a  decisive  blow  on  the  German  right  flank 
in  order  to  compel  the  enemy  to  retire  from  the 


4  PRESENT-DAY  WARFARE 

trenches  occupied  on  the  Aisne  and  to  the  south. 
This  attempt  on  the  part  of  the  French  to  outflank 
their  opponents  was  met  by  a  constant  extension  of 
the  German  trenches  and  a  counter-effort  to  envelop 
the  French  left  flank.  Thus  resulted  what  has  been 
called  "the  race  to  the  sea."  When  at  last  the  French 
and  German  lines  reached  the  North  Sea,  both 
armies  had  to  settle  down  where  they  were  because 
movements  around  either  flank  were  no  longer  pos- 
sible, one  flank  being  protected  by  the  sea  and  the 
other  by  the  mountains  of  neutral  Switzerland. 
Both  flanks  resting  on  impassable  obstacles,  the 
foes  were  forced  to  deliver  frontal  attacks  and  only 
trench  warfare  was  possible.  But  this  method  of 
warfare  is  not  new  nor  unheard  of;  neither  did  it 
take  birth  from  the  genius  of  some  German  general, 
as  some  people  assert.  Trench  warfare  existed  during 
the  Civil  War  in  the  United  States,  but  it  is  now 
conducted  in  greater  magnitude  than  ever  before  in 
the  history  of  the  world. 

The  opponents  found  themselves  face  to  face 
after  the  battle  of  the  Marne  and  the  race  to  the 
sea,  in  some  places  the  trenches  being  separated 
by  only  a  few  yards.  Both  tried  to  make  life  pos- 
sible where  they  were.  The  line  of  rifle-pits  was 
transformed  into  more  roomy  trenches,  in  which 
men  could  stand  and  move  about  without  being 
shot.  Boyaux,  that  is  to  say,  trenches  running 


GENERAL  DISCUSSION  5 

back  from  the  firing-line,  were  dug  to  allow  the 
men  to  walk  from  the  firing-line  to  the  rear  without 
detection.  This  permitted  the  transportation  of 
supplies  of  all  kinds  and  the  evacuation  of  wounded 
and  sick,  and  rendered  possible  the  relief  of  the 
trench  garrison — that  is,  the  replacing  of  troops  who 
had  remained  for  a  certain  length  of  time  in  the 
trenches,  troops  worn  out  by  ceaseless  strain  and 
by  losses — by  troops  who  had  been  at  rest-billets  in 
rear  of  the  lines.  This  is  generally  a  very  tedious 
and  difficult  operation,  but  it  must  be  accomplished 
if  the  ground  is  to  be  held. 

As  the  troops  settled  down  to  a  warfare  in  the 
trenches,  the  opponents  tried  to  avoid  surprise  at- 
tacks, and  for  this  purpose  protected  their  trenches 
with  every  kind  of  defense  and  obstacle  which  could 
be  devised.  Both  sides  had  to  create  and  improve 
their  war  material — big  guns  and  powerful  howitzers 
were  built  and  made  ready  to  go  into  action. 

Automatic  rifles  and  machine-guns  in  large 
numbers  were  added  to  the  armament,  which  in- 
creased the  fire-power  of  infantry  and  which,  com- 
bined with  the  ordinary  rifles,  could  pour  a  sufficient 
shower  of  bullets  on  the  enemy  to  check  any  of- 
fensive movement,  and  this  occasioned  terrible 
losses  especially  to  units  which  delivered  the  as- 
sault in  mass  formations,  as  the  Germans  did  during 
the  Ypres  battle.  I  remember  a  German  company 


6  PRESENT-DAY  WARFARE 

which  made  a  counter-attack  on  a  part  of  the  line 
held  by  my  regiment,  the  6yth  Infantry,  in  very  close 
order,  in  which  nearly  all  were  killed.  This  hap- 
pened on  the  night  of  the  5th  of  May,  1917.  At 
daybreak  we  could  see  in  front  of  our  trenches  the 
corpses  of  that  whole  German  company,  at  the  head 
of  which  lay  that  of  its  captain,  sword  still  in  hand. 

Arms  with  curved  trajectories  also  had  to  be  pro- 
vided to  dislodge  the  Germans  concealed  either  in 
the  trenches  or  in  their  shell-holes,  and  for  this  pur- 
pose hand  and  rifle  grenades  have  proven  very 
efficacious.  It  was  also  necessary  to  be  able  to  dis- 
lodge the  enemy  who  held  out  stiffly  in  a  part  of 
a  trench,  and  for  this  we  use  flame-throwers  that 
are  able  to  send  flames  to  a  distance  of  thirty  to 
forty  metres.  These  have  been  much  used'  in  the 
late  offensive  on  the  Aisne.  It  must  be  said  that 
the  Germans  first  took  the  initiative  in  using  these 
new  means  of  warfare. 

The  artillery  has  been  subjected  to  many  innova- 
tions during  the  progress  of  the  war,  one  of  the  most 
important  being  the  great  use  of  guns  of  large  calibre. 
These  were  found  necessary  because  the  guns  of 
the  field-artillery  were  unable  to  reach  the  enemy 
protected  in  dugouts  well  beneath  the  surface  of 
the  ground,  which  could  only  be  destroyed  by  shells 
containing  large  quantities  of  high  explosive.  An- 
other interesting  feature  of  the  development  of  ar- 


GENERAL  DISCUSSION  7 

tillery  is  the  increase  in  the  number  of  guns  of  all 
calibres  in  a  small  area  to  result  in  a  concentration 
of  fire  which,  with  all  guns  firing  at  a  rapid  rate, 
is  called  "drum"  fire,  and  which  the  Germans  during 
the  recent  offensive  in  Flanders  have  designated 
as  "hurricane"  fire  and  "typhoon"  fire.  These 
designations  give  one  some  idea  of  the  violence  which 
artillery-fire  can  attain.  In  addition  to  the  heavy 
artillery  of  great  power,  which  is  fired  from  emplace- 
ments, advantage  has  been  taken  of  the  opportunity 
presented  by  this  type  of  warfare  to  use  railroad 
artillery,  enormous  guns  mounted  on  specially  de- 
signed platform  cars  whose  heavy  projectiles  fired 
at  ranges  as  high  as  twenty  miles  have  a  very  de- 
structive effect. 

As  the  defensive  power  of  trenches — constantly 
strengthened  and  improved — continued  to  increase 
it  became  necessary  to  adopt  some  form  of  artillery 
which  could  drop  projectiles  into  the  trenches  close 
at  hand,  so  trench  artillery  consisting  of  mortars 
of  different  sizes  was  put  in  the  first-line  trenches. 
These  mortars  are  able  to  hurl  upon  the  enemy's 
trenches  aerial  torpedoes  containing  a  great  quan- 
tity of  high  explosive.  Having  but  a  short  range, 
they  are  used  only  for  the  purpose  of  destroying 
the  enemy's  first  lines. 

The  artillery  has  also  made  much  use  of  what 
are  known  as  "special"  shells,  these  being  shells 


8  PRESENT-DAY  WARFARE 

containing  either  lachrymatory  or  asphyxiating 
gases.  They  are  fired  especially  against  the  enemy's 
artillery  to  prevent  him  from  using  his  guns,  but 
are  also  used  to  form  a  deadly  barrage  through  which 
the  hostile  infantry  cannot  advance.  These  gas- 
shells  explode  with  but  a  very  slight  report,  and 
the  sound  of  the  explosion  is  the  only  warning  that 
one  has  to  prepare  for  a  gas  attack  and  adjust  his 
mask. 

The  Germans,  during  the  Ypres  battle  first 
launched  an  attack  with  gases  and  the  use  of  as- 
phyxiating and  lachrymatory  gases  has  since  been 
very  common.  It  was  there  used  by  opening  special 
pipes  which  led  to  big  reservoirs  containing  asphyx- 
iating gases.  This  gas  system  is  a  very  compli- 
cated one  and  can  only  be  used  in  quiet  sectors  where 
it  is  possible  to  provide  such  a  system.  When  every- 
thing is  ready,  clouds  of  gases  are  poured  toward 
the  enemy  for  several  hours.  The  Germans  launched 
such  a  gas  attack  in  front  of  my  regiment  in  May, 
1916,  but,  fortunately,  as  we  had  thoroughly  trained 
our  men  in  the  use  of  their  gas-masks  we  sustained 
but  few  casualties.  Most  of  the  men  who  died  in 
this  way  had  not  their  masks  with  them  and  were 
not  able  to  reach  them.  The  masses  of  gas  rolled 
very  low.  Two  engineers  who  were  working  in  saps 
in  the  front  of  my  battalion  had  gone  without  their 
masks,  or  rather  had  put  them  in  a  dugout  a  short 


GENERAL  DISCUSSION  9 

distance  away,  and  when  the  gases  rolled  in,  one 
of  these  men  conceived  the  idea  of  climbing  to  the 
top  of  a  tree,  with  the  result  that  he  was  not  injured. 
The  other  one,  who  tried  to  run  and  find  his  mask, 
died  before  he  could  reach  the  dugout. 

To  avoid  destruction  artillery  must  be  concealed. 
No  longer  can  a  battery  fire  in  security  from  a  posi- 
tion in  rear  of  the  crest  of  a  hill,  for  the  airplanes 
will  locate  it  at  once.  To  avoid  destruction  it  must 
be  screened  from  view  of  the  enemy's  aircraft,  and 
"camouflage"  is  resorted  to.  This  word  means 
concealing,  transforming  or  disguising,  any  object. 
Camouflage  has  become  an  art  during  the  fighting 
of  the  past  three  years. 

"  Barrage  fire,"  which  has  been  adopted  and  per- 
fected by  the  artillery  since  the  cessation  of  open 
warfare,  means  simply  a  rain  of  shells  on  a  certain 
designated  zone.  The  British  call  it  curtain  fire, 
which  well  expresses  the  idea  that  a  barrage  is  lit- 
erally a  screen  of  fire  and  steel  placed  between  the 
foes,  and  through  which  the  enemy  cannot  pass 
without  being  annihilated.  When  the  barrage 
moves  from  line  to  line  at  regulated  intervals  to 
protect  advancing  infantry  in  the  big  drives  it  is 
called  a  creeping  barrage.  Trench  warfare  permits 
great  quantities  of  shell  to  be  transported  and 
assembled  in  dumps,  so  that  when  the  barrage 
fire  is  opened  by  the  quick-firing  modern  guns 


io  PRESENT-DAY  WARFARE 

there  may  be  available  a  plentiful  supply  of  am- 
munition. 

The  engineers  have  had  to  play  a  very  important 
role  in  this  trench  warfare,  for  the  front  is  more  like 
an  immense  fortress  than  a  battle-field  as  we  had 
imagined  it  in  open  warfare,  and  the  laying  out  of 
defensive  positions  and  arranging  for  their  construc- 
tion and  repair  has  been  a  mighty  task.  In  some 
parts  of  the  front  mine  warfare  has  been  carried 
on  to  a  degree  never  before  thought  possible.  Under- 
ground galleries  are  dug  at  the  expense  of  much 
labor,  great  cavities  underneath  the  strongholds 
of  the  enemy  are  packed  with  immense  amounts 
of  explosive,  and  when  the  fixed  time  arrives  the 
mine  is  exploded,  causing  havoc  to  the  foe  and  open- 
ing a  crater  in  the  surface  of  the  earth  at  times  to 
a  depth  of  over  ninety  feet.  What  with  mine  war- 
fare and  the  destruction  wrought  by  the  great  guns 
of  the  artillery,  there  is  utter  devastation  and  ruin 
in  that  part  of  France  over  which  the  troops  have 
battled. 

The  building  and  maintenance  of  lines  of  com- 
munication, including  railroads  of  both  standard 
and  narrow  gauge  and  roads  of  all  kinds,  has  been 
another  never-ending  duty  of  the  engineers. 

The  aviation  branch  of  the  service  has  been  ex- 
panded and  developed  to  a  degree  which  is  little 
short  of  marvellous.  There  has  been  a  most  remark- 


GENERAL  DISCUSSION  11 

able  increase  in  the  number  of  planes,  and  different 
types  have  had  to  be  designed  and  constructed  to 
meet  the  needs  of  airmen  for  righting,  bombing, 
artillery-observation,  and  reconnoissance. 

Cavalry  also  has,  of  course,  been  affected  by  the 
change  from  open  to  trench  warfare.  Formerly  it 
served  as  a  screen,  served  as  the  eyes  and  ears  of 
the  infantry  and  prevented  the  enemy  from  ob- 
taining information  by  its  reconnoitring  patrols, 
its  chief  purpose  being  to  locate  and  destroy  the 
enemy's  cavalry.  Now  that  both  armies  are  be- 
hind lines  of  trenches,  cavalry  cannot  be  used  as 
it  was  before,  and  therefore  it  serves  in  the  trenches 
dismounted.  If  we  assume  that  some  day  open 
warfare  will  be  resumed,  cavalry  cannot  be  used 
with  the  weapons  it  had  before,  because  the  enemy's 
infantry  has  a  much  more  powerful  armament;  and 
it  has,  therefore,  been  necessary  to  add  new  weap- 
ons to  those  heretofore  carried  by  the  horsemen. 
Cavalrymen  are  now  equipped  with  bayonets,  hand 
and  rifle  grenades,  and  automatic  guns.  There 
has  also  been  quite  a  considerable  increase  in  the 
number  of  machine-guns  assigned  to  the  mounted 
troops. 

In  the  warfare  of  nowadays  much  depends  on 
all  units  keeping  in  touch  with  each  other.  The 
word  liaison  covers  all  sorts  of  means  of  communi- 
cation. Sound  and  visual  signals,  rockets,  pigeons, 


12  PRESENT-DAY  WARFARE 

dogs,  and  runners  are  among  the  means  of  liaison 
which  are  employed. 

Means  of  transportation  have  been  greatly  im- 
proved during  this  war.  In  open  warfare  the  troops 
had  to  march.  Now  we  employ  for  transportation 
a  great  quantity  of  trucks,  and  these  offer  advan- 
tages, as  their  use  does  not  necessitate  such  great 
work  as  the  construction  of  new  railroads.  During 
the  Verdun  battle  all  relief,  the  transportation  of 
ammunition,  supplies,  and  food,  was  assured  by 
trucks  running  along  a  road  which  the  French  sol- 
diers called  the  "Sacred  Road."  If  it  could  not 
have  been  used  it  would  have  meant  death  for  Ver- 
dun. That  which  most  impressed  me  when,  with 
my  regiment,  I  was  transported  to  Verdun  on  the 
19th  of  June,  1916,  was  to  see  repairing  parties  at 
work  continuously,  day  and  night,  along  this  road, 
on  which  there  were  two  parallel  streams  of  cars, 
one  running  upward  toward  Verdun  and  the  other 
one  from  Verdun  toward  the  interior  of  the  coun- 
try— the  one  bringing  the  troops  to  fight  and  re- 
pulse the  Boche  and  the  other  bringing  troops  who 
had  fought  and  were  relieved  and  glad  to  go  to  rest- 
billets  after  doing  their  bit. 

It  is  much  easier  to  bring  food  to  the  troops  who 
fight  in  the  trenches  than  it  is  in  open  warfare,  for 
the  kitchens  can  be  located  rather  close  to  the  lines, 
and  carrying  parties  are  able  to  bring  hot  meals 


GENERAL  DISCUSSION  13 

to  the  men  even  in  the  first  line.  In  open  warfare 
this  was  not  possible,  because  wagons  had  to  be 
left  at  a  distance  on  account  of  the  nuisance  which 
they  occasioned  on  the  roads.  Therefore  each 
squad  had  to  do  its  own  cooking — nowadays  the 
cooking  is  done  for  the  whole  company.  Thus  we 
have  less  waste  and  the  food  is  better  cooked.  As 
the  troops  do  not  move  it  was  possible  to  arrange 
for  huge  food  store-places  and  to  supply  troops 
whenever  rations  were  wanted.  Even  if  the  supply- 
trains  failed  to  arrive,  these  food  stations  had  enough 
food  to  provide  the  fighting  units  for  several  days. 
In  open  warfare  the  constitution  of  such  depots 
was  not  practicable  because  the  armies  moved  sev- 
eral miles  each  day. 

When  an  offensive  is  about  to  take  place,  the 
artillery-fire  reaches  such  a  pitch  that  all  positions 
are  destroyed  and  the  ground  is  transformed  into 
a  field  of  shell-holes,  which  resembles  the  surface 
of  the  moon,  and  which  is  generally  referred  to  as 
"moon  terrain."  This  results  in  the  trench  warfare 
being  changed  to  the  shell-hole  warfare,  which  is 
now  the  method  of  fighting  on  all  offensive  sectors 
on  the  Western  front. 

We  have  to  train  our  men  for  the  trench  warfare 
which  they  must  fight  in  relatively  quiet  sectors, 
and  also  for  the  shell-hole  warfare  for  those  sectors 
where  either  French  or  Germans  have  started  an 


i4  PRESENT-DAY  WARFARE 

offensive,  as,  for  instance,  at  Verdun,  on  the  Chemin 
des  Dames,  or  in  Flanders.  The  armies  are  huge 
masses  of  men  who  fight  against  each  other — the 
French  have  nearly  three  million  men  in  the  field — 
but  it  would  give  a  very  false  idea  to  imagine  that 
on  the  first  line  large  units  fight  under  very  strict 
command.  That  is  not  so;  and  more  especially  in 
shell-hole  warfare  men  are  allowed  to  use  their  own 
judgment,  and  there  are  small  groups  of  only  five 
or  six  men  who  co-operate  and  assist  each  other. 
These  little  groups  Have  to  fight  alone,  and  it  is 
only  their  good  training  and  their  sense  of  duty 
toward  their  country  that  enables  them  to  hold 
the  ground  and  fight  in  connection  with  the  neigh- 
boring groups.  The  great  masses  are  directed  by 
the  generals,  but  as  we  come  closer  to  the  enemy 
we  notice  that  large  units  cannot  be  handled  by 
their  leaders  and  that  it  is  very  difficult  in  this  war- 
fare to  transmit  orders.  In  open  warfare  the  men 
could  see  their  chiefs,  they  could  see  how  they  led 
them.  In  shell-hole  warfare  that  is  not  the  case. 
Each  man  fights  for  himself  but  the  efforts  of  all 
these  men,  fighting  apparently  in  disorder,  fight- 
ing apparently  in  no  connection  one  with  another, 
are  directed  toward  the  same  aim — to  overpower 
the  Germans. 

It  is  necessary  that  each  small  unit,  that  is  to 
say,  each  platoon,  should  be  able  to  fight  by  itself, 


GENERAL  DISCUSSION  15 

and  so  it  is  provided  with  the  means,  having  all 
the  armament  which  is  required  in  this  war,  includ- 
ing hand  and  rifle  grenades  and  automatic  rifles. 
The  platoon  nucleus  of  the  battle  is  a  complete  fight- 
ing unit  in  itself,  being  the  largest  group  which  one 
man  is  capable  of  actually  leading  and  command- 
ing in  battle.  Each  weapon  has  its  own  special 
use  and  the  platoon  must  be  sufficient  unto  itself, 
capable  of  developing  an  intense  fire  by  means  of 
its  automatic  rifles,  routing  the  enemy  out  of  his 
hole  by  use  of  hand-grenades  if  the  distance  be  short, 
or  by  the  use  of  rifle-grenades  if  not  close  enough 
to  use  the  former.  The  bayonet,  the  rifle-butt,  and 
the  trench-knife  are  for  hand-to-hand  encounters, 
for  which  the  Germans  have  no  great  liking. 

The  training  required  by  the  present-day  methods 
of  warfare  is  different  in  many  particulars  from 
that  for  open  warfare.  For  example,  in  open  war- 
fare we  had  no  gas  attacks.  In  this  war  it  became 
necessary  to  teach  each  man  of  every  branch  the 
quick  use  of  his  gas-mask  and  the  means  of  avoid- 
ing death  by  gases.  In  every  army  it  was  found 
essential  to  train  specialists  who  could  man  the 
different  weapons  which  had  to  be  utilized,  in  order 
that  injury  might  be  inflicted  upon  the  enemy 
wherever  he  might  be. 

It  is,  also,  most  necessary  to  train  the  different 
specialists  to  work  together.  One  automatic  rifle- 


16  PRESENT-DAY  WARFARE 

man  does  not  fight  for  himself;  bombers  do  not 
fight  for  themselves;  but  all  fight  together  in 
close  connection,  and  it  is  imperative,  if  we  wish 
to  obtain  the  maximum  effect  of  our  new  mate- 
rial, to  train  our  specialists  for  a  long  time  in 
working  together.  This  is  not  very  easy,  because 
it  requires  continued  and  patient  training,  and  most 
of  the  time  we  do  not  stay  at  rest  long  enough  to 
give  this  training.  On  this  account  it  was  deemed 
better  to  change  the  conditions  of  training.  For- 
merly, when  men  had  finished  their  training  in  the 
depots  in  the  interior  of  the  country,  they  were  sent 
directly  to  the  front  in  order  to  fill  the  gaps  which 
were  caused  by  losses.  The  results  under  that  sys- 
tem were  not  very  good,  because  the  men,  being 
generally  recruits,  were  not  accustomed  to  their 
entirely  new  life,  and  the  units  were  not  homo- 
geneous. Nowadays  the  green  recruit  is  trained 
in  the  interior  of  France.  He  gets  there  only  a  rough 
individual  training.  He  learns  how  to  shoot,  how 
to  use  his  bayonet,  and  how  to  throw  grenades 
(but  only  dummy  ones).  Then  he  is  sent  to  a  depot 
at  the  rear  of  the  lines.  We  have  one  of  these  depots 
for  each  army.  There  he  is  qualified,  at  least  in  his 
specialty.  He  is  sent  to  schools — bombers'  schools, 
automatic-rifle  schools,  machine-gun  schools,  and 
so  on.  Then  he  returns  to  his  company  at  the  depot 
and  the  recruits  are  again  trained  together.  At 


GENERAL  DISCUSSION  17 

last  they  are  sent  to  another  depot  in  rear  of  the 
lines  but  nearer  the  front  than  before.  There  is  one 
of  these  depots  for  each  division,  and  the  men  are 
formed  into  a  battalion  for  each  regiment.  They 
gain  "esprit  de  corps"  and  learn  to  know  the  dif- 
ferent leaders  and  to  be  proud  of  the  battles  fought 
by  their  regiment.  At  last  they  are  sent  to  their 
regiment  and  join  the  units  in  the  battalions  which 
have  sustained  losses.  They  go  there  and  are  not 
strangers  as  they  were  formerly,  for  they  know  most 
of  the  officers  and  many  of  the  men,  they  have  been 
accustomed  to  hearing  daily  the  sound  of  the  guns 
pounding  the  trenches,  and  they  have  even  been 
submitted  to  artillery-fire  because  they  have  been 
used  as  fatigue-parties,  and  have  been  obliged  to 
dig  trenches  both  at  the  rear  and  close  to  the  posi- 
tions occupied  by  their  own  regiment.  The  train- 
ing is  longer  than  was  necessary  before  this  new 
work.  It  is  more  detailed  and  brings  the  men  into 
action  gradually. 


CHAPTER  II 
MACHINE-GUNS  AND  AUTOMATIC  RIFLES 

MACHINE-GUNS  have  been  used  to  a  very 
great  extent  during  the  war  and  all  the  bel- 
ligerent armies  have  increased  the  number  of  these 
in  the  fighting  units.  The  machine-guns  in  use  in 
Europe  are  of  several  different  types,  with  a  rate 
of  fire  varying  from  two  hundred  and  fifty  to  five 
hundred  rounds  per  minute.  Some  types  are 
operated  by  the  force  of  the  recoil  resulting  from 
the  explosion,  while  in  others  gas  is  the  operating 
force.  The  rapidity  of  action  causes  the  barrels 
to  become  very  hot  and  there  must  be  some  pro- 
vision made  for  their  cooling,  otherwise  the  gun 
would  soon  be  out  of  action. 

The  Germans  use  a  Maxim  machine-gun,  which 
is  water-cooled  and  of  the  barrel-recoil  type.  The 
jacket  that  surrounds  the  barrel  forms  a  reservoir 
filled  with  water  which  is  changed  from  time  to 
time.  Other  types  of  guns  are  those  used  by  the 
French,  the  Hotchkiss  and  the  Saint-Etienne.  They 
are  cooled  by  air,  and  actuated  by  gases  produced 
by  the  exploding  cartridges. 

18 


MACHINE-GUNS  AND  AUTOMATICS    19 

Most  machine-guns  are  rather  heavy  (the  com- 
plete gun,  i.  e.,  the  gun  itself  with  tripod,  weighing 
more  than  fifty  kilos)  can  only  be  fired  when  sta- 
tionary, require  a  crew  of  several  men  to  serve  them, 
and  when  they  are  moved  during  action  the  men  of 
the  crew  dismount  them  and  carry  the  parts.  They 
are  most  accurate,  but  require  the  determination 
of  the  exact  range  in  order  that  the  fire  may  be  ef- 
fective. The  fire-power  developed  is  very  great. 
Ammunition  has  to  be  constantly  supplied,  and 
the  transportation  of  this  ammunition  is  not  an 
easy  problem. 

The  machine-guns  are  transported  either  on 
mules  or  on  little  carts  dragged  by  a  mule  or  a  horse. 
They  are  used  in  pairs,  two  guns  forming  a  platoon. 
If  a  long-continued  fire  is  required  only  one  gun 
of  a  platoon  will  fire  so  that  the  other  may  cool, 
but,  of  course,  in  cases  of  emergency  the  two  guns 
would  be  used. 

From  a  mechanical  point  of  view  these  guns  are 
rather  complicated  weapons.  They  have  to  be 
served  by  men  who  understand  perfectly  their  con- 
struction and  who  are  able  to  repair  them  in  a  very 
short  time.  A  very  slight  accident  will  often  pre- 
vent them  from  firing,  but  the  expert  men  of  the 
crew  can  make  repairs  or  readjustments  very  rapidly. 
For  firing,  the  guns  are  placed  on  a  tripod  which 
can  be  adjusted  to  different  heights.  When  used 


20  PRESENT-DAY  WARFARE 

in  the  open  the  gun  must  be  close  to  the  ground, 
in  order  not  to  be  detected,  but  when  firing  behind 
a  parapet  the  tripod  is  usually  extended  to  its  full 
height.  When  used  for  fire  against  airplanes  the 
gun  is  placed  in  an  almost  vertical  position  and 
makes  a  sort  of  barrage  in  trying  to  hit  the  plane. 
This  use  of  the  gun  is  only  possible  if  a  plane  flies 
low,  as  machine-guns  are  not  effective  if  the  plane 
is  much  higher  than  a  thousand  yards. 

The  location  of  the  machine-guns  and  their  dis- 
tribution depends  on  whether  the  action  is  offensive 
or  defensive,  and  also  on  the  configuration  of  the 
ground,  but,  in  any  event,  there  are  two  great  prin- 
ciples which  are  always  applied  in  the  tactical  use 
of  machine-guns  and  which  govern  their  emplace- 
ments, be  it  offensive  or  defensive.  These  are:  First, 
that  the  machine-gun  must  act  by  surprise,  and 
second,  that  it  must  be  able  to  fire  on  the  flank  of 
the  enemy,  that  is  to  say,  in  an  enfilading  position. 
The  movements  of  a  machine-gun  must  be  made 
quickly  and  in  secret,  otherwise  they  will  be  re- 
ported to  the  enemy's  artillery,  their  emplacements 
will  be  exactly  located  and  a  few  shells  disable 
them. 

The  fire-power  of  a  machine-gun  is  so  great,  that, 
in  a  few  seconds  heavy  losses  can  be  caused  in  the 
enemy  ranks,  provided  the  gun  is  properly  located. 
It  must  have  a  flanking  position  because  of  the  ac- 


MACHINE-GUNS  AND  AUTOMATICS    21 

curacy  of  the  gun's  fire,  which  results  in  the  cone 
of  dispersion  being  so  narrow  that  if  it  is  fired  at 
the  front  of  an  enemy,  in  skirmish  order,  it  will  not 
cause  great  losses.  If,  on  the  contrary,  the  ma- 
chine-gunners have  selected  a  flanking  position 
they  are  able  to  execute  enfilading  fire  and  whole 
lines  of  skirmishers  fall  in  a  few  seconds.  This 
staggers  the  enemy,  shatters  his  morale,  and  obliges 
the  succeeding  waves  to  stop.  The  guns  fire  short 
and  violent  volleys,  not  being  able  to  sustain  great 
fire-power  for  long,  and  also  because  the  targets 
do  not  remain  under  fire,  having  either  been  shot 
down  or  having  crept  under  cover. 

Machine-guns  should  be  echelonned  in  depth, 
and  since  they  can  only  fire  when  stationary,  their 
stages  of  advance  should  be  so  calculated  as  always 
to  have  some  machine-guns  ready  to  open  fire.  In 
an  offensive  we  generally  divide  our  machine-guns, 
one  part  advancing  waves  to  defend  the  conquered 
terrain  and  one  part  remaining  in  our  first  line, 
partly  to  check  any  movement  of  the  enemy  should 
our  advance  not  be  successful  but  more  especially 
to  form  a  creeping  barrage  in  front  of  the  assault- 
ing waves  and  to  counter-batter  the  enemy's  ma- 
chine-guns. Of  course,  these  two  groups  will  some- 
times be  called  upon  to  relieve  each  other.  For 
instance,  the  group  advancing  with  the  assaulting 
wave  having  stopped  at  a  certain  position  might 


22  PRESENT-DAY  WARFARE 

be  relieved  by  the  group  which  has  been  kept  in 
the  first  line,  and  thus  advance  farther  into  the 
enemy's  lines. 

As  a  rule,  it  is  not  considered  good  policy  to  put 
machine-guns  in  the  first  lines  as  they  are  quickly 
located  by  the  enemy  and  so  terribly  shelled  as  to 
preclude  the  effective  use  of  these  weapons  should 
the  enemy  attack.  We  sometimes  advance  our 
machine-guns  to  the  first  lines  in  order  temporarily 
to  protect  these  lines,  which  have  been  organized  by 
infantry;  they  are,  however,  withdrawn  to  the  rear 
as  soon  as  possible  and  echelonned  in  depth. 

On  the  defensive  the  guns  are  even  more  eche- 
lonned in  depth  and  their  emplacements  carefully 
selected.  Each  machine-gunner  knows  where  he 
is  to  fire  should  the  enemy  reach  a  particular  point, 
and  he  also  knows  the  exact  range  of  each  different 
point.  On  the  defensive,  machine-guns  are  con- 
cealed from  the  enemy's  view  by  skilful  camouflag- 
ing and  great  echelonning,  which  makes  progress 
for  the  enemy  both  very  slow  and  very  costly,  thus 
attaining  the  real  object  of  a  defensive,  which  is 
to  gain  time  and  shatter  the  front  of  an  attack.  The 
whole  front  of  the  defensive  sector  is  completely 
covered  by  intersecting  machine-gun  fire,  which  is 
often  sufficient  to  break  any  offensive  planned  by 
the  enemy. 

Machine-guns  can  execute  indirect  fire  as  do  guns, 


MACHINE-GUNS  AND  AUTOMATICS    23 

but  it  is  rather  a  complicated  task  firing  on  an  un- 
seen target.  For  instance,  being  stationed  behind 
a  crest,  a  bullet  fired  over  the  crest  may,  because 
of  its  curved  trajectory,  strike  some  one  stationed 
behind  the  crest.  We  know  that  if  it  is  fired  at  a 
certain  angle  the  bullet  will  attain  a  certain  height 
and  range,  therefore,  the  first  thing  is  to  be  sure  the 
bullet  won't  strike  the  crest  on  its  way  toward  the 
enemy.  Usually,  when  we  use  indirect  fire  in  the 
sectors  we  not  only  calculate  accurately  all  the  ele- 
ments offered  to  that  fire  but  also  verify  them  by 
machine-gun  fire  in  order  to  see  that  the  barrage 
really  is  in  front  of  the  trenches  we  want  to  defend. 

In  defensive  sectors  we  combine  indirect  with 
direct  fire.  Sometimes  machine-guns  take  posi- 
tions enabling  them  to  fire  over  the  heads  of  the 
infantry.  During  the  battle  of  Champagne,  in 
September,  1916,  my  battalion  began  the  attack 
from  a  little  slope,  and  was  to  storm  a  wood  which 
was  at  the  bottom  of  this  valley.  The  machine- 
guns  fired  over  the  heads  of  my  battalion  and  did 
very  good  work  during  the  entire  fight,  as  they 
remained  stationary  and  fired  during  the  whole  time. 

It  is  important  to  have  the  machine-guns  moved 
as  little  as  possible,  as  during  the  time  of  moving 
they  are  useless.  The  idea  is  for  them  to  select  posi- 
tions enabling  them  to  help  the  infantry  by  their 
fire  as  long  as  possible,  and  then  to  move  to  the 


24  PRESENT-DAY  WARFARE 

next  position  where  they  recommence.  While  they 
are  moving  other  machine-guns  should  be  held  in 
readiness,  so  as  to  be  able  to  help  the  infantry  if 
necessary. 

It  is  sometimes  very  easy,  and  sometimes  very 
difficult,  to  control  the  effects  of  fire.  When  the 
ground  is  dry  the  bullets  raise  little  clouds  of  dust 
which  give  a  clear  idea  of  where  they  have  fallen; 
but  when  the  ground  is  wet  and  damp  it  is  much 
more  difficult  to  see  where  the  bullets  fall.  The 
platoon  commander  controls  the  fire,  giving  the 
range  and  making  all  the  required  corrections.  The 
first  requisite  for  good  machine-gun  fire  is  a  good 
observation-post  from  which  the  enemy  can  be 
well  seen;  next  to  find  the  proper  range;  and  finally 
to  discover  the  best  means  of  bringing  up  men  and 
material  to  the  firing  position  without  attracting 
the  attention  of  the  enemy.  It  is  better  to  take 
more  time  in  preparing  for  the  fire  than  to  do  it 
quickly  and  be  seen  by  the  enemy,  in  which  case 
the  machine-gun  would  never  have  a  chance  to  go 
into  action. 

The  automatic  rifles  are  used  in  the  French  army 
and  will  be  used  by  this  country.  They  are  neither 
machine-guns  nor  light  machine-guns,  but  barrel- 
recoil  weapons,  scarcely  heavier  than  ordinary  rifles 
but  having  the  advantage  of  being  capable  of  being 
fired  while  walking,  thus  forming  an  excellent  of- 


MACHINE-GUNS  AND  AUTOMATICS    25 

fensive  arm.  A  crew  of  three  men  is  assigned  to 
each  automatic  rifle,  one  man  serving  the  gun  and 
the  other  two  carrying  ammunition.  They  are 
used  in  the  first  assaulting  waves,  where  the  fire- 
power in  the  offensive  is  utilized.  On  the  defensive, 
they  are  placed  in  the  first  lines,  which  are  thus 
protected  in  front  by  heavy  fire  from  these  rifles 
and  with  intersecting  fire  by  the  machine-guns. 
In  an  offensive  the  first  lines  are  enabled  to  hold 
their  ground  after  having  attained  their  objective 
in  spite  of  counter-attacks. 

The  auto  rifles  work  well  with  the  bombers,  be- 
cause, if  the  enemy  hides  in  shell-holes  or  trenches 
in  order  to  avoid  the  automatic-rifle  fire,  the  bombers 
can  come  within  good  range  for  grenade-throwing. 
If,  on  the  other  hand,  the  enemy  should  try  to  pre- 
vent our  bombers  from  throwing  grenades  the  auto- 
matic rifles  would  cause  great  havoc  among  them, 
as  they  would  be  obliged  to  show  themselves  in 
order  to  take  proper  aim. 

This  gun  sometimes  has  stop-jams,  but  the  man 
who  serves  it  must  be  able  to  put  it  into  good  con- 
dition again.  It  is  less  visible  than  a  machine-gun 
and  can,  therefore,  be  brought  much  closer  to  the 
enemy  without  his  being  aware  of  its  presence, 
and  the  riflemen  have  greater  facilities  for  moving 
their  guns  as  they  are  lighter  and  more  portable. 
My  regiment  first  used  them  during  the  Verdun 


26  PRESENT-DAY  WARFARE 

battle,   and  in  the  Somme  and   in  the  Aisne  of- 
fensives. 

Night  fire  by  either  machine-guns  or  automatic 
rifles  is  not  very  effective  because  it  is  impossible 
to  discern  the  target,  although  if  a  sector  has  been 
in  our  hands  for  some  time,  fire  at  night  might  prove 
very  effective,  as  barrages  of  machine-gun  fire  and 
automatic-rifle  fire  can  be  dropped  on  certain  areas 
where  the  enemy  is  reported  to  be,  as  well  as  in  the 
front  of  others  in  order  to  prevent  his  gaining  a 
foothold  in  our  line.  In  February,  1917,  the  Ger- 
mans tried  to  raid  my  battalion  front  near  Verneuil. 
In  preparation  for  this  they  executed  drum  fire 
over  the  front  they  intended  to  raid.  During  this 
time  the  machine-guns  of  the  defensive  fired  a  volley 
a  minute,  thus  keeping  the  front  of  the  battalion 
constantly  covered  by  machine-gun  fire.  When 
they  extended  their  range  in  order  to  allow  the  in- 
fantry to  enter  our  lines,  all  the  machine-guns  started 
firing,  without  order,  at  top  speed,  and  created  such 
a  terrific  fire  that  the  enemy  did  not  even  attempt 
to  enter  our  trenches,  and  regained  his  own  as  quickly 
as  possible.  This  was  done  during  a  heavy  fog  at 
four  o'clock  in  the  morning,  so  that  it  was  nearly 
as  dark  as  at  night,  and  the  machine-gunners  had 
to  fire  without  seeing  their  targets.  Nevertheless, 
they  knew  exactly  at  what  range  and  in  what  di- 
rection to  open  the  curtain  of  fire. 


MACHINE-GUNS  AND  AUTOMATICS    27 

The  training  of  both  machine-gunners  and  auto- 
matic-rifle men  takes  a  very  long  time,  especially 
that  of  the  first  gunner.  They  should  be  strong 
and  gallant  soldiers,  trained  to  carry  heavy  loads 
long  distances  and  over  furrowed  ground.  They 
must  be  perfectly  familiar  with  the  different  parts 
of  their  guns,  and  must  be  able  to  mount  or  dis- 
mount them  correctly  without  even  looking  at  them. 
They  must  learn  to  mount  their  guns  in  the  dark; 
must  be  taught  to  fire  properly,  and,  finally,  must 
learn  to  work  harmoniously  as  a  team.  With  this 
training  they  will  be  able  to  do  well  on  the  stand, 
but  will  still  have  to  be  trained  from  a  tactical 
point  of  view.  This  includes  the  training  of  the 
platoon  and  then  the  company,  both  for  defensive 
and  offensive  action,  and  the  training  in  connec- 
tion with  the  infantry,  their  organizations  being  a 
part  of  the  infantry  and  giving  it  valuable  assis- 
tance, but  being  unable  to  work  without  it.  It 
would  be  a  gross  mistake  to  fancy  that  machine- 
guns  can  take  the  place  of  guns.  They  have  not  at 
all  the  same  objective.  They  are  arms  with  small 
and  medium  range.  The  training  of  the  machine- 
gunners  will  be  a  very  long  one,  because  they  must 
learn  to  act  independently  and  to  show  great  initia- 
tive. They  are  not  equipped  as  are  the  rest  of  the 
infantry.  They  carry  their  blankets  in  the  individ- 
ual shelter-tent  across  the  body,  and  inside  this  roll 


28  PRESENT-DAY  WARFARE 

they  carry  their  rations.  They  do  not  carry  a  full 
pack  like  the  infantry,  because  that  would  make  it 
difficult  to  carry  a  machine-gun. 

A  great  problem  is  that  of  supplying  ammunition. 
Special  dumps  should  be  provided,  and  during  the 
offensive  the  gunners  must  know  to  which  dump 
they  have  to  go  to  bring  ammunition  to  their  guns. 
These  dumps  are  advanced  according  to  the  ad- 
vance of  troops.  Each  platoon  carries  a  certain 
number  of  boxes  of  ammunition.  When  on  the 
defensive,  depots  are  arranged  where  there  is  plenty 
of  ammunition. 

The  training  of  auto-rifle  men  is  different,  be- 
cause they  do  not  form  special  companies  like  the 
machine-gunners,  but  form  part  of  the  infantry 
company.  Their  training  takes  rather  a  long  time, 
because  the  management  and  care  of  an  auto  rifle 
is  more  difficult  than  that  of  an  ordinary  rifle;  be- 
sides which  they  require  the  same  training  as  do 
other  riflemen  to  become  good  marksmen.  Another 
difficult  thing  is  to  teach  them  how  to  fire  while 
advancing,  and  this  requires  long  and  continued 
practice.  One  difficulty  lies  in  the  fact  that  when 
any  stoppage  occurs  they  have  a  tendency  to  stop 
and  repair  it,  thus  checking  the  advance  of  the  whole 
wave.  They  must  learn  to  repair  their  rifles  while 
marching,  which  is  not  easy.  The  moral  effect 
of  several  teams  advancing  while  firing  is  very  great, 


MACHINE-GUNS  AND  AUTOMATICS    29 

for  they  are  able  to  pour  a  rain  of  bullets  over  the 
parapets  or  the  ridges  of  the  position  held  by  the 
enemy,  thus  preventing  him  from  observing  what 
is  going  on.  These  automatic  rifles  make  the  same 
noise  and  have  the  same  rattle  as  machine-guns, 
which  adds  to  their  great  moral  effect.  Auto-rifle 
fire  is  not  as  accurate  as  machine-gun  fire,  but  is 
just  as  accurate  if  not  more  so  as  the  fire  of  an  or- 
dinary rifle. 

The  British  and  the  Germans  use  light  machine- 
guns.  Those  of  the  British  are  called  Lewis  guns. 
These  Lewis  guns  are  not  to  be  confounded  with 
automatic  rifles.  As  machine-guns  they  cannot 
be  used  for  the  purpose  of  increasing  the  fire-power 
in  marching,  and  can  only  be  fired  from  a  mount. 
They  therefore  only  attain  their  full  efficiency  after 
the  wave  has  stopped  advancing. 

The  rifles  form  the  main  armament  of  infantry 
companies.  Nearly  every  infantryman  is  armed 
with  a  rifle,  even  though  he  may  be  a  specialist,  be- 
cause his  specialty  will  often  be  of  no  use  and  he 
will  have  to  do  his  bit  as  an  ordinary  rifleman.  For 
instance,  the  bomber  may  have  thrown  all  his 
grenades,  and  should  he  have  no  rifle  he  would  be 
defenseless  and  useless;  but  if  he  has  his  rifle  he 
will  continue  to  fight  with  it  and  with  his  bayonet. 

The  training  of  a  rifleman  consists  in  teaching  him 
first  how  to  use  a  rifle,  that  is  to  say,  to  become  a 


3o  PRESENT-DAY  WARFARE 

crack  shot  in  a  stand.  Then  he  will  be  taught  the 
tactical  use  of  his  weapon,  and,  finally,  the  whole 
platoon  will  be  trained  in  the  use  of  infantry  fire. 
Individual  training  should  teach  a  private  the  per- 
fect use  and  handling  of  his  rifle — how  to  keep  it 
in  perfect  condition  and  how  to  dismount  and  re- 
place the  different  parts  correctly.  He  must  be 
taught  how  to  load,  to  take  fire,  and  what  is  the 
correct  posture.  All  this  must  be  taught  with  blank 
or  dummy  cartridges  before  the  man  is  taken  on 
the  stand,  and  there  made  to  apply  the  principles 
he  has  learned. 

But  all  this  will  only  make  a  good  shot  from  a 
stand  and  will  not  develop  the  abilities  required 
on  the  field  under  conditions  differing  widely  from 
those  of  a  stand.  The  man  must  be  taught  to  handle 
his  rifle  under  conditions  as  similar  as  possible  to 
those  on  the  field;  he  must  be  able  to  fire,  no  matter 
under  what  conditions,  and  in  any  position;  the  tar- 
get may  be  a  very  fugitive  one  and  he  must  remain 
steady,  because,  unless  he  gets  the  enemy,  the  enemy 
will  get  him.  He  must  be  able  to  fire  after  having 
run  (which  will  nearly  always  be  the  case,  as 
skirmishers  make  a  rush  and  then  take  cover),  and 
he  must  be  able  to  fire  in  order  to  allow  other 
skirmishers  to  proceed.  This  forces  the  enemy  to 
take  cover  during  a  few  seconds  and  allows  them  to 
use  the  bayonet.  It  is  the  fire  which  permits  a  new 


MACHINE-GUNS  AND  AUTOMATICS    31 

rush  to  be  made,  and  unless  superiority  of  fire  is  ob- 
tained, it  is  impossible  to  advance,  as  the  losses 
would  soon  be  staggering. 

The  superiority  of  fire  referred  to  above  can 
be  an  artillery  superiority.  It  need  not  be  a  su- 
periority of  infantry  fire.  As  a  matter  of  fact, 
everything  referred  to  above  usually  applies  only 
in  open  warfare  as  it  was  fought  before  trenches 
were  dug  all  along  the  front.  Since  trench  warfare 
was  established,  in  all  the  assaults  my  regiment 
delivered  the  men  never  had  to  fire  during  the  as- 
sault, that  is  to  say,  during  the  time  they  stayed 
in  No  Man's  Land  or  in  the  Germans'  positions. 
They  only  had  to  fire  after  having  carried  the  enemy's 
positions,  when  the  Germans  counter-attacked  them, 
or,  if  they  had  to  fire  before  then,  the  advance  was 
checked  and  they  had  to  intrench  themselves  where 
they  were. 

Superiority  of  fire  is  much  more  easily  obtained 
by  the  artillery,  which  devastates  the  position  and 
opens  the  way  to  the  infantry,  which  submerges  it 
and,  after  having  mastered  all  local  resistance,  oc- 
cupies it.  The  assault  is  merely  an  occupation  of 
the  ground  where  local  resistance  is  to  be  over- 
come, but  rifles  will  only  come  into  play  when  the 
infantry  has  to  maintain  its  gains  against  enemy 
counter-attacks  intended  to  drive  the  enemy  back 
to  his  own  trenches.  The  French  use  the  Lebel 


32  PRESENT-DAY  WARFARE 

rifle,  which  is  one  of  the  oldest  in  use  among  the 
belligerents,  but  which  has  rendered  very  good  ser- 
vice. It  is  longer  than  the  German  rifle,  so  that 
with  the  bayonet  fixed,  we  have  a  marked  advantage 
in  bayonet  fighting. 

Pistols  are  used  by  all  the  officers  and  by  a  certain 
number  of  privates  (especially  bombers),  who  have 
them  in  addition  to  rifles.  In  hand-to-hand  combat 
in  trenches  they  are  very  handy  weapons  and  are 
of  great  use  to  "mopping-up"  parties.  Pistol  train- 
ing should  be  similar  to  that  of  the  rifleman;  first 
develop  a  stand  marksman  and  then  convert  him 
into  a  fighter  capable  of  using  his  weapon  in  every 
circumstance  of  the  fight.  Only  automatic  pistols 
are  now  in  use. 


CHAPTER  III 

HAND  AND  RIFLE  GRENADES,  THE  ONE-POUNDER 

GUN,  TRENCH  MORTARS,  BAYONETS,  AND 

TRENCH  KNIVES 

DURING  this  war,  hand  and  rifle  grenades 
have  been  a  most  valuable  part  of  the  in- 
fantry armament.  These  weapons  are  not,  as  it 
it  is  commonly  thought,  an  innovation  in  warfare. 
Grenades  were  first  used  during  the  reign  of  King 
Francis  I  of  France,  in  1510,  and  the  Russians  and 
the  Japanese  used  them  in  the  Russo-Japanese  War. 
When  the  war  broke  out  in  1914,  we  had  a  supply  of 
hand-grenades,  but  only  the  engineers  were  trained 
in  their  use,  for  we  believed  that  they  should  only 
be  used  in  besieging  a  stronghold.  But  is  not  the 
entire  front  a  stronghold  ?  After  the  battle  of  the 
Marne,  both  Germans  and  French  occupied  trenches 
separated  by  only  a  few  yards,  which  made  it  im- 
possible to  go  "over  the  top,"  because  each  was 
mowed  down  by  the  enemy's  fire.  Our  artillery 
was  not  powerful  enough  to  silence  the  Boches,  and 
as  we  were  not  able  to  kill  them  with  our  rifles,  we 
had  to  devise  some  new  means  of  fighting.  In  some 

33 


34  PRESENT-DAY  WARFARE 

sectors  the  troops  hurled  stones  at  each  other,  but 
very  soon  the  men  constructed  a  sort  of  grenade 
made  of  tin  ration-boxes,  which  they  loaded  with 
explosives,  nails,  and  glass,  using  Bickford  fuses  to 
fire  them.  These  were  the  first  grenades  our  men 
used  in  the  trenches,  and  they  were  used  to  a  great 
extent  in  my  regiment  in  front  of  the  Tranchee  de 
Calonne,  south  of  Verdun.  By  1915  we  were  fur- 
nished with  an  ample  supply  of  hand-grenades. 

The  defensive  hand-grenade  is  about  the  shape 
and  the  size  of  a  large  lemon  and  contains  a  burst- 
ing charge  of  explosives,  weighing  about  twenty- 
two  ounces.  For  offensive  use  the  grenades  had 
to  be  made  in  a  different  manner  from  those  which 
were  intended  for  defensive  purposes.  Being  on 
the  defensive,  it  was  necessary  to  have  a  grenade 
which,  when  bursting,  not  only  injured  the  enemy 
with  the  explosive  which  it  contained  but  also  with 
the  many  fragments  of  the  grenade.  These  frag- 
ments flew  in  every  direction,  and  it  was  necessary 
to  be  sheltered  in  order  to  throw  such  grenades  with- 
out danger  to  the  thrower,  as  the  radius  of  action 
is  greater  than  the  distance  to  which  the  grenade 
can  be  thrown. 

When  a  man  is  in  the  open  he  must  have  another 
type  of  grenade  so  as  to  injure  the  enemy  and  not 
himself.  Grenades  bursting  into  fragments  can- 
not be  used.  The  offensive  grenades  contain  a  much 


TRENCH  WEAPONS  35 

greater  quantity  of  explosive  than  the  defensive  ones, 
but  do  not  break  up  into  flying  fragments,  as  the 
case  is  made  of  tin.  Defensive  grenades  are  made 
of  cast  iron  and  are  corrugated  horizontally  and  ver- 
tically so  that  the  explosion  will  burst  the  case  into 
a  great  number  of  pieces — about  120  for  each  gre- 
nade. These  fragments  are  dangerous  to  a  distance 
of,  at  least,  100  to  200  yards,  and  on  one  occasion 
I  saw  an  officer  wounded  by  a  piece  of  a  grenade 
which  exploded  at  a  distance  of  over  200  yards; 
but  this  is  rather  an  exceptional  case.  The  frag- 
ments are  ragged  and  cause  very  painful  wounds, 
as  the  cast  iron  penetrates  and  tears,  and  the  explo- 
sive generally  burns  the  flesh.  In  each  grenade  there 
is  a  Bickford  fuse  communicating  with  a  fulminating 
capsule  which  sets  fire  to  the  explosive.  There  is 
always  a  safety  system  in  order  to  prevent  accidents; 
generally  a  pin  holds  a  lever  and  prevents  it  from 
lifting.  When  this  pin  is  taken  off  and  the  grenade 
is  hurled,  the  lever  lifts  automatically,  sets  fire  to 
the  fuse,  which  burns  during  five  seconds,  and  which 
then  sets  fire  to  the  bursting  charge.  These  weapons 
must  be  handled  very  carefully,  because  if  they 
should  be  treated  roughly  the  safety-pin  might  fall 
and  thus  cause  one  grenade  to  explode,  and  also 
all  the  neighboring  ones. 

The  manner  of  throwing  a  grenade  is  a  very  im- 
portant part  in  the  training  of  bombers.     Many 


36  PRESENT-DAY  WARFARE 

Americans  think  that  because  they  are  good  base- 
ball-players they  will  throw  grenades  well.  This 
is  only  partly  true,  because  if  they  throw  a  grenade 
as  they  throw  a  baseball,  they  will  not  accomplish 
the  results  which  are  desired.  The  grenade  is  to  be 
thrown  like  a  cricket-ball  for  the  following  reasons : 
(i)  By  hurling  a  grenade  in  this  way  we  have  a 
curved  trajectory,  and  thus  are  able  to  catch  an 
enemy  concealed  either  in  a  trench  or  in  a  shell- 
hole.  A  grenade  thrown  as  a  baseball  has  a  com- 
paratively straight  trajectory  and  will  not  reach 
the  enemy  concealed  in  a  hole  or  in  a  trench;  and, 
moreover,  every  obstacle  will  stop  the  grenade  in 
its  flight.  (2)  A  grenade  thrown  by  the  French 
method  stays  a  longer  time  in  the  air  than  when 
hurled  in  another  way.  It  must  be  borne  in  mind 
that  the  grenade  fuses  five  seconds  before  it  ex- 
plodes. If  it  drops  after  one  or  two  seconds  the 
enemy  has  three  seconds  to  catch  it  and  hurl  it  back 
at  the  thrower.  This  was  done  a  great  many  times 
in  the  beginning  of  the  trench  warfare.  (3)  The 
French  method  is  not  tiresome,  so  each  man  can 
throw  a  great  many  grenades,  and  as  grenade  fight- 
ing requires  the  throwing  of  hundreds  and  thou- 
sands of  grenades,  if  the  thrower  does  not  adopt  an 
easy,  strength-saving  motion,  he  will  very  soon 
get  a  "glass"  arm.  Besides,  the  man  throwing  the 
grenade  after  the  manner  of  a  baseball-player  takes 


TRENCH  WEAPONS  37 

many  chances  of  hurting  his  hand  severely  against 
the  parados  of  the  trench,  which  may  cause  him 
to  drop  the  grenade  in  the  trench  and  injure  his 
comrades  and  himself.  The  method  used  both  by 
French  and  British  is  the  following:  In  the  standing 
position  the  man  takes  aim  with  the  extended  left 
arm,  and,  holding  the  grenade  in  the  right  hand,  he 
brings  his  extended  right  arm  forward  until  the 
hands  are  together;  then  swings  the  right  arm  back 
and  down  whilst  looking  to  see  that  nothing  inter- 
feres. He  then  hurls  his  grenade  along  the  same 
plane  as  that  of  his  left  arm,  adding  great  power 
by  the  movement  of  his  body  in  the  throwing  posi- 
tion, the  right  hand  coming  up  directly  over  the 
head.  Before  throwing,  the  left  leg  is  straight  and 
the  right  knee  bent,  but  as  the  grenade  is  hurled, 
the  thrower  straightens  the  right  leg  and  bends 
the  left  leg  at  the  knee.  Thus  all  the  parts  of  the 
body  assist  in  the  throwing  of  the  grenade,  which 
is  not  exhausting.  We  have  had  bombers  who  were 
able  to  hurl  hundreds  of  grenades  without  becom- 
ing tired. 

The  first  important  point  in  the  training  of 
bombers  is  to  select  men  of  the  right  temperament. 
Bombers  ought  to  be  most  courageous  men  who 
are  able  to  throw  a  good  distance — at  least  thirty 
yards;  but  most  of  the  throwers  should  be  able 
to  reach  forty  and  forty-five  yards.  The  captain 


38  PRESENT-DAY  WARFARE 

selects  from  among  his  men  those  who  are  the  most 
daring,  who  practise  hurling  dummy  grenades. 
He  then  selects  those  who  hurl  them  from  the  longest 
range,  and  these  receive  training  as  bombers.  They 
must  be  able  to  throw  at  a  long  range  and  to  throw 
accurately.  These  two  parts  of  the  training  ought 
to  be  taught  at  the  same  time.  The  bombers  are 
taken  out  in  the  open,  targets  are  made  by  marking 
out  lines  of  white  tape,  the  nearest  being  at  a  distance 
of  fifteen  yards,  and  others  five  yards  apart.  The 
bombers  throw  their  bombs  first  at  the  fifteen-yard 
line  and  then  gradually  increase  their  range.  To 
make  them  throw  accurately,  the  first  white  lines  will 
be  called  trenches,  then  listening-posts.  To  strike 
the  latter  is  more  difficult,  because  listening-posts 
are  not  as  broad  as  an  ordinary  trench  and  they 
are  also  short.  Lastly,  the  throwers  practise  hurl- 
ing grenades  into  a  shell-hole.  This  is  still  more 
difficult  on  account  of  the  peculiar  form  of  these 
craters.  The  bomb  must  not  strike  on  one  of  the 
edges  of  the  crater,  but  must  fall  directly  inside. 
The  training  should  not  be  conducted  the  whole 
time  with  dummy  grenades,  because  the  men  will 
get  accustomed  to  dummy  grenades,  and  when  they 
come  to  throwing  live  ones,  will  handle  them  awk- 
wardly, being  unaccustomed  to  them  and  to  the 
noise  they  make. 
After  this  first  instruction  the  grenadier  is  able 


TRENCH  WEAPONS  39 

to  throw  hand-grenades  accurately  at  a  sufficient 
distance,  but  he  is  not  yet  prepared  for  fighting 
purposes.  He  must  now  be  trained  from  the  tactical 
point  of  view,  and  must  be  taught  how  to  fight  in 
trenches  and  in  shell-holes.  When  in  trenches  he 
must  know  how  to  throw  grenades  while  protected 
by  a  traverse,  and  how  to  proceed  to  the  next 
traverse.  In  shell-hole  warfare  he  must  know  how, 
and  be  able,  to  throw  his  grenade  accurately  into 
the  shell-hole  into  which  he  intends  to  leap.  The 
bomber  must  also  be  taught  how  to  adjust  his  equip- 
ment when  carrying  grenades.  This  is  very  im- 
portant, because  if  not  equipped  properly  the  hand- 
grenades  might  explode  or,  at  any  rate,  might  be  a 
great  hinderance  to  him  while  crawling  in  No  Man's 
Land.  After  having  been  taught  how  to  equip  him- 
self, he  will  be  taught  how  to  crawl  in  No  Man's 
Land,  i.  e.,  to  creep  over  the  ground  by  the  use  of 
elbows  and  knees;  how  to  pass  barbed-wire  en- 
tanglements, and  how  to  throw  grenades  while 
kneeling  and  while  prone. 

It  would  seem  that  bombers,  being  individually 
well  trained,  would  do  good  team-work,  but  this  is 
not  the  case.  I  remember  in  February,  1915,  as- 
sembling ten  bombers  who,  individually,  were  able  to 
throw  grenades  at  a  distance  of  from  forty  to  forty- 
five  yards;  but  when  hurling  them  together  as  a 
body  they  only  threw  at  an  average  distance  of  from 


40  PRESENT-DAY  WARFARE 

twenty-eight  to  thirty  yards.  This  may  be  explained 
by  the  fact  that  each  bomber  was  afraid  that  his 
comrades  would  not  throw  the  bombs  properly, 
and  paid  more  attention  to  his  neighbors  than  to 
the  throwing  of  his  own  grenade.  Thus  it  is  neces- 
sary to  proceed  with  the  training  of  the  whole  team 
in  the  same  manner  as  with  that  of  the  individual 
soldier. 

Each  bombing  squad  is  composed  of  a  corporal 
in  command,  two  throwers,  two  carriers,  two  rifle- 
men, or  scouts,  and  one  reserve.  Each  of  these  men 
has  a  particular  duty  to  perform.  The  corporal 
commands  the  whole  team  and  directs  the  fire  of 
his  throwers.  These,  as  the  name  indicates,  throw 
the  grenades  and  have  next  to  them  a  carrier,  who 
constantly  provides  them  with  fresh  grenades.  The 
thrower  would  be  defenseless  if  he  were  to  meet  a 
German  at  close  range,  because  the  adversary  could 
fire  at  him  before  he  could  throw  his  grenade  and 
before  the  grenade  would  explode,  for  it  must  al- 
ways be  remembered  that  it  requires  five  seconds 
for  the  grenade  to  explode  after  being  thrown.  So 
the  thrower  is  protected  by  an  ordinary  rifleman 
acting  as  a  scout.  These  men  must  be  well  trained 
in  the  use  of  the  bayonet.  The  scout  is  always  ahead 
of  the  thrower,  prevents  the  Germans  from  coming 
to  close  range,  and  reports  the  results  of  the  fire 
of  grenades. 


TRENCH  WEAPONS  41 

The  squad  being  formed,  each  man  is  taught  to 
handle  and  throw  grenades,  because  each  of  them 
must  be  able  to  take  the  place  of  any  one  of  the 
team.  The  training  is  the  same  as  that  of  the  ac- 
tual thrower,  both  as  to  long  range  and  accuracy. 
Then  the  whole  squad  is  trained  in  team-work  in 
the  trenches  and  in  shell-hole  warfare,  either  on 
the  defensive  or  on  the  offensive.  In  trenches  on 
the  offensive,  the  team  has  to  precede  into  com- 
munication-trenches and  drive  away  all  Germans 
who  may  be  occupying  these  trenches.  The  scout 
is  ahead,  at  least  one  traverse  in  front  of  the  thrower. 
Behind  the  thrower  comes  the  carrier  and  the  cor- 
poral. Another  traverse  behind,  a  second  group 
is  formed  of  the  other  thrower,  his  carrier,  scout,  and 
the  reserve  man.  These  two  groups  are  separated, 
so  that  a  grenade  exploding  near  the  first  group 
will  not  injure  the  second  one.  The  thrower  hurls 
his  grenades  over  the  head  of  his  scout,  who  reports 
whether  the  range  is  correct,  and  who  then  proceeds 
to  the  next  bay  of  the  trench  to  ascertain  whether 
any  Germans  are  there.  The  thrower,  carrier,  and 
the  corporal  reach  the  traverse  which  their  scout 
has  just  left,  the  second  group  also  makes  another 
advance,  and  thus  the  whole  team  proceeds  from 
one  bay  to  another.  They  must  be  very  careful, 
in  order  to  avoid  traps  laid  by  the  Germans.  If 
a  greater  fire-power  is  requiredj  the  corporal  orders 


42  PRESENT-DAY  WARFARE 

the  two  throwers  to  accompany  each  other.  If 
another  trench  is  encountered  leading  off  from  the 
trench  in  which  the  team  works,  one  of  the  throwers, 
his  carrier,  and  the  scout  should  proceed  up  this 
other  trench  in  order  to  prevent  any  German  coun- 
ter-attack on  the  flank  of  the  team. 

Bombers  are  always  used  for  cleaning  up  the 
trenches  during  an  attack.  They  take  possession 
of  the  entries  to  the  dugouts,  and  thus  compel  the 
German  garrison  to  surrender.  If  the  enemy  offers 
resistance,  then  bombs  are  hurled  inside  the  dug- 
outs, incendiary  grenades  and  asphyxiating  grenades 
generally  being  used  for  this  purpose,  thus  com- 
pelling the  Boches  to  surrender.  The  cleaners-up  are 
not  allowed  to  leave  the  entrance  of  a  dugout  in  a 
trench  to  which  they  are  assigned  without  first 
ascertaining  that  no  German  is  still  alive  in  this 
dugout.  These  cleaners-up  must  be  men  who  are 
strong  and  cold-blooded.  Sometimes  they  have  a 
very  hard  and  arduous  task.  In  the  last  offensive 
which  my  regiment  made  on  the  Chemin  des  Dames, 
a  dugout  which  contained  four  hundred  Germans 
was  taken  only  after  a  siege  of  two  days. 

In  the  defensive,  the  bombers  must  be  able  to 
throw  a  great  quantity  of  grenades  in  a  very  short 
time,  forming  a  defensive  barrage  in  front  of  the  as- 
saulting troops,  and  I  can  assure  you  that  the  fire 
effect  produced  by  this  kind  of  barrage  is  very  great. 


TRENCH  WEAPONS  43 

If  the  bombers  have  time  and  an  ample  supply  of 
grenades,  it  is  quite  impossible  to  cross  such  a  bar- 
rage. 

The  bombers  are  also  taught  to  make  barricades. 
These  are  a  sort  of  wall  built  out  of  sand-bags  in 
which  loopholes  are  placed.  They  are  erected  when- 
ever the  team  stops  in  the  trench  which  thus  be- 
longs both  to  Germans  and  French,  and  are  placed 
at  the  bend  of  a  trench  in  order  to  get  the  greatest 
possible  range.  The  barricades  form  a  sort  of  lis- 
tening-post, a  second  wall  of  sand-bags  being  placed 
behind  the  first  one  at  a  distance  of  about  four  or 
five  yards.  This  is  done  in  order  to  prevent  a  grenade 
which  explodes  behind  the  first  barricade  from  hurt- 
ing the  occupants  of  the  listening-post.  It  is  a  dif- 
ficult task  for  the  German  bomber  to  throw  a 
grenade  into  such  a  listening-post,  composed  of 
two  walls  of  sand-bags,  as  he  cannot  approach  to 
short  range  without  being  shot  down  by  the  riflemen 
who  are  firing  through  the  loopholes.  He  is  obliged 
to  throw  his  grenade  from  behind  a  bend  of  the 
trench  or  from  behind  a  traverse.  Then  the  throwers 
who  are  in  the  listening-post  will  also  hurl  grenades, 
and  if  the  enemy  does  not  succeed  in  getting  his 
grenade  between  the  two  sand-bag  walls,  no  frag- 
ment will  hurt  the  French  bomber. 

In  shell-hole  warfare  the  bombers  proceed  in 
single  file,  each  man  leaping  from  one  shell-hole 


44  PRESENT-DAY  WARFARE 

to  another,  the  scout  always  in  front  of  the  thrower 
and  his  carrier.  The  thrower  hurls  his  grenade  over 
the  head  of  the  scout  into  a  shell-hole,  then  the  scout 
leaps  into  the  shell-hole  where  this  grenade  has 
just  exploded,  and  with  his  bayonet  takes  care  of 
any  uninjured  enemy  who  may  have  escaped  the 
effects  of  the  bomb.  Both  carrier  and  thrower  then 
proceed  to  the  shell-hole  which  the  scout  has 
just  left.  This  same  method  is  repeated  at  each 
shell-hole,  and  in  a  very  short  time  great  areas  of 
shell-holes  are  cleaned  up.  When  my  battalion  was 
in  the  Verdun  battle  (June,  1916),  the  regiment 
on  our  left  was  hurled  back  with  severe  losses, 
leaving  a  gap  of  about  2,000  yards  between  the 
two  regiments.  The  Germans  succeeded  in  get- 
ting into  this  gap,  which  placed  us  in  a  very  crit- 
ical position,  because  the  enemy  could  turn  the 
Hank  of  our  regiment  and  compel  us  to  retreat.  In 
fact,  a  party  of  Germans  succeeded  in  getting  close 
to  the  colonel's  commanding  post  on  the  night  of  the 
22d  of  June.  But  next  day  parties  of  our  bombers 
proceeded  from  shell-hole  to  shell-hole,  and  suc- 
ceeded in  driving  out  the  Germans.  The  advice 
to  bombers  should  be:  "Throw  your  grenades  at 
a  greater  range  than  the  enemy,  and  throw  more 
than  he  does." 

Bombers   are   also  used   in   big  offensives  when 
all  the  troops  go  over  the  top  in  the  so-called  "wave" 


TRENCH  WEAPONS  45 

formation.  They  are  placed  in  one  line  and  pro- 
ceed with  their  comrades,  being  always  in  the  first 
line  of  their  platoon.  Their  duty  is  to  hurl  grenades 
into  the  shell-holes  which  could  be  transformed 
into  sectors  of  resistance.  They  work  in  close  co- 
operation with  other  specialists,  chiefly  the  auto- 
matic riflemen.  Automatic  rifles  and  grenades  are 
the  complement  of  each  other.  This  sort  of  fight- 
ing necessitates  the  consumption  of  a  great  amount 
of  grenades,  and  in  some  special  cases  thousands 
of  grenades  have  been  hurled  at  such  a  time.  A 
very  striking  example  of  this  was  given  in  May, 
1917,  by  a  bombing  team  on  the  Mont  Cornillet. 
A  regiment  had  been  ordered  to  storm  this  position, 
which  was  a  very  valuable  observation-point,  but 
the  Germans  sent  a  party  of  fifty  bombers,  who  suc- 
ceeded in  driving  back  the  French  regiment  from 
the  crest.  The  colonel  commanding  the  regiment 
asked  for  reinforcements,  and  ten  selected  bombers 
of  the  Bombers  Army  School  were  sent  to  him. 
These  succeeded  in  killing  some  of  the  German 
bombers  in  the  first  volley.  As  they  outranged 
them,  after  a  hot  fight  of  nearly  two  hours,  the  Ger- 
mans were  compelled  to  fall  back  and  seek  shelter 
in  their  dugouts,  where  they  were  presently  cap- 
tured. In  this  fight  the  French  bombers  used  about 
10,000  grenades. 
What  results  can  be  obtained  by  hand-grenade 


46  PRESENT-DAY  WARFARE 

fighting  ?  Can  it  be  used  in  open  warfare  ?  With 
bombers  only,  we  cannot  hope  to  start  great  opera- 
tions. They  prove  very  useful  in  making  raids, 
in  hurling  volleys  of  grenades,  in  surprise  attacks, 
in  cleaning  up  trenches,  and  returning  to  their  own 
trenches  with  prisoners;  but  it  would  be  a  mistake 
to  think  that  by  bombers  alone  we  could  secure 
success.  Bombers  form  a  part  of  the  platoon  and 
are  only  useful  if  they  are  employed  in  connection 
with  the  other  specialists,  and  more  especially  with 
the  automatic-rifle  men.  Sometimes,  in  big  offen- 
sives, special  detachments,  composed  of  bombers 
and  automatic-rifle  men,  were  formed  in  front  of 
assaulting  waves  in  order  to  ascertain  whether  the 
artillery  had  done  its  work  and  whether  the  enemy's 
infantry  was  unable  to  offer  resistance.  The  auto- 
matic-rifle men  had  a  strong  fire-power,  and  the 
bombers,  with  their  grenades,  could  dislodge  the 
enemy  concealed  in  the  trenches.  If,  on  the  other 
hand,  the  enemy  showed  fight,  these  detachments 
were  able  to  cling  to  the  ground,  and  the  artillery 
preparation  would  be  resumed.  Bombers  alone 
may  also  be  employed  in  some  special  cases  of 
open  warfare,  especially  in  fighting  in  villages  or 
towns.  An  enemy  concealed  in  houses  or  in  caves 
can  with  a  very  small  garrison  stop  and  cause  heavy 
casualties  to  the  assailant.  Our  regulations  say 
that  such  strongholds  are  to  be  attacked  on  both 


TRENCH  WEAPONS  47 

flanks;  nevertheless,  it  will  be  necessary  to  occupy 
them,  to  actually  take  them,  and  it  would  seem  that 
bombers  could  do  good  work,  the  throwers  being  pro- 
tected by  the  scouts,  who  would  fire  on  any  enemy 
who  appeared  while  the  grenades  were  being  hurled 
into  the  caves  and  houses.  Bombers  could  also  be 
used  in  special  cases  of  open  warfare,  namely,  in 
fighting  in  open  woods. 

The  rifle-grenade  is  inserted  into  a  discharger, 
shaped  like  a  truncated  cone  (called,  in  French, 
"Tromblon"),  which  is  fixed  upon  the  muzzle  of 
the  rifle.  The  rifle  is  then  fired,  the  bullet  passing 
through  a  hole  in  the  centre  of  the  grenade,  which 
is  pushed  forward  by  the  force  of  the  gas  from  the 
cartridge.  As  the  bullet  passes  through  the  grenade 
it  strikes  the  primer,  which  ignites  the  fuse.  This 
is  called  the  "VB"  grenade,  from  the  initials  of  the 
man  who  invented  it  (Vivien  Bessieres).  Its  range 
is  from  two  hundred  to  five  hundred  yards.  It  is 
very  convenient,  because  the  rifle-bombers  use  the 
same  rifles  and  rifle  ammunition  as  ordinary  rifle- 
men. If  they  have  no  rifle-grenades,  then  they 
fight  as  riflemen.  They  are  generally  placed  in  the 
second  line,  the  grenades,  when  required,  being 
fired  over  the  heads  of  the  men  of  the  first  line. 
Rifle-grenades  are  also  employed  in  grenade  fight- 
ing, and  are  fired  also  over  the  heads  of  the  hand- 
bombers.  The  great  difficulty  lies  in  keeping  the 


48  PRESENT-DAY  WARFARE 

rifle-grenadiers  supplied  with  ammunition,  for  the 
grenades  are  rather  heavy,  weighing  over  a  pound. 
But  they  are  very  useful  on  the  defensive,  in  making 
a  barrage  at  a  greater  distance  than  the  hand- 
grenade  barrage,  and  they  are  also  used  for  the  pur- 
pose of  harassing  the  enemy  by  keeping  his  trenches 
and  communication-trenches  under  fire. 

The  37-millimetre  gun  is  called  the  "accompany- 
ing gun,"  that  is  to  say,  it  always  follows  the  in- 
fantry and  forms  a  part  of  the  armament  of  modern 
infantry.  Firing  a  projectile  weighing  about  a 
pound,  it  is  also  called  the  one-pounder  gun.  Each 
battalion  in  the  French  army  has  one  of  these  little 
guns,  which  is  ordinarily  mounted  on  wheels  and 
pulled  by  a  mule,  but  when  in  action  it  is  dragged 
by  the  gun  crew.  When  it  is  placed  in  battery  the 
wheels  are  taken  off.  It  can  be  dismounted  and 
transported  in  the  same  manner  as  a  machine-gun, 
and  is  used  for  the  purpose  of  destroying  machine- 
guns,  in  which  purpose  it  is  most  successful.  It  has 
a  range  of  over  twenty-five  hundred  yards,  but  is 
generally  used  at  a  distance  of  about  nine  hundred 
yards,  which  is  the  best  range  for  it.  It  is  extremely 
accurate  and  quick-firing,  firing  about  twenty  rounds 
per  minute.  In  my  battalion  we  made  good  use  of 
it  on  the  Chemin  des  Dames,  where  we  succeeded 
in  displacing  several  German  machine-guns  which 
were  pouring  a  deadly  fire  on  us  from  a  place  called 


TRENCH  WEAPONS  49 

Froidemont  Farm.  The  great  difficulty  in  using 
this  gun  is  the  fact  that  if  the  enemy  locates  it,  their 
machine-guns  will  be  able  to  shoot  down  the  crew 
before  it  can  fire  a  single  shot.  Consequently,  it  is 
necessary  either  to  be  able  to  open  fire  before  the 
enemy's  machine-gunners  or  to  select  a  position 
concealed  from  the  enemy's  view.  The  latter  is 
generally  done,  as  in  offensives  we  are  unable  to 
locate  the  machine-gun  nests  before  they  fire  upon 
our  assaulting  troops. 

The  light  trench  mortar,  which  has  an  effective 
range  of  from  three  to  five  hundred  yards,  is  an  in- 
fantry weapon,  served  by  infantrymen.  There  are 
a  number  of  different  models,  some  of  which  are 
pneumatic  guns.  The  projectile  is  a  bomb  which 
explodes  on  impact,  and  because  of  the  low  veloc- 
ity, the  trajectory  is  very  curved.  Like  hand  and 
rifle  grenades  the  work  of  this  mortar  is  to  reach 
the  enemy  concealed  in  trenches,  and  it  is  very  use- 
ful in  harassing  the  foe  and  in  forming  barrages. 
The  calibre  is  about  three  inches,  and  while  it  is 
a  most  effective  weapon  against  personnel,  it  is 
not  powerful  enough  to  destroy  works.  These  light 
mortars  are  placed  in  the  front-line  trenches;  they 
are  very  accurate  and  can  be  fired  very  rapidly. 
At  times  seven  projectiles  from  the  same  gun  can 
be  seen  in  the  air  at  once.  Owing  to  the  ease  with 
which  they  are  transported,  these  weapons  may 


So  PRESENT-DAY  WARFARE 

accompany  troops  on  the  offensive,  being  dis- 
mounted and  the  parts  carried  by  the  men  of  the 
mortar  detachment. 

Each  man  now  carries  an  intrenching-tool.  They 
form  a  part  of  the  regular  equipment,  and  a  most 
important  one,  indeed.  The  infantry  may  fight 
at  times,  but  it  always  digs  !  It  has  been  said  that 
Napoleon  won  many  victories  "with  the  feet  of 
his  soldiers."  It  can  be  said  that  the  French  gen- 
erals have  won  many  victories  with  the  shovels  and 
picks  of  their  men !  These  intrenching-tools  are 
used  for  the  purpose  of  making  rifle-pits,  and  also 
for  working  in  the  trenches.  If  quick  work  is  re- 
quired, then  these  tools  are  not  sufficient,  and  larger 
tools  are  necessary.  These  latter  are  transported 
in  the  regimental  trains  and  are  also  carried  by  the 
engineers.  We  have  a  great  supply  of  them  in  the 
local  dumps.  They  consist  mainly  of  picks  and 
shovels,  but  include  also  some  destruction-tools,  such 
as  axes  and  saws. 

The  infantryman  is  provided  with  a  bayonet, 
but  people  are  wrong  in  thinking  that  enemies  often 
engage  with  the  bayonet  during  a  fight.  Many 
persons  imagine  that  units,  such  as  platoons  headed 
by  gallant  leaders,  encounter  each  other  and  begin 
a  bloody  hand-to-hand  fight.  This  never  occurs. 
Sometimes,  and  this  is  rather  seldom,  individuals 
fight  with  bayonets,  but,  as  a  rule,  if  the  assaulting 


TRENCH  WEAPONS  51 

troops  who  advance  with  fixed  bayonets  succeed 
in  reaching  the  enemy's  trench,  the  enemy  does  not 
fight  with  the  bayonet.  In  open  warfare,  also,  bayo- 
net combats  are  rare,  though  after  the  battle  of  the 
Marne  many  men  were  killed  in  bayonet  fighting. 
I  have  never  seen  a  bayonet  fight  myself,  though 
I  was  on  the  front  for  a  little  more  than  two  years 
and  a  half,  and  took  part  in  all  the  big  French  of- 
fensives. The  only  fight  which  could  be  considered 
in  this  way  happened  in  August,  1914.  At  eight 
o'clock  at  night  (on  the  24th)  my  battalion  was 
ordered  to  storm  a  farm  occupied  by  the  Germans. 
I  commanded  the  vanguard.  It  was  pitch-dark, 
and  when  we  got  near  to  this  farm  the  Germans 
poured  a  shower  of  bullets  at  us,  though  with  slight 
effect.  On  we  rushed  and  entered  the  farm — no 
Germans  to  be  found !  They  had  left  as  soon  as 
they  saw  that  we  were  not  to  be  stopped.  Grenade 
fighting  has  now  taken  the  place  of  the  former  bay- 
onet fighting.  However,  it  would  be  a  gross  mis- 
take not  to  train  the  men  in  the  latter,  for  they  may 
some  time  have  a  chance  to  use  their  bayonet. 
It  is  also  very  valuable  to  them  to  have  an  idea  of 
the  bayonet  fighting,  in  order  that  they  may  not 
fear  the  fierce  hand-to-hand  fighting  so  much. 

The  nations  using  the  different  arms  have  dif- 
ferent-shaped bayonets,  the  British  and  American 
ones  being  heavy  and  short.  The  Germans  have 


52  PRESENT-DAY  WARFARE 

a  bayonet  of  about  the  same  size  as  the  English, 
but  one  edge  of  the  blade  is  a  saw,  which,  however, 
is  not  used  in  hand-to-hand  fighting,  as  some  people 
think,  but  for  the  purpose  of  cutting  trees.  The 
French  bayonet  is  much  longer  than  that  of  the 
other  armies,  and  it  has  a  triangular  point.  It  is 
more  like  a  long  heavy  needle  than  an  ordinary 
bayonet.  It  inflicts  vicious  wounds,  because  the 
wound  closes  upon  itself,  and  the  enemy  bleeds  to 
death  internally.  The  French  rifle  is  also  much 
longer  than  the  German,  and  that  is  one  reason 
why  the  enemy  never  wants  to  fight  with  the  bay- 
onet against  the  French,  for  he  would  be  at  a  dis- 
advantage most  of  the  time.  When  a  Frenchman 
nears  a  German  the  latter  fires  from  a  short  dis- 
tance. This  is  why  in  the  training  in  bayonet  fight- 
ing it  is  necessary  to  teach  the  men  to  fire  before 
hitting  the  enemy. 

The  bayonet  drill  is  a  very  simple  one.  The  men 
are  taught  to  be  nimble  and  agile,  to  parry  and  to 
make  thrusts  at  their  opponents.  This  training 
is  done  in  special  places  prepared  for  this  purpose. 
The  men  have  in  front  of  them  dummy  Germans, 
and  are  taught  how  to  hit  the  enemy  and  also  how 
to  pull  the  bayonet  out  after  having  driven  it 
into  him.  (This  last  is  a  very  important  point, 
because  sometimes  it  is  difficult  to  extract  the  bay- 
onet, especially  when  it  comes  in  contact  with  the 


TRENCH  WEAPONS  53 

bones.  Often  the  best  way  to  get  it  out  is  to  fire 
the  rifle.)  A  cross-country  course  is  laid  out  and 
the  soldiers  have  to  jump  over  fences,  through 
barbed-wire  entanglements,  run  through  trenches, 
cross  little  woods,  and  on  the  way  they  always  find 
dummies  which  they  are  to  bayonet.  This  is  done 
in  order  to  train  the  minds  of  the  men  to  work  quickly 
and  to  teach  the  soldiers  to  use  their  arms  under 
any  conditions. 

Trench  knives  have  been  used  only  since  trench 
warfare  began,  and  are  given  more  especially  to 
the  "moppers-up"  for  cleaning  up  the  trenches. 
This  became  necessary  because  the  bayonet  fixed 
upon  the  rifle  proved  awkward  in  narrow  dugouts. 
It  is  also  the  complement  of  the  grenade.  The 
grenade  is  employed  for  the  more  distant  work,  and 
then  the  knife  is  used  in  the  close  fighting.  These 
trench  knives  are  of  different  forms  but  are  usually 
made  like  daggers. 


CHAPTER  IV 
THE  ARTILLERY 

THE  role  of  artillery  has  assumed  greater  im- 
portance than  ever,  as  a  consequence  of  trench 
and  shell-hole  warfare.  The  work  of  the  artillery 
in  the  early  period  of  the  war  was  to  prepare  for 
the  assault  of  infantry  and,  by  so  doing,  to  render 
the  advance  march  possible.  Under  cover  of  very 
powerful  bursts  of  artillery-fire,  infantry  was  able 
to  advance  and  reach  a  point  some  five  or  six  hun- 
dred yards  from  the  enemy.  Then  all  the  artillery 
would  concentrate  its  fire  against  the  enemy's  posi- 
tion, and  the  infantry  would  have  to  storm  it.  In 
the  warfare  of  to-day  the  role  of  the  artillery  is  quite 
a  different  one.  Artillery  must  be  able  to  help  in- 
fantry before,  during,  and  after  the  assault.  This 
can  only  be  accomplished  by  possessing  excellent 
observation-posts,  knowing  exactly  the  positions 
which  the  enemy  and  our  own  troops  occupy,  and 
having  the  correct  range.  In  one  word,  it  is  neces- 
sary that  both  opponents  be  face  to  face  for  a  cer- 
tain time.  The  expenditure  of  shells  has  increased 
enormously  on  account  of  the  greater  part  which 

54 


THE  ARTILLERY  55 

artillery  plays  in  the  battle.  In  fact,  artillery 
devastates  the  position  and  opens  the  way  to  the 
infantry  which  occupies  and  holds  it.  The  artillery 
renders  the  conquest  of  the  position  by  the  infantry 
possible  and  they  keep  it,  even  if  the  enemy 
counter-attacks  in  an  effort  to  regain  the  lost 
ground. 

In  artillery  we  must  distinguish  between  the  func- 
tions of  the  guns  and  those  of  the  howitzers.  The 
former  have  a  very  flat  trajectory;  the  howitzers 
have  a  curved  one,  being  able  to  reach  an  enemy 
concealed  behind  cover.  Howitzers  are  used  in 
open  warfare  when  the  enemy  is  in  the  rear  of  a 
crest,  but  in  trench  warfare  their  fire  has  numerous 
applications.  We  divide  artillery  into  (i)  field-ar- 
tillery; (2)  heavy  artillery;  (3)  heavy  artillery  of 
great  power;  (4)  railroad  artillery,  and  (5)  trench 
artillery.  All  of  these  have  different  uses  and  all 
are  required  in  a  battle  to-day.  The  different  guns 
and  howitzers  have  a  special  brake  which  enables 
the  gun  to  return  to  its  former  position  after  the 
shot  is  fired.  If  such  brakes  did  not  exist,  the  re- 
coil would  carry  the  gun  backward,  and  after  each 
shot  the  gunners  would  be  obliged  to  put  their  guns 
in  the  position  which  they  had  before  the  shot  was 
fired,  which  would,  of  course,  result  in  the  rate  of 
fire  being  much  slower.  The  guns  send  shells.  These 
shells  are  generally  put  in  a  sort  of  cartridge  con- 


56  PRESENT-DAY  WARFARE 

taining  a  certain  amount  of  powder.  When  the 
gun  fires,  the  gas  produced  by  the  deflagration  of 
the  powder  hurls  the  shell  forward.  The  shell  itself 
is  a  case  of  steel  containing  either  high  explosives 
and  a  fuse  or  high  explosives  and  small  round  bullets 
with  a  fuse  also.  The  fuse  can  be  timed  in  such  a 
manner  that  the  moment  the  shell  hits  the  ground 
it  explodes.  Or  the  fuse  can  also  be  so  constructed 
that  the  shell  explodes  after  a  certain  length  of 
time — that  is  to  say,  either  during  its  flight  in  the 
air  or  within  a  certain  time  after  it  has  hit  the 
ground;  for  instance,  one  or  two  seconds  after- 
ward. The  shells  which  contain  bullets  are  called 
"shrapnel,"  from  the  name  of  the  man  who  invented 
them.  They  must  explode  over  the  head  of  the 
enemy  (not  too  high),  so  that  all  the  bullets  and 
the  different  parts  of  the  steel  casing  will  produce 
their  effect.  On  the  other  hand,  those  shells  which 
only  explode  within  a  certain  length  of  time  after 
they  have  reached  the  ground  are  called  "shells 
with  retarded  fuses."  They  prove  very  useful  for 
the  demolition  of  dugouts,  because  they  penetrate 
some  distance  into  the  ground,  and  explode  either 
inside  of  the  dugout  or  in  its  vicinity.  If  the  dug- 
out is  not  entirely  destroyed,  the  force  of  the  ex- 
plosion will  shake  it  so  much,  will  cause  such  a 
displacement  of  air,  that  the  whole  dugout  will  col- 
lapse. 


THE  ARTILLERY  57 

Artillery  has  been  obliged  to  make  different  fires, 
which  have  received  quite  different  names.  These 
names,  usually,  are  descriptive  of  the  effect  of  the 
fire.  For  instance,  the  words  "curtain  fire,"  or  "bar- 
rage" (which  is  a  French  term),  indicate  that  the 
fire  forms  a  sort  of  screen,  a  kind  of  curtain  pro- 
duced by  exploding  shells,  which  is  placed  between 
the  opponents.  Very  often,  in  the  official  communi- 
cations, it  is  stated  that  the  curtain  fire  or  the  artil- 
lery-fire turned  into  a  drum  fire.  The  Germans  first 
used  that  expression,  speaking  of  "Trommelfeuer," 
that  is  to  say,  that  the  shelling  was  so  intense  that 
it  could  be  compared  to  the  rattling  of  the  drum. 
Lately  they  have  named  it  "hurricane"  or  "ty- 
phoon" fire,  thus  describing  the  greater  violence 
which  is  attained  by  this  fire.  Another  expression  is 
"raking  fire,"  meaning  that  the  shells  so  rake  a 
space  of  ground  that  every  inch  of  it  is  covered 
several  times  by  shells  or  splinters,  rendering  it  use- 
less to  the  enemy  as  a  means  of  resistance.  We 
have  also  "encaging"  or  "box"  fire.  This  fire,  as 
the  name  implies,  is  one  which  places  the  enemy  in 
a  cage  or  a  box  of  fire,  and  prevents  him  from  run- 
ning away  either  on  the  right  or  on  the  left  flank. 
There  is  also  the  "bothering  fire,"  the  "harassing 
fire,"  the  "sprinkling  fire,"  with  its  object  to  sprin- 
kle the  enemy  with  shells,  the  "combing  fire,"  and 
the  "retailing  fire."  One  of  the  most  important 


58  PRESENT-DAY  WARFARE 

fires  is  the  "destroying  fire,"  which  has  as  its  ob- 
ject the  melting  away,  in  a  very  short  time,  of  all 
the  enemy's  organization. 

The  artillery  is  the  principal  aid  of  infantry.  It 
cannot  do  its  work  without  the  infantry,  but  the 
infantry  can  lead  the  fight  without  the  assistance 
of  the  artillery.  The  artillery,  to  be  able  to  fulfil 
its  mission,  must  be  in  close  connection  with  the 
infantry  and  must  be  able  to  see  and  study  the  ef- 
fect of  its  fire.  This  connection  between  infantry 
and  artillery  is  assured  by  the  ordinary  means  of 
liaison  and  by  frequent  meetings  between  the  ar- 
tillery and  infantry  officers.  The  infantry  signals 
to  the  artillery  by  rockets  and  also  by  the  inter- 
mediation of  planes.  The  artillery  is  now  placed  in 
such  a  way  that  the  ground  of  the  field  of  battle  can 
be  divided  into  a  certain  number  of  zones,  to  each 
one  of  which  is  allotted  an  equal  number  of  guns, 
so  that  everywhere  the  fire-power  could  be  equal. 
This  could  not  be  done  with  a  system  of  infantry 
defense,  to  be  distributed  around  a  certain  number 
of  points  or  strongholds.  We  are  obliged  to  fight 
and  beat  the  enemy  down,  in  order  to  conduct  great 
concentration  of  fire  on  chosen  areas.  By  this 
method  large  gaps  are  formed  in  the  enemy's  line, 
gaps  through  which  the  infantry  rushes  on  and 
carries  away  all  the  rest  of  the  enemy's  positions, 
just  as  in  a  dam  with  a  certain  number  of  holes; 


THE  ARTILLERY  59 

the  water  rushes  through  these  holes,  and  very 
soon  the  dam  is  carried  away. 

We  shall,  in  this  chapter,  review  the  different 
kinds  of  artillery  and  see  how  each  works,  thus 
getting  a  general  idea  of  how  great  masses  of  ar- 
tillery are  used  in  each  moment  of  the  battle. 

First,  the  field-artillery,  which  is  a  very  large 
branch.  The  fire  of  this  field-artillery  has  a  very 
strong  effect  against  men,  but  being  of  rather  small 
calibre,  its  effect  is  not  very  great  against  material. 
Our  75-millimetre  gun  works  splendidly  against 
columns  but  is  not  so  good  against  trenches  and 
dugouts,  which  it  is  unable  to  destroy,  proving  very 
useful,  however,  for  the  destruction  of  barbed  wire. 
It  is  a  quick-firing  gun,  destroying  effectively  in  a 
very  short  time,  by  hurling  such  a  great  number  of 
shells  that  the  enemy  has  no  time  to  get  out  of  the 
fray.  Successful  against  men,  it  is  always  to  be 
found  in  a  barrage  fire,  be  it  the  ordinary  barrage, 
which  is  lowered  when  the  enemy  tries  to  attack 
our  trenches,  in  order  to  form  in  front  of  them  a 
zone  which  he  can't  cross,  or  the  "creeping"  bar- 
rage— that  is  to  say,  a  barrage  which  moves  along, 
creeping  in  front  of  advancing  infantry,  the  object 
of  which  is  to  kill  every  enemy  trying  to  come  out 
of  his  dugout.  This  gun  is  also  used  when  it  is  de- 
sired to  place  under  fire  the  enemy's  columns  or 
reinforcements  which  are  at  a  more  or  less  great 


60  PRESENT-DAY  WARFARE 

distance.  As  it  is  very  accurate,  we  get  the  proper 
range  in  a  very  short  time,  and  the  destructive  fire 
may  be  begun.  Of  course,  it  is  absolutely  necessary 
that  observers  should  observe,  direct,  and  control 
the  fire  of  the  battery.  The  75-millimetre  is  also 
used  as  anti-aircraft  guns,  the  fire  forming  a  sort 
of  barrage  in  the  air,  in  order  to  prevent  the  enemy 
from  crossing  certain  prohibited  zones. 

The  heavy  artillery  comprises  guns  and  howitzers. 
The  guns  are  of  greater  power  than  those  of  the 
field-artillery,  but  they  also  have  a  flat  trajectory. 
The  howitzers  have  a  curved  one.  In  heavy  ar- 
tillery-fire the  destructive  power  of  the  shells  is 
greater  and  the  effect  upon  the  nerves  of  the  men 
is  stronger.  The  men  must  become  used  to  these 
big  shells,  which  hurry  along,  making  as  much  noise 
as  the  rattling  of  a  train.  Practically  speaking,  they 
are  not  very  dangerous  for  the  men  in  the  open, 
because,  if  they  don't  fall  too  close  to  the  men,  they 
merely  explode  with  a  terrific  noise,  throwing  up 
heaps  of  stones  and  clouds  of  black  smoke,  without 
much  danger  to  the  men.  The  men  very  soon  get 
used  to  it  and  don't  fear  them  as  they  did  in  the  be- 
ginning. The  English  call  them  "big  black  Jack 
Johnsons."  Nevertheless,  they  have  very  great 
destructive  power,  and  absolutely  ruin  strong  forti- 
fications or  buildings,  making  enormous  craters  and 
shaking  the  works  to  their  foundations.  The  heavy 


THE  ARTILLERY  61 

artillery  is  only  used  for  the  destroying  of  strong 
points  and  powerful  trenches  which  it  is  deemed 
necessary  to  level.  In  the  "barrage"  a  certain 
amount  of  shells  of  heavy  artillery  are  fired,  mostly 
on  account  of  their  moral  effect,  and  also  because 
of  the  fact  that  one  of  these  shells  might,  by  chance, 
hit  one  of  the  enemy's  columns  and  blow  it  to  pieces. 
The  great  difficulty  with  heavy  artillery  is  to  bring 
the  guns  into  position,  for  they  are  very  heavy  and 
require  a  great  amount  of  work  to  form  positions  of 
batteries. 

The  railroad  artillery  is  composed  of  very  large 
guns,  mounted  on  wagons,  which  are  dragged  by 
locomotives.  They  fire  very  large  calibre  shells, 
but  the  preparation  of  such  a  fire  is  a  long  one,  as 
special  railroads  have  to  be  built  for  such  guns. 
The  trench  mortars  are  guns  which  hurl  aerial  tor- 
pedoes containing  large  quantities  of  explosives. 
The  initial  velocity  of  this  projectile  is  a  very  slow 
one,  and  the  trajectory  is  a  very  curved  one,  so  that 
it  is  possible  to  follow  with  the  naked  eye  the  course 
of  the  aerial  torpedo.  As  they  do  not  fire  very  far, 
these  trench  mortars  are  fixed  in  the  first  lines, 
and  can  only  be  fired  into  the  enemy's  first  lines. 
Having  a  great  quantity  of  explosives,  they  prove 
very  effective  and  destroy  even  the  best  dugouts, 
or  at  least  ruin  their  entries.  This  last  is  a  good 
point,  as  these  dugouts  whose  entries  are  ruined 


62  PRESENT-DAY  WARFARE 

are  not  dangerous  to  our  progress.  Some  of  these 
torpedoes  have  retarded  fuses,  and  such  are  used 
for  the  purpose  of  destroying  dugouts,  while  others 
have  instantaneous  fuses,  and  prove  very  effective 
in  the  destruction  of  barbed  wire.  They  have  a 
strong  destroying  power,  due  to  the  deflagration  of 
explosives  which  they  contain,  and  thus  at  a  dis- 
tance of  several  metres,  simply  blow  away  the  wire. 
Now  that  we  have  seen  the  functions  of  the 
different  guns  of  artillery,  the  different  parts  they 
play  in  the  battle  will  be  more  easily  understood. 
Trench  mortars  and  75-millimetre  guns  work  upon 
the  first  position;  75-millimetre  guns  destroy  the 
wire  of  the  second  position  and  the  rest  is  pounded 
by  the  big  guns.  Should  there  be  special  strong 
points,  the  railroad  artillery  is  used.  The  75-milli- 
metre gun  and  the  light  howitzers  fight  the  battle 
during  the  assault,  because  they  are  effective  against 
unsheltered  men  or  those  in  shell-holes.  We  cannot 
increase  the  artillery  to  an  indefinite  degree,  that 
is  to  say,  we  cannot  put  over  a  certain  amount  of 
artillery  on  a  certain  area,  because  this  artillery 
would  have  great  difficulty  in  working  on  account 
of  the  lack  of  the  means  of  liaison,  and  the  lack  of 
observation-posts  for  the  different  batteries.  Be- 
yond a  certain  point  in  fire-power  attained  by  the 
artillery  on  one  sector,  the  losses  both  in  men  and 
material  by  the  cramming  together  of  guns  would 


THE  ARTILLERY  63 

not  be  offset  by  the  results  of  a  greater  fire-power. 
In  a  certain  manner  we  can  compare  it  to  the  theory 
of  saturation.  If  you  put  too  much  salt  in  water, 
a  certain  amount  of  it  cannot  be  dissolved  by  that 
water.  If  you  put  too  many  guns  on  a  certain 
front,  a  certain  number  of  guns  will  remain  inactive 
or  will  do  bad  work,  and  all  will  sustain  severe 
casualties. 

We  shall  see  now  the  role  of  artillery  on  the  de- 
fensive and  on  the  offensive.  In  defensive  warfare 
in  a  quiet  sector,  one  mustn't  think  that  there  is 
a  sort  of  truce,  or  that  there  is  no  actual  fighting 
going  on.  Artillery  is  always  on  the  lookout,  and 
ready  to  take  under  its  fire  any  objective  which 
may  appear.  The  artillery  also  has  to  make  counter- 
battery  against  an  unseen  enemy,  that  is  to  say, 
fire  against  the  enemy's  artillery.  But  its  role  be- 
comes most  important  should  an  attack  take  place. 
We  will  consider  two  different  attacks — either  small 
attacks,  carried  out  on  a  small  scale  (a  raid),  or 
a  big  offensive,  as  when  the  Germans  attacked 
Verdun.  The  main  object  of  a  raid  is  to  allow  the 
enemy's  infantry  to  gain  a  footing  in  our  lines, 
destroy  them  and  the  dugouts,  and  carry  back 
prisoners.  These  raids  are  generally  made  with 
small  forces  and  with  little  help  from  the  artillery. 
The  role  of  our  guns  is,  first,  to  prevent  the  enemy 
from  entering  our  trenches;  second,  if  he  does  so, 


64  PRESENT-DAY  WARFARE 

to  try  to  prevent  him  from  returning  to  his  own 
trenches.  But  it  is  a  very  difficult  task,  indeed, 
as  most  of  the  time  the  whole  thing  happens  with- 
out warning,  and  the  Germans  often  have  time  to 
enter  our  trenches  before  the  curtain  fire  is  let  loose. 
And  in  this  case  it  is  the  infantry  alone  which  is 
able  either  to  prevent  the  enemy  from  entering  our 
trenches  or  else  to  hurl  him  out  by  a  speedy  coun- 
ter-attack. 

A  very  good  example  to  illustrate  this  is  that  of 
a  raid  which  took  place  on  the  front  of  my  battalion 
in  January,  1917,  near  Verneuil,  near  the  Aisne.  At 
some  minutes  past  six  in  the  morning,  strong  shell- 
ing waked  me  up,  and  at  the  same  time  an  orderly 
rushed  into  my  dugout,  coming  from  the  neighbor- 
ing commanding  post,  which  was  located  at  a  distance 
of  about  sixty  yards.  The  man  came  and  told  me 
that  the  major  wanted  to  have  me  with  him.  It 
was  very  dark  and  gray  mist  covered  the  whole 
landscape.  From  our  intelligence  service  we  knew 
that  the  Germans  wanted  to  raid  all  along  the  front 
held  by  our  division.  Orders  had  been  issued  by 
the  general  commanding  the  division  that,  in  case 
of  a  local  and  strong  bombardment,  the  first-line 
trenches  were  to  be  evacuated.  Should  the  enemy 
enter  them,  an  immediate  counter-attack  was  to 
be  made  by  the  troops  who  had  retired  along  the 
first  line  of  resistance  in  an  effort  to  drive  them 


THE  ARTILLERY  65 

back.  We  held  a  salient,  or,  rather,  a  company 
of  my  battalion  held  a  salient,  called  the  "horse- 
hoof"  on  account  of  its  peculiar  shape.  That  en- 
tire salient  was  bombarded  with  big  aerial  torpedoes, 
and  according  to  the  orders  issued  a  garrison  retired 
along  the  main  line  of  resistance.  I  telephoned  to 
each  company  to  know  what  was  going  on,  and  the 
captains  reported  that  everything  was  all  right 
then.  That  shelling  lasted  for  a  few  minutes  and 
then  ceased  all  at  once.  So  I  went  with  the  major 
into  the  salient,  and  there  we  learned  that  the  Ger- 
mans had  entered  our  first  lines.  We  had  evacuated, 
and  according  to  the  orders  issued  by  our  general 
the  platoons  which  were  on  both  flanks,  hearing 
that  the  Germans  were  in  our  trenches,  counter- 
attacked. The  way  they  discovered  that  the  Ger- 
mans were  in  the  trenches  was  that  when  the  Boches 
came  into  our  first  lines  they  were  astounded  not  to 
find  anybody  in  them,  and  talked  loudly  and  yelled 
to  each  other.  One  was  plainly  heard  saying: 
"Hello,  Carl.  Have  you  an  idea  where  these 
damned  Frenchies  have  concealed  themselves?" 
"No,  I  don't  know,"  was  the  answer,  "but  I'm 
afraid  they  may  play  us  some  nasty  trick."  To 
avoid  this,  Carl  and  some  of  his  mates  lighted  electric 
lamps,  and  not  long  after  our  flanking-platoons 
counter-attacked  on  both  sides  of  the  horse-hoof, 
in  grand  style,  driving  the  enemy  quickly  away, 


66  PRESENT-DAY  WARFARE 

killing  two  of  them  and  taking  one  of  them  prisoner. 
They  hadn't  asked  for  the  curtain  fire,  because  they 
feared  that  on  account  of  the  proximity  of  the  two 
lines  the  barrage  might  hinder  them  in  counter- 
attacking, and  because  they  felt  pretty  sure  of  lick- 
ing the  Germans.  All  this  happened  in  a  few 
minutes,  and  the  artillery  had  neither  time  nor 
opportunity  for  interfering. 

Of  course,  this  is  an  exceptional  case,  the  artillery 
usually  playing  an  important  role  in  all  attacks. 
Artillery  has  to  lead  the  fight  before  the  enemy  at- 
tacks, while  he  attacks,  and  after  he  launches  the 
assault.  Should  it  be  a  surprise  attack  carried  out 
on  a  small  scale,  the  artillery  of  the  defense  need 
not  be  reinforced.  But  it  is  soon  ascertained  by 
the  preparations  of  the  enemy's  guns  whether  or 
not  they  have  offensive  purposes.  If  so,  all  the  bat- 
teries of  the  front  which  is  pounded  and  the  neigh- 
boring batteries  form  a  concentration  of  fire  in  order 
to  fight  the  enemy's  artillery,  that  is,  to  make 
counter-battery,  and  also  to  fire  against  the  first 
line.  But  in  most  cases,  if  the  enemy  launches  a 
big  offensive,  as  was  the  case  for  the  Verdun  battle, 
it  can't  be  concealed,  and  the  artillery  is  soon  aware 
of  the  fact  and  reinforcements  are  brought  to  the 
artillery  of  the  defense,  more  especially  reinforce- 
ments of  heavy  artillery.  This  artillery  also  con- 
centrates its  fire  on  one  special  point,  and  deals 


THE  ARTILLERY  67 

there  its  stupendous  blow.  The  idea  is  to  cripple 
the  enemy's  batteries  which  are  pounding  our  first 
lines,  and  also  to  destroy  all  the  enemy's  first  line  and 
all  places  from  which  we  suppose  that  his  infantry 
may  start  for  the  attack.  A  German  general  said, 
after  the  Somme  battle,  that  artillerymen  should 
think  what  they  would  do  if  they  were  in  the  place 
of  the  enemy,  from  where  they  would  go  over  the 
top.  Having  determined  this,  they  should  ruthlessly 
crush  all  such  assembly-places  and  occasion  such 
severe  casualties  to  the  enemy's  infantry  that  it 
be  obliged  to  scatter  itself  in  the  neighboring  shell- 
holes  and  prevented  from  going  over  the  top. 
Should  our  artillery  not  succeed  in  preventing  the 
enemy  from  going  over  the  top,  the  "curtain  fire" 
should  be  let  loose.  Of  course,  we  cannot  count 
on  the  "curtain  fire"  being  loosed  before  the  first 
troops  will  have  gone  over  the  top;  but  in  most 
cases  it  can  cut  the  assaulting-parties  into  two 
parts — one  which  will  speed  toward  our  line,  and 
another  composed  of  the  reinforcements  and  the 
rest  of  the  assaulting  waves  which  will  not  be  able 
to  cross  the  "curtain  fire."  Besides,  our  heavy 
artillery  fires  against  all  the  means  of  communica- 
tion at  the  rear,  and  against  the  main  communica- 
tion-trenches, thus  preventing  the  bringing  up  of 
reinforcements  to  continue  the  battle.  The  first 
forces  which  cross  No  Man's  Land  are  doomed 


68  PRESENT-DAY  WARFARE 

to  speedy  destruction  by  the  garrison  of  the  first 
line. 

As  soon  as  the  enemy  enters  our  trenches  the  local 
counter-attacks  take  place.  Should  the  attack 
prove  strong  and  should  we  not  succeed  in  prevent- 
ing the  assaulting  waves  from  penetrating  our  first- 
line  trenches,  then,  at  the  request  of  the  infantry 
commander,  artillery  lets  loose  a  "curtain  fire"  at 
a  certain  distance  behind  the  first  lines,  in  order 
to  hamper  the  enemy's  advance,  and  to  give  time  to 
prepare  for  counter-attacking.  These  reserves  are 
required  because  the  local  garrison  does  not  prove 
strong  enough  to  drive  the  enemy  away  by  its  own 
counter-attacks.  So  while  the  artillery  stops  the 
Germans'  progress  and  prevents  their  organizing 
the  ground  they  take,  it  also  takes  under  its  fire  all 
means  of  communication  in  order  to  keep  the  enemy 
from  sending  reinforcements  of  men  and  material  to 
the  newly  won  position.  Then,  a  very  short  time 
after  the  attack  has  been  launched,  a  counter-attack 
preceded  by  a  strong  artillery-fire  takes  place. 

In  Champagne  in  January,  1916,  the  Germans 
captured  a  position,  and  the  reserves  were  hurried 
up  in  order  to  back  the  troops  of  the  attacking  sec- 
tor. My  battalion  was  hurried  up  from  rest-billets 
to  the  rear  of  the  troops  which  were  to  deliver  the 
counter-attack.  Our  artillery,  during  these  few 
hours  which  were  necessary  to  bring  us  into  a  posi- 


THE  ARTILLERY  69 

tion  of  readiness,  had  been  pounding  the  north  posi- 
tion so  that  when  the  counter-attack  occurred  the 
enemy  made  no  resistance,  having  had  no  opportu- 
nity of  organizing  the  ground,  as  they  had  been  con- 
stantly shelled,  had  received  no  material,  no  rein- 
forcements, and  were  cut  off  from  their  position  of 
departure.  In  the  counter-attack  we  regained  all 
the  lost  ground  and  took  sixty-two  prisoners. 

If  the  attack  proves  very  strong  the  artillery  com- 
mander designates  the  positions  to  which  the  bat- 
teries are  to  fall  back  and  plans  how  this  move  will 
be  executed  under  the  cover  of  other  batteries  which 
will  be  holding  the  enemy  at  bay.  It  was  in  this 
way  that  we  proceeded  during  the  early  period  of 
the  Verdun  battle  while  we  were  on  the  defensive. 
It  mustn't  be  understood  that  while  on  the  defensive 
we  stayed  passive.  Our  defensive  is  active,  eche- 
lonned  in  depth,  the  infantry  as  well  as  the  artillery. 
Sometimes  the  reserves  by  these  counter-attacks 
are  unable  to  regain  the  lost  ground.  In  that  event 
the  counter-attacks  will  have  had  for  result  only 
the  slowing  up  of  the  enemy's  progress.  To  estab- 
lish our  situation  there  will  be  but  one  means;  that 
will  be  to  make  a  counter-offensive.  In  the  battles 
fought  at  Verdun,  in  a  counter-offensive  the  ar- 
tillery played  a  similar  role  as  in  the  offensive,  and 
we  shall  talk  the  matter  over  while  setting  the  role 
of  artillery  in  offensive.  The  great  disadvantage 


70  PRESENT-DAY  WARFARE 

in  the  defensive  (as  well  for  artillery  as  for  any  other 
arm)  is  that  we  do  not  impose  our  will  on  the  enemy, 
but  he  forces  his  will  on  us.  Therefore,  we  cannot 
calculate  exactly  all  that  is  going  to  happen,  not 
knowing  the  intentions  of  the  enemy,  and  so  we 
are  not  able  to  take  measures  beforehand  to  coun- 
teract them.  This  we  are  obliged  to  do  whilst  the 
battle  is  going  on. 

Another  great  difficulty  in  a  defensive  is  to  keep 
in  liaison  with  our  infantry.  The  idea  of  course 
is  to  protect  it,  but  very  often  we  cannot  tell  ex- 
actly where  it  is,  which  part  of  the  ground  is  ours, 
which  part  has  been  lost,  etc.  This  last  has  a  tac- 
tical importance,  because  the  effect  of  our  fire  will 
be  much  greater  if  it  catches  the  enemy  just  when 
he  reaches  a  new  position  already  quite  upturned 
by  its  shells.  The  artillery  also  knows  that  the  in- 
fantry holding  the  very  first  line  is  not  able  to  form 
much  resistance,  because  (as  it  will  be  explained 
later  on)  in  the  first  lines  we  have  very  few  men, 
and  because  the  enemy's  fire  will  have  utterly  de- 
stroyed and  levelled  that  position,  and  thus  dis- 
abled the  few  men  forming  this  garrison.  Another 
difficulty  is  that  the  enemy  outnumbers  us  in  guns. 
Having  prepared  an  offensive,  he  has  an  immense 
superiority  in  artillery.  The  only  way  to  locate 
our  infantry  will  be  by  aerial  observation,  but  this 
is  done  with  difficulty,  as  the  enemy  will  have  assem- 


THE  ARTILLERY  71 

bled  big  fleets  of  planes  in  order  to  gain  the  mastery 
of  the  air  on  this  sector,  which  will  try  to  prevent 
our  planes  from  flying  and  from  bringing  home  any 
information.  The  enemy  will  try  to  blind  our 
artillery  and  to  stun  our  infantry.  You  can  thus 
see  that  in  the  defensive  battle  our  gunners  have 
very  trying  work,  indeed,  and  that  they  sustain 
severe  casualties,  having  to  fire  under  the  most 
difficult  circumstances,  being  submitted  to  the  fire 
of  shells  of  large  caliber,  and  firing  in  an  atmosphere 
of  gases,  not  knowing  where  the  infantry  is,  not 
seeing  much  on  account  of  the  dust  and  the  smoke. 
Our  gunners  did  behave  most  bravely  in  this  fight 
during  the  Verdun  battle,  and  it  is  by  their  gallantry 
and  their  spirit  of  self-sacrifice  that  they  were  able 
to  cripple  the  German  offensive,  and  so  afford  the 
infantry  the  chance  of  encountering  the  enemy. 
My  regiment  was  holding  the  sector  of  the  Bois 
Fumin  in  June,  1916.  From  the  2ist  to  the  23d  the 
Germans  launched  enormous  attacks,  composed  of 
picked  infantry,  and  backed  by  such  powerful  artil- 
lery that  our  aviators  said  that  they  were  unable  to 
locate  individual  batteries,  as  all  the  counter-slopes 
and  all  the  covers  swarmed  with  German  artillery. 
During  this  battle,  though  subjected  to  heavy 
counter-battery,  our  gunners  fired  the  whole  time, 
and  by  the  accuracy  and  efficiency  of  their  fire 
caused  the  admiration  of  my  regiment.  On  the 


72  PRESENT-DAY  WARFARE 

2ist  of  June  they  fired  for  four  hours  without 
interruption. 

In  the  offensive,  the  role  of  artillery  consists  in  pre- 
paring this  offensive,  that  is  to  say,  in  opening  a  way 
for  infantry  to  help  the  infantry  during  the  assault, 
and  in  being  ready  to  cripple  any  counter-attack. 
In  these  offensives  huge  masses  of  artillery  are 
put  into  action,  requiring  enormous  amounts  of 
ammunition.  The  first  thing  is  to  select  good  ob- 
servatories and  to  have  good  means  of  liaison,  for 
to  have  effective  fire  you  must  be  able  to  conduct 
it,  that  is  to  say,  to  watch  the  results  of  the  fire 
and  communicate  these  observations  to  your  bat- 
teries, which  do  not  see.  For  a  big  offensive  the 
artillery  must  not  be  brought  into  position  too  early, 
in  order  not  to  attract  the  enemy's  attention,  and 
for  the  same  reason  too  many  works  should  not 
be  made,  and  all  works  should  be  immediately  con- 
cealed by  means  of  camouflage.  Too  many  works 
should  not  be  made  anyway,  because  they  soon  be- 
come useless  when,  on  account  of  the  advance,  the 
batteries  move  to  new  positions  on  the  conquered 
ground.  Therefore,  most  of  the  material  should 
be  employed  for  these  new  positions  and  for  the 
batteries  which  are  quite  close  to  the  first  lines, 
and  which  will  only  be  armed  one  or  two  nights 
before  the  attack. 

Now  that  we  have  quick-firing  guns  in  light  as 


THE  ARTILLERY  73 

well  as  in  heavy  artillery  the  preparations  do  not 
take  very  long;  but  in  three  or  four  days  a  great 
amount  of  steel  is  hurled  upon  the  enemy's  position 
and  turns  them  into  a  crater-field.  The  enemy's 
artillery  will  be  fired  at  with  guns  of  great  caliber 
in  order  to  destroy  it.  In  our  drive  on  the  Somme 
in  1916,  near  Bouchavesne,  we  found  several  bat- 
teries which  had  been  totally  ruined  by  our  fire, 
the  guns  overturned,  the  shelters  shot  to  pieces, 
and  the  gunners  killed.  In  our  drive  on  the  Aisne 
a  little  before  the  Chemin  des  Dames,  we  also  de- 
stroyed several  batteries.  To  have  been  able  to  de- 
stroy them  we  must  have  located  the  guns  very 
exactly.  It  is  often  not  very  difficult,  because  in 
the  defensive  the  enemy  builds  very  strong  posi- 
tions, and  as  they  take  a  long  time  to  be  finished, 
they  are  very  exactly  located  on  our  maps  and, 
therefore,  very  surely  destroyed.  During  the  last 
period  I  was  on  the  front  the  Germans  tried  to 
avoid  the  destruction  of  their  guns  by  frequently 
changing  their  positions,  even  putting  them  in 
the  open  so  that  they  shouldn't  be  located  by  our 
observatories.  But  planes  will  locate  them  pretty 
soon  and  they  won't  escape  destruction,  having 
absolutely  no  protection.  In  our  drive  on  the  Aisne 
in  April  and  May  we  destroyed  nearly  thirty  per 
cent  of  the  German  artillery  we  have  located. 
The  difficulty  in  the  offensive  fight  is  to  co-ordi- 


74  PRESENT-DAY  WARFARE 

nate  the  efforts  of  such  big  masses  of  artillery,  and 
this  can  only  be  done  if  perfect  means  of  liaison 
exist.  Of  course,  in  one  sense  it  is  easier  than  in 
the  defensive,  because  most  of  the  time,  and  this 
especially  in  the  beginning  of  a  big  drive,  the  artil- 
lery's reactions  are  very  feeble  and,  therefore,  the 
chances  are  that  our  means  of  liaison  do  function. 
But,  anyhow,  you  must  always  bear  in  mind  that 
some  of  them  may  be  crippled,  and  that  therefore 
others  must  be  always  in  readiness  to  afford  us  every 
assistance  required.  The  offensives  of  the  5th  of 
May  and  of  the  25th  of  April,  during  the  battles 
of  the  Aisne  and  Moronvillers,  gave  us  a  good  ex- 
ample of  the  services  which  our  liaison  could  ren- 
der and,  therefore,  our  artillery  did  splendid  work. 
My  regiment  attacked  at  nine  o'clock  in  the  morn- 
ing, being  preceded  by  a  strong  and  well-executed 
creeping  barrage  which  silenced  the  enemy's  bat- 
teries. (They  fired  only  at  9.35  and  their  fire  on 
the  rear  of  our  line  was  not  effective  till  4  p.  M.,  so 
that  we  had  sufficient  time  to  organize  the  con- 
quered ground.)  But  it  must  be  stated  that  after 
we  had  carried  the  enemy's  position,  our  artillery 
did  not  remain  inactive,  but  made  powerful  con- 
centration of  fire  against  the  enemy's  batteries, 
forcing  them  to  fall  back  and  take  up  new  positions 
at  the  rear,  and  those  who  did  not  had  a  very  diffi- 
cult task  on  account  of  the  continuous  shelling. 


CHAPTER  V 
LIAISON 

HOW  are  we  to  handle  these  powerful  war- 
machines,  in  order  to  obtain  the  maximum 
effect,  and  to  have  them  work  harmoniously  ?  Bare 
common  sense  will  make  clear  to  us  that  the  only 
way  to  gain  the  full  value  of  mechanical  power, 
secured  by  war-machines,  and  enabling  it  to  ren- 
der valuable  assistance  to  man-power,  is  to  have 
the  human  and  mechanical  power  act  in  very  close 
co-operation.  We  must  be  able  to  have  strict  con- 
trol over  them  and  to  have  them  work  when  we 
want  and  as  we  want.  Such  co-operation  can  only 
be  attained  by  improved  means  of  liaison,  and  to 
accomplish  this  purpose  science  has  entered  the  ser- 
vice of  the  army. 

This  branch  of  military  science  has,  like  all  others, 
made  amazing  progress.  When  the  war  broke  out, 
orders  were  carried  by  couriers  or  transmitted  by 
telephone  or  by  signalling  with  flags.  These  means 
of  liaison  very  soon  proved  inefficient  and  not  ap- 
propriate to  the  requirements  of  modern  warfare; 
horsemen  could  hardly  be  expected  to  be  used  as 
couriers,  for  they  are  not  able  to  reach  the  com- 

75 


76  PRESENT-DAY  WARFARE 

manding  posts  on  account  of  the  torn-up  ground 
and  of  the  innumerable  trenches  and  defenses. 
Roads  are  not  passable  for  cars  and  motor-cycles 
near  the  front.  There  remain  the  runners,  who  were 
greatly  used  in  the  Verdun  battle;  but  this  is  a 
very  slow  and  costly  method,  and  should  be  used 
as  seldom  as  possible.  Signalling  by  flags  did  not 
prove  very  valuable  on  the  western  front,  and  it 
has  hardly  ever  been  used,  for  men  are  not  able  to 
signal  standing  without  being  detected  by  the  enemy 
and  shot  by  its  snipers;  besides,  this  mode  of  sig- 
nalling has  but  a  very  short  range  and  is  there- 
fore a  very  slow  means  of  liaison,  for  it  is  necessary 
to  have  a  great  many  signalling  posts,  and  this 
means  that  it  will  require  a  long  time  to  pass  a 
message.  The  conclusion  from  this  very  short  study 
of  the  means  of  liaison  used  before  the  war  is  that 
they  did  not  answer  to  the  requirements  of  modern 
warfare,  and  therefore  the  French  General  Staff 
had  to  study  the  question  very  closely  and  find  a 
solution  of  the  problem. 

In  the  beginning  of  the  trench  warfare  we  used 
the  telephone  very  much;  soon  in  every  trench 
there  were  telephone-wires.  But  as  the  artillery 
fire  grew  more  and  more  powerful,  and  became  a 
drum  fire,  the  wires  were  always  cut,  and  it  became 
quite  impossible  to  telephone  during  operations. 
On  the  other  hand,  as  we  often  used  returning- 


LIAISON  77 

by-the-earth  conduction,  the  enemy  picked  up  our 
conversations  by  listening-machines.  The  following 
instructions  were  therefore  issued:  All  lines  must 
be  of  double  wire  within  at  least  2,000  metres  of 
the  first  position  and  completely  insulated.  Lost 
current,  which  results  from  worn  or  defective  insu- 
lation, may  operate  on  German  listening-phones; 
it  is  therefore  strictly  forbidden  to  make  any  al- 
lusion by  telephone  of  events  which  might  in  any 
way  benefit  the  enemy,  and  it  is  therefore  also  for- 
bidden to  have  telephone-lines  from  the  battalion's 
commanding  post  to  the  companies'  commanding 
posts.  To  prevent  our  lines  being  cut,  we  bury 
them  at  a  depth  of  two  metres.  There  is  one  main 
line  running  from  the  army  corps  headquarters  to 
the  divisions'  and  the  divisionary  infantry  com- 
manding post  and  to  the  post  of  correspondence, 
where  a  staff-officer  is  permanently  stationed,  and 
which  is  at  the  height  of  regimental  headquarters. 
The  regiments  branch  their  lines  upon  this  main 
line,  which  can  be  compared  to  a  main  line  from 
New  York  from  which  all  telephones  of  the  neigh- 
boring towns  are  branched.  The  personnel  em- 
ployed comprises,  for  each  battalion,  one  non-com- 
missioned officer,  two  corporals,  and  ten  telephone 
operators. 

We  also  use  signalling-lamps  and  portable  search- 
lights; the  first  have  a  range  of  500  to  1,000  yards 


78  PRESENT-DAY  WARFARE 

by  day,  and  by  night  of  1,000  to  3,000  yards.  We 
had  two  of  these  per  company,  but  they  will  progres- 
sively be  replaced  by  portable  search-lights  of  14 
centimetres,  which  have  a  range  of  1,000  to  3,000 
yards  by  day,  and  of  2,000  to  6,500  yards  at  night. 
Besides,  we  also  have  the  portable  search-light  of 
24  centimetres;  range  by  day  1,600  to  6,500  yards, 
by  night  3,000  to  11,000  yards;  allotment,  four  per 
regiment.  Each  battalion  has  one  corporal  and 
four  signalmen  to  handle  these  portable  search- 
lights and  messages  are  passed  by  means  of  the 
Morse  alphabet. 

Another  means  of  liaison  is  that  of  runners  who 
will  double  the  other  means,  posts  of  two  runners 
each  are  placed  at  intervals  of  150  to  300  yards. 

Wireless  telegraphy  obviates  all  question  of  dis- 
tance and  obstacle,  but  the  number  of  stations  must 
be  limited,  otherwise  there  would  arise  a  great  con- 
fusion in  detecting  the  different  waves  caught. 
There  are  two  radiotelegraphic  stations  by  division, 
and  besides  all  planes  are  equipped  with  radiographic 
apparatus,  and  are  thus  able  to  correspond  with 
the  headquarters. 

Earth-conduction  telegraphy  (e.  c.  t.),  a  method 
of  sending  currents  through  the  ground,  is  also  used. 
We  have  one  sending-station  per  battalion,  and 
one  receiving-station  at  the  colonel's  headquarters. 
Pigeons  rendered  valuable  services.  Each  battalion 


LIAISON  79 

has  four  pigeon-carriers,  these  are  used  in  cases  of 
emergency. 

Rockets  and  appliances  for  signalling  are  greatly 
used.  Bengal  lights  serve  for  the  purpose  of  mark- 
ing the  front  line  for  the  planes.  Signal-rockets 
and  other  varieties,  as  caterpillar-rockets,  rockets 
with  red  or  yellow  smoke,  flag-rockets;  are  used  for 
the  purpose  of  signalling. 

Signal  cartridge  25,  also  called  military  telegraph 
star,  sends  a  white,  red,  or  green  star  which  lasts 
eight  seconds.  We  also  have  the  signal  cartridge 
35,  used  for  the  purpose  of  communicating  from  the 
line  to  the  rear.  The  V.  B.  rifle-grenade  discharger, 
using  a  special  blank  cartridge,  can  throw  the  fol- 
lowing rockets:  parachute  stars,  red,  white,  green, 
one  star,  three  stars,  six  stars,  caterpillar,  red  smoke 
and  yellow  smoke.  With  all  these  devices  we  form 
a  special  code  enabling  infantry  in  the  line  to  cor- 
respond with  the  rear,  and  more  especially  with  ar- 
tillery. 

Perhaps  the  most  convenient  of  all  liaisons  is  gained 
by  the  plane,  which  always  is  able  to  fly  over  its 
own  lines  and  to  bring  back  in  a  very  short  time 
photos  of  any  line,  showing  exactly  the  positions 
occupied  by  our  troops,  who  mark  their  lines  either 
by  using  Ruggieri  pots  or  Bengal  fires,  or  in  spread- 
ing their  panels.  These  panels  are  made  of  water- 
proof linen,  white  on  one  side  and  neutral  on  the 


80  PRESENT-DAY  WARFARE 

other,  and  are  from  1.6  to  1.3  feet  large.  They  are 
left  spread  until  the  plane  has  signalled  "Under- 
stood," but  in  no  case  more  than  fifteen  minutes. 
Infantry  is  also  able  to  correspond  with  the  plane  by 
means  of  identification  panels  and  triangular  panels, 
with  which  different  figures  are  formed,  each  one  of 
these  having  a  different  meaning. 

Liaison  must  be  very  closely  established  between 
units  of  the  same  arm;  therefore  the  majors  com- 
manding the  battalions  in  support  go  ahead  in  the 
big  offensives  with  the  majors  commanding  the 
first-line  battalions  in  order  to  secure  immediate 
information  from  those  they  are  to  reinforce. 
Liaison  should  also  exist  between  different  arms; 
artillery  can  only  work  efficiently  if  it  is  in  close 
touch  with  infantry,  and  particularly  with  the  units 
they  are  to  support.  Such  connection  is  established 
by  constant  understanding  between  infantry  and  ar- 
tillery officers.  Their  command  posts  should  be  es- 
tablished in  close  proximity  of  each  other  whenever 
possible.  Artillery  agents  from  the  battalion  on  are 
with  the  infantry. 

This  rapid  sketch  gives  a  faint  idea  of  the  ex- 
tent and  of  the  complexity  of  this  problem,  an  all* 
important  one,  on  which  the  French  General  Staff 
has  devoted  all  its  care.  The  means  of  liaison  are 
as  the  nerves  of  the  battle-field  which  carry  to  the 
remotest  cells  the  thought  of  the  brain — the  gen- 


LIAISON  8 1 

eral.  If  they  do  not  function  properly,  parts  of 
the  body  will  not  be  able  to  act  as  they  are  told  to; 
there  will  be  no  harmony  in  action,  and  therefore 
the  body  will  not  give  its  maximum  output;  for 
all  movements  must  be  co-ordinated  under  one 
single  will  which  directs  all  energies  to  one  sole  aim. 


CHAPTER  VI 

AVIATION 

A1ATION,  that  is  to  say,  war  aviation,  has 
revealed  itself  in  the  present  war.  Before 
this  war  began  it  was  merely  a  sport,  and  we  had 
very  few  machines  compared  with  the  number  we 
have  now.  At  the  outbreak  of  this  war,  aviators 
knew  nothing  of  firing  from  a  plane.  A  man  who 
would  have  taken  a  rifle  up  would  have  been  laughed 
at.  Now  conditions  have  entirely  changed.  From 
the  experience  of  the  war,  tactics  have  been  created 
for  planes  and  new  types  of  machines  have  been 
built  which  are  adapted  to  the  services  required. 
We  have  had  to  build  quantities  of  them,  and  train 
a  great  many  pilots  as  we  increased  the  number  of 
planes,  and  also  on  account  of  the  losses  which  were 
sustained.  Two  principal  qualities  which  should 
be  possessed  by  planes  are  vertical  speed  ascent 
and  horizontal  speed.  Both  of  these  should  be  as 
great  as  possible  because,  if  the  enemy's  planes  out- 
range them,  they  will  be  in  a  great  state  of  inferior- 
ity and  will  have  many  chances  to  be  brought  down 
by  the  enemy.  We  have  divided  the  role  of  our 
planes  as  follows:  The  observing  planes,  the  fight- 
82 


AVIATION  83 

ing  planes,  and  bombarding  planes.  The  changes 
brought  in  this  war  have  rendered  it  necessary  to 
have  many  planes. 

When  both  armies  stopped  face  to  face  and  dug 
trenches,  their  very  first  idea  was  to  conceal  them- 
selves from  the  enemy's  view,  in  order  not  to  be 
subjected  to  its  murderous  fire.  Therefore  the  use 
of  camouflage  became  very  extensive,  and  it  was 
almost  impossible  to  observe  from  the  earth,  and 
quite  impossible  to  observe  positions  which  were 
toward  the  rear. 

In  open  warfare,  when  we  wanted  to  know  what 
was  going  on  behind  an  outpost-line  forming  a  screen 
and  preventing  enemy  incursions,  we  used  to  get 
the  information  by  fighting;  either  sending  cavalry 
troops  or  detachments  of  infantry,  cavalry,  and  artil- 
lery which  were  to  get  through  these  lines  and  attack 
the  enemy  in  order  to  force  him  to  bring  reinforce- 
ments, and  when  this  was  attained  to  retire.  Thus 
we  were  able  to  see  where  these  reinforcements  were, 
their  strength,  and  what  the  enemy  was  preparing 
behind  the  lines.  Now  this  mode  of  information 
is  an  obsolete  one,  for  the  delivery  of  such  an  at- 
tack would  require  extensive  means  both  in  men 
and  material,  because  the  lines  are  protected  by 
strong  barbed-wire  entanglements  and  the  positions 
are  held  by  troops  strongly  echelonned  in  depth. 
So  another  means  had  to  be  found. 


84  PRESENT-DAY  WARFARE 

On  the  other  hand,  the  conditions  of  life  in  the 
trenches  become  intolerable  when  the  artillery  con- 
stantly keeps  our  position  under  fire,  so  aviation  has 
had  to  be  developed;  first,  to  be  able  to  see  what 
was  going  on  behind  the  first  line,  to  see  what  de- 
fenses, what  trenches  the  enemy  was  building,  what 
movements  of  troops  he  was  making  at  the  rear. 
Every  time  the  enemy  prepares  an  offensive,  new 
railroads  are  made  and  unusual  traffic  takes  place, 
and  new  jumping-off  trenches,  commanding  posts 
and  positions  of  batteries  are  built.  How  can  we 
get  this  information  except  by  plane  ?  So  the  very 
first  necessity  of  planes  was  to  know  what  the  enemy 
was  doing,  to  direct  the  fire  of  our  artillery.  Planes 
only  could  see  the  results  of  the  fire  and  bring  in- 
formation about  its  effects;  but  very  soon  the  enemy 
did  the  same  thing  that  we  did  and  with  his  planes 
tried  to  prevent  us  from  doing  this  special  work; 
so  another  field  of  aviation  was  brought  into  use, 
namely,  fighting  aviation.  It  was  the  duty  of  our 
aviation  corps  to  gain  the  mastery  of  the  air.  How 
could  it  gain  the  mastery  of  the  air  ?  By  being  alone 
able  to  fly,  having  either  brought  down  all  the  Ger- 
man planes,  or  having  prevented  them  from  flying. 

So  till  now  we  have  seen  two  branches  of  the  avia- 
tion. First,  observing  at  a  great  distance,  and  then 
fighting  the  enemy's  aviation.  A  new  branch  soon 
developed,  which  was  that  of  bombardment.  Planes 


AVIATION  85 

were  used  for  the  purpose  of  dropping  over  fac- 
tories or  fortified  towns  or  knots  of  communication 
tons  of  explosives  in  order  to  destroy  them.  The 
last  form  which  aviation  has  taken  is  that  of  fight- 
ing troops  on  the  ground,  either  infantry,  artillery, 
or  cavalry. 

Now  that  we  have  seen  the  general  outline  of 
aviation  we  shall  go  into  more  detail  and  see  how 
these  different  branches  work  and  what  their  meth- 
ods are.  Taking  observing  planes  first,  these  are  di- 
vided into  two  great  classes — the  first  being  those 
which  observe  "at  a  short  distance  from  their  own 
line,  and  the  second  are  reconnoitring  planes,  which 
go  far  into  the  enemy's  territory.  The  first  ones  are 
planes  which  go  over  the  lines  in  order  to  see  what  is 
going  on  and  take  photos.  These  two  methods  must 
be  used  because  they  give  complementary  results. 
The  photos  show  the  different  works  which  are  being 
carried  on  by  the  enemy  and  the  correct  location 
of  these  different  points.  But  the  information  gotten 
by  the  photos  must  be  completed  by  information 
of  what  the  observer  has  seen.  If  the  emplacement 
of  the  battery  is  concealed  with  camouflage  the 
photo  will  not  show  if  there  is  a  gun  or  not;  only 
the  observer  will  be  able  to  get  such  information. 
Of  course,  these  two  sources  of  information  com- 
plete each  other.  After  having  taken  a  series  of 
photos  the  planes  fly  back,  the  photos  are  imme- 


86  PRESENT-DAY  WARFARE 

diately  developed,  and  in  less  than  two  hours  the 
results  of  the  flight  may  be  gotten. 

The  liaison  between  the  plane  and  the  artillery 
is  a  very  important  one.  The  plane  is  the  eye  of 
the  artillery,  and  the  whole  programme  of  aviation 
on  the  battle-field  is  the  following:  To  see  and  pre- 
vent the  enemy  from  seeing;  that  is  to  say,  fly 
and  prevent  the  enemy  from  flying.  The  planes 
have  wireless-telegraphy  apparatus,  and  are  able 
to  correspond  with  the  battery  and  give  it  all  in- 
formation concerning  the  results  of  the  fire.  Be- 
fore taking  the  air  the  plane  has  gotten  in  touch  with 
the  artillery  and  knows  exactly  its  requirements. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  aviator  flies  over  a  certain 
sector  and  gets  very  soon  acquainted  with  all  de- 
tails of  the  landscape.  For  the  big  artillery,  which 
fires  at  a  very  great  distance,  the  planes  are  the 
only  means  of  determining  the  results  of  the  firing. 
Planes  do  a  great  quantity  of  work  in  the  first  part 
of  the  artillery  fight,  that  is  to  say,  when  the  artillery 
is  registering  in  order  to  make  an  effective  fire  in 
a  short  time.  This  requires  great  skill  because  every 
shot  must  be  observed  in  order  to  be  sure  the  ele- 
ments of  fire  are  correct.  In  these  observation 
planes  are  generally  two  men,  the  pilot  and  the  ob- 
server. These  machines  are  not  as  a  general  rule  as 
speedy  as  the  fighting  planes.  The  fighting  planes 
must  be  able  to  manoeuvre  very  quickly  to  dodge 


AVIATION  87 

the  adversary.  The  main  feature  of  this  peculiar 
fight  is  the  necessity  of  coming  very  close  to  one 
another,  even  as  close  as  fifty  metres.  The  enemy, 
of  course,  tries  to  get  in  a  better  position  than  his 
opponent,  and  he  has  but  two  alternatives,  either 
to  flee  or  accept  the  fight.  If  he  flees  then  the  fight- 
ing plane  will  have  to  pursue  him.  If  he  accepts 
the  fight  then  the  fighting  plane  must  make  the 
best  of  it. 

In  reality  each  pilot  has  his  own  tactics,  and  his 
own  way  of  fighting.  Some  try  to  get  between  the 
sun  and  the  opponent,  so  that  he  is  dazzled.  Many 
fly  at  a  great  height,  and  then  dive  down  with  a 
tremendous  speed,  coming  very  close  to  their  op- 
ponent, and  fire  a  volley  at  a  close  range.  Others 
try  to  come  under  the  adversary,  and  then  fly  up, 
being  always  at  a  very  close  range.  Others  try  to 
stay  in  the  dead  angle.  The  dead  angle  is  a  zone 
in  which  the  enemy  cannot  fire.  Most  of  the  time 
the  fighters  are  alone,  and  direct  their  machines 
and  handle  their  machine-guns.  Very  great  pro- 
gress has  been  realized  since  it  was  possible  to  fire 
in  front  without  taking  heed  of  the  propeller.  For 
the  fighting  plane  the  great  object  is  to  be  able  to 
manoeuvre,  that  is  to  say,  to  be  able  to  dodge  along, 
to  climb  quicker  and  fly  quicker  in  a  horizontal 
way  than  an  adversary. 

The  different  tactics  used  by  French  and  Ger- 


88  PRESENT-DAY  WARFARE 

mans  are  the  following:  The  Germans  try  to  risk 
their  machines  as  little  as  possible  over  the  lines 
and,  therefore,  keep  all  their  fighting  machines  in 
readiness  behind  the  lines,  flying  at  a  great  height 
and  forming  a  sort  of  aerial  barrage.  These  are 
very  far  at  the  rear,  closer  to  the  lines,  and  not  so 
high  as  the  machines  serving  for  the  purpose  of 
guarding  and  protecting  the  observing  planes  which 
are  still  lower.  When  they  want  to  cross  a  line  we 
generally  do  not  send  big  squadrons,  but  a  few  ma- 
chines; as  you  see,  these  methods  are  essentially 
defensive.  The  French,  on  the  contrary,  have  more 
offensive  spirit,  and  they  generally  cross  the  lines 
in  groups,  squadrons,  which  push  ahead  in  fighting 
the  enemy  planes,  and  fly  back  at  the  rear,  offering 
fight  to  the  enemy's  fighting  machines.  When  huge 
bombardments  are  considered,  and  specially  in  far- 
off  raids,  then  we  have  squadrons  of  bombarding 
machines  protected  by  fighting  squadrons.  These 
fighting  squadrons  are  to  prevent  the  enemy's  fight- 
ing planes  from  attacking  the  bombarding  plane, 
and  thus  they  get  over  their  objectives  and  drop 
the  amount  of  explosive  they  have  to  drop  there. 
The  planes  are  also  much  used  in  flying  very  low 
during  fighting  with  machine-guns  and  infantry. 
They  prove  very  useful  against  reinforcements  which 
are  in  rather  close  formation  and  can  be  dispersed 
by  an  effective  machine-gun  fire. 


AVIATION  89 

We  explained  that  the  planes  going  for  the  recon- 
noissance  purpose  are  to  take  photos.  They  have 
expert  photographers,  who  take  and  develop  the 
photos  in  a  very  short  time,  and  when  used  to  look- 
ing over  such  photos,  and  especially  in  comparing 
them  to  photos  taken  lately,  it  is  a  very  easy  to  see 
how  much  and  what  sort  of  work  the  enemy  has 
done.  Planes  are  also  used  very  much  for  the  liaison 
purpose,  either  in  transmitting  requests  of  infantry 
or  bringing  orders  or  bringing  back  to  the  general 
the  exact  location  of  infantry  troops.  We  have 
explained  how  infantry  is  able  to  talk  with  the  plane. 
Of  course,  this  plane  makes  itself  known  by  a  special 
signal  accrediting  him  as  the  plane  sent  by  the  gen- 
eral. Infantry  then,  by  means  of  panels,  signals 
its  requests,  which  are  speedily  transmitted  by  the 
plane.  As  the  plane  is  at  a  greater  height  than  the 
infantry  it  will  serve  as  a  fine  observatory,  and  the 
aviator  will  be  able  to  signal  what  is  going  on,  for 
instance,  if  the  enemy  is  preparing  a  counter-attack. 
The  plane  also  is  able  to  bring  orders  from  the  com- 
manding general,  and  signal  them  to  the  infantry  by 
a  special  signal  which  will  be  understood  by  every 
one.  A  great  use  of  the  plane  is  that  it  be  able  to 
fly  very  quickly  above  our  line,  and  especially  able 
to  go  everywhere.  In  many  cases  a  man  cannot 
go  in  certain  places  during  the  daytime  because 
there  are  no  communication-trenches,  and  these 


90  PRESENT-DAY  WARFARE 

planes  can  be  seen  by  the  enemy  who  fires  and  shoots 
down  every  man  passing  there.  This  was,  for  in- 
stance, the  case  of  one  sector  held  by  one  of  my 
companies  near  the  wood  of  Saint-Pierre-Vaast. 
No  man  was  able  to  go  to  this  particular  point  dur- 
ing daytime,  and  moving  was  only  possible  at  night. 
The  Germans  delivered*  severe  attack  on  the  neigh- 
boring brigade  in  the  beginning  of  December,  1916, 
and  we  wanted  to  be  able  to  know  if  our  men  had 
held  their  ground.  What  did  we  do  ?  We  sent  a 
plane  which  flew  over  the  lines,  and  took  photos, 
after  having  signalled  that  we  wanted  infantry  to 
mark  its  line.  When  the  photos  were  developed  it 
was  plainly  seen  that  they  held  the  same  position 
as  the  previous  day.  It  must  be  understood  that 
even  in  places  where  it  is  possible  to  go  during  day- 
time, it  always  takes  a  very  long  time  to  come  from 
the  rear  to  go  to  the  front,  or  come  from  the  firing- 
lines  and  go  to  the  rear.  The  plane,  on  the  con- 
trary, gets  all  information  at  very  short  notice,  which 
proves  of  great  value. 


CHAPTER  VII 
CAVALRY 

MUCH  has  been  said  about  the  use  of  cavalry. 
Some  well-informed  people  maintain  that 
it  is  now  quite  useless  to  have  cavalry  in  an  army; 
that  in  modern  battles  cavalry  will  have  no  oc- 
casion to  do  its  bit.  Others  as  well  informed  hold 
that  cavalry  is  very  useful,  and  that  no  complete 
victory  is  possible  for  an  army  without  cavalry.  It 
is  difficult  to  discuss  the  subject  clearly  before  ex- 
amining in  some  detail  and  studying  a  little  closer 
the  method  of  cavalry  in  fighting.  In  the  cavalry 
we  have  to  consider  two  factors,  horses  and  men. 
The  first  requisite  in  a  war-horse  is  not  to  be  too 
delicate — to  be  able  to  furnish  service  even  if  not 
every  night  in  a  stable,  even  if  not  groomed  daily, 
even  if  compelled  to  stay  out  in  wind  and  rain. 
This  is  the  very  first  condition,  because,  should  the 
horses  be  too  delicate,  the  whole  cavalry  would  be 
dismounted  in  a  very  short  time.  The  next  requisite 
is  speed.  Horses  must  be  capable  of  bearing  their 
horsemen  with  full  pack  at  a  quick  gallop;  this  is 
an  essential  for  fighting  on  horseback.  The  next 
91 


92  PRESENT-DAY  WARFARE 

requisite  is  that  the  horses  should  be  strong,  that 
is  to  say,  able  to  carry  their  rider  and  full  pack 
without  tiring  and  losing  speed.  The  next  is  that 
the  equipment  of  the  horses  should  be  so  arranged 
that  the  whole  weight  they  carry  will  be  evenly 
distributed;  the  horses'  backs  would  otherwise  be 
sore  pretty  soon,  and  thus  they  would  become 
unable  to  render  any  service.  Horses  which  have 
proved  very  good  for  cavalry  are  half-bloods;  they 
are  not  delicate  and  are  very  speedy. 

Now  that  we  have  one  condition,  speed,  it  must 
be  utilized  to  its  maximum  effect  and,  therefore, 
the  form  which  the  combat  of  horsemen  will  take 
is  the  charge,  that  is  to  say,  the  hurling  of  a  mass 
of  cavalry  at  full  speed  against  the  enemy.  Having 
speed  we  can  attempt  to  secure  surprise,  and  this 
is  necessary,  because  while  galloping  horsemen  are 
not  able  to  fire  they  offer  a  good  target;  and  if  troops 
which  are  charged  upon  do  not  lose  nerve,  they 
may  be  able  to  work  great  havoc  on  the  cavalry; 
but  if  these  troops  are  surprised  their  morale  will  be 
so  shaken  as  to  render  them  unable  to  make  proper 
use  of  their  arms,  and  the  cavalry  will  run  down 
every  man  that  flees.  If  cavalry  is  directed  against 
cavalry  it  must  be  able  to  charge  before  the  enemy 
can  make  proper  dispositions.  These  are  roughly 
the  chief  characteristics  of  the  fighting  on  horse- 
back. .  The  charge,  that  is,  the  shock,  is  the  purpose, 


CAVALRY  93 

and  to  attain  success  depends  upon  ability  to  de- 
liver, unexpected,  the  quicker,  stronger  blow.  The 
great  quality  of  cavalry  is  speed,  the  faculty  of 
moving  about;  hence  it  is  difficult  for  artillery  to 
get  the  range  of  cavalry  in  movement.  If  we  com- 
pare the  cavalry  with  the  infantry,  we  see  that  the 
latter  acts  in  a  series  of  efforts  coming  one  after 
the  other,  and  one  stronger  than  the  other;  these 
efforts  being  kept  up  by  the  echelonment  in  depth 
of  the  great  masses  of  reserves.  It  is  like  a  tide 
which  is  rolling  ahead  and  taking  possession  of  the 
ground  it  has  covered.  Cavalry,  on  the  contrary, 
sweeps  along  with  a  great  effort  like  a  tornado,  but 
is  not  able  to  keep  its  own  ground  by  its  own  means. 
Cavalry  must  be  dismounted,  and  horsemen  used 
as  ordinary  infantry  to  keep  conquered  ground. 
This  is  the  fight  on  foot. 

When  cavalry  is  mounted  there  is  no  such  echelon- 
ment in  depth  as  for  infantry;  the  idea  is  then  to 
deliver  a  staggering  blow  in  a  short  time;  if,  there- 
fore, the  charge  is  to  be  effective  it  must  be  made 
in  rather  close  order.  Should  the  charge  be  made 
in  forages,  that  is  to  say,  in  extended  order,  the  ef- 
fect of  the  shock  would  of  course  be  a  very  slight 
one;  but  this  formation  is  much  less  vulnerable. 
Generally  a  small  party  of  cavalry  charges  in  forages 
on  one  part  of  the  line  in  order  to  draw  the  enemy's 
attention  to  this  particular  point,  and  then  charges 


94  PRESENT-DAY  WARFARE 

in  masses  on  another  part,  using  its  maximum  ef- 
fect of  speed  and  surprise.  Cavalry  is  the  arm  which 
is  used  before  the  battle  and  after  the  battle  or 
during  the  last  part  of  the  battle.  It  changes  a  suc- 
cess to  a  complete  victory,  a  retreat  to  a  rout.  Be- 
fore a  battle,  cavalry  in  open  warfare  serves  as  a 
screen,  preventing  enemy  incursions,  covering  in- 
fantry, and  serving  in  a  way  as  the  eye  of  infantry. 
Many  things  which  can't  be  seen  by  planes  are  seen 
by  cavalry;  for  instance,  the  details  of  the  line,  the 
correct  location  of  outposts,  and  so  on. 

The  great  object  of  cavalry  is  to  destroy  the 
enemy's  cavalry.  It  is  a  much  easier  task  for  cavalry 
to  fight  against  cavalry  than  against  infantry;  the 
latter  should  only  be  attempted  if  the  cavalry  is 
able  to  make  a  complete  surprise  or  if  the  foe  has 
a  very  low  morale.  This,  of  course,  is  a  question  of 
correct  appreciation  of  the  situation  by  the  com- 
manding general;  a  prompt  decision  should  be  taken, 
because,  if  he  delays,  the  opportunity  might  be  lost. 
One  of  the  main  objects  of  a  cavalry  leader  is  to 
utilize  to  its  maximum  the  conformation  of  the 
ground  in  order  to  avoid  being  located  either  by 
the  enemy's  artillery,  which  would  put  his  command 
under  its  fire,  or  by  the  enemy's  infantry  so  as  to 
be  able  to  come  at  a  close  range  before  setting  loose 
a  volley.  A  quick  mind  and  a  speedy  execution 
are  qualities  required  both  by  a  general  command- 


CAVALRY  95 

ing  a  cavalry  unit  and  by  the  horsemen  under  his 
command. 

Great  masses  of  cavalry  have  been  used  in  the 
beginning  of  this  campaign  and  in  the  pursuit  after 
the  Marne  battle;  big  cavalry  units  have  also  been 
used  on  the  Russian  front  and  during  the  Italian 
retreat  after  the  battle  of  the  Isonzo.  The  role 
of  the  cavalry  units  is  in  advance  of  the  infantry 
to  assure  its  security  for  a  great  distance.  Smaller 
cavalry  units  closer  to  infantry  assure  its  imme- 
diate security  and  patrol  the  neighboring  ground, 
which  infantry  could  not  do.  These  masses  of 
cavalry  have  for  their  main  object  to  destroy  the 
enemy's  cavalry,  and  are  directly  under  the  orders 
of  the  army  commander.  They  seize  all  the  passes, 
all  the  debouches  needed  by  an  army  which  is 
progressing.  They  do  not  contain  only  cavalry, 
but  also  infantry  on  bicycles  and  light  infantry  in 
trucks,  besides  some  artillery,  to  organize  and  keep 
the  ground  which  has  been  taken  by  the  cavalry 
with  or  without  fight. 

During  the  battle  itself  cavalry  units  are  often 
used  for  the  purpose  of  keeping  liaison  between 
two  large  units,  armies,  for  instance,  and  to  prevent 
the  enemy  from  taking  advantage  of  the  gaps  which 
exist  on  the  enormous  front  on  which  battles  in 
open  warfare  are  fought.  But  cavalry  must  al- 
ways be  ready  to  take  an  active  part  in  the  battle. 


96  PRESENT-DAY  WARFARE 

Often  cavalry  masses  are  kept  on  the  wings  in  order 
to  prevent  any  movement  by  the  opponent's  cavalry 
on  the  flank,  and  also  in  order  to  be  able  to  make 
a  quick  attack  on  the  enemy's  flank  and,  after  the 
battle,  to  begin  an  effective  pursuit,  especially  if 
a  flank  movement  is  considered  possible.  But  in 
many  cases  in  open  warfare  cavalry  has  to  fight  on 
foot  in  order  to  keep  the  ground  it  has  conquered; 
therefore,  our  cavalry  was  not  only  armed  with 
lances  and  sabres  for  the  charge,  but  also  with  cara- 
bines, that  is  to  say,  short  rifles,  which  can  be  slipped 
over  the  head. 

So  the  role  of  the  cavalry  has  been  defined  in  open 
warfare.  Cavalry  protects  infantry  troops  before 
the  battle.  During  the  battle  it  stands  ready  to 
interfere  with  its  full  might,  and  after  the  battle 
either  to  complete  the  success  and  force  the  enemy 
to  speedy  retreat,  or,  if  the  general  commanding  the 
army  has  decided  to  fall  back  on  some  new  positions 
at  the  rear,  then  to  cover  the  retreat  and  so  pre- 
vent the  enemy  from  getting  close  to  the  main  body 
of  the  troops,  in  order  that  the  retreating  army  may 
gain  one  or  several  days'  marches  over  the  pursu- 
ing army;  in  a  word,  to  prevent  the  enemy  from 
making  a  pursuit,  only  allowing  him  to  follow  the 
retreating  troops.  This  mission  is  a  very  difficult 
one,  requiring  a  great  amount  of  self-sacrifice,  for 
cavalry  units  will  be  obliged  to  bear  alone  the  brunt 


CAVALRY  97 

of  the  fight  and  must  cling  to  the  ground  for  a  cer- 
tain time  in  order  to  allow  the  retreating  columns 
to  fall  back  safely. 

In  this  sort  of  fight  cavalry  will  often  be  obliged 
to  dismount,  the  horses  waiting  at  a  certain  dis- 
tance in  the  rear;  for  instance,  behind  a  crest.  The 
dismounted  horsemen  will  hold  their  ground  on  the 
other  side  of  the  crest,  but  they  must  not  allow  the 
enemy  to  come  too  near  because  they  wouldn't 
have  enough  time  to  quit  their  position,  gain  the 
place  where  their  horses  are,  and  mount  them  be- 
fore the  enemy  would  be  upon  them.  It  is  a  very 
difficult  sort  of  fight,  as  great  skill  is  required  in 
selecting  the  position  for  the  men  and  horses,  and  the 
combat  is  by  no  means  an  easy  one,  for  the  defense 
must  be  kept  as  long  as  possible,  but  not  too  long. 
The  same  game  will  start  again  at  the  next  crest. 
Cavalry  now  has  also  machine-guns,  which  prove  of 
great  use  in  the  defense  of  positions  and  will  add  a 
great  fire-power  to  that  of  the  carabines  of  the 
horsemen.  The  idea  in  this  rear-guard  combat  is 
to  force  the  enemy  to  stop  his  columns  to  deploy 
them  in  skirmish  order.  Then  they  will  proceed 
by  bounds  toward  the  position  they  want  to  storm, 
but  when  they  get  at  this  position  they  will  find 
nobody,  and  this  experience  will  be  repeated  on  the 
next  crest.  This  is  tiring  work  for  the  enemy's  in- 
fantry, and  the  columns  can't  proceed  very  quickly; 


98  PRESENT-DAY  WARFARE 

so  much  time  lost  by  the  enemy  is  time  gained  for 
his  opponent. 

These  tactics  were  used  by  our  cavalry  in  the 
early  period  of  this  war,  during  the  open  warfare 
before  the  battle  of  Charleroi  till  the  battle  of  the 
Marne.  But  when  the  trench  warfare  began 
cavalry  couldn't  be  used  as  before.  It  would  have 
been  mere  madness  to  hurl  against  intrenchments 
defended  by  strong  fire  and  protected  by  strong 
defenses  cavalry  forces  which  could  do  but  one 
thing:  die  in  front  of  the  enemy  positions.  So  our 
cavalry  was  kept  at  the  rear,  or  the  men  were  only 
employed  without  their  horses  in  trenches  where 
they  performed  the  same  duties  as  infantry.  But 
we  have  seen  great  changes  in  the  uses  of  the  differ- 
ent atms,  and  more  especially  of  infantry.  It  would 
therefore  seem  very  odd  if  cavalry  shouldn't  have 
undergone  very  great  and  definite  changes,  and  so 
it  has.  These  really  were  necessary  because  it 
became  more  and  more  evident  that  cavalry  would 
often  have  to  fight  against  infantry,  and  to  keep  the 
ground  it  had  taken  by  charges,  either  mounted  or 
dismounted.  But  to  enable  the  horsemen  to  charge 
on  foot  it  was  necessary  to  furnish  them  with  the 
bayonet  of  ordinary  infantrymen,  and  as  with  their 
former  armament  they  fell  far  below  the  fire-power 
of  infantry,  they  were  provided  with  grenades,  rifle- 
grenades,  and  automatic  rifles,  and  the  number  of 


CAVALRY  99 

machine-guns  was  greatly  increased.  They  now 
have  therefore  the  same  fire-power  as  infantry  and 
a  much  greater  power  for  keeping  their  ground; 
that  is  to  say,  that  cavalry  can  be  used  for  combat 
in  a  different  way  than  on  horseback. 

This  does  not  imply  that  cavalry  must  not  be 
used  any  more  simply  as  cavalry  or  that  cavalry 
should  be  replaced  by  mounted  infantry.  It  should 
always  be  kept  in  mind  that,  if  you  want  to  pierce 
the  enemy's  lines  and  force  him  to  retreat,  then  will 
be  the  day  when  cavalry  can  be  used,  and  if  we 
have  no  cavalry  our  infantry  won't  be  able  to  stick 
close  enough  to  the  enemy,  and  particularly  will 
not  be  able  to  make  bold  and  quick  Hanking  move- 
ments. It  was  lack  of  cavalry  which  prevented  the 
Japanese  from  entirely  defeating  the  Russian  army. 
It  was  the  lack  of  cavalry  which  prevented  the 
Balkan  Powers  from  regaining  a  very  complete 
victory  over  the  Turks.  Cavalry  is  the  arm  of  the 
supreme  moment.  Of  course,  if  this  moment 
doesn't  arrive  cavalry  can't  be  used  as  such,  but  if 
this  moment  does  arrive  cavalry  must  be  ready 
fully  to  perform  its  duty.  In  the  Italian  retreat  on 
the  Isonzo  General  Cadorna's  cavalry  showed  with 
what  efficiency  this  arm  could  act  on  some  occasions. 


CHAPTER  VIII 

SANITARY  SERVICE 

THE  object  of  the  sanitary  service  is  to  keep  the 
fighting  troops  in  good  condition,  to  take  in 
charge  the  wounded  and  the  ailing  and  cure  them, 
and  to  bury  the  dead.  The  task  allotted  to  this  ser- 
vice is  a  very  huge  one,  and  it  has  been  organized  to 
answer  these  requirements.  It  has  been  divided 
into  service  of  the  front  line  and  service  of  the  rear. 
On  the  front  line  there  are  doctors,  from  the  bat- 
talion to  a  regiment,  the  division,  the  army  corps, 
and  the  army.  We  shall  see  how  this  service  func- 
tions in  the  battle  and  when  no  active  fighting  is 
going  on.  Before  the  battle  takes  place  the  chief 
of  the  medical  service  of  the  army  confers  with  the 
general  in  order  to  get  all  information  obtainable  in 
advance,  and  according  to  the  plan  of  operations 
measures  will  be  taken  by  this  medical  corps.  Of 
course,  knowing  the  importance  of  the  men  engaged 
in  the  fight  a  rough  calculation  is  made  of  the 
losses  which  might  be  sustained,  and  measures  are 
taken  to  be  able  to  take  care  of  all  these  wounded. 
These  measures  are  for  the  concentration  of  the 
necessary  medical  material  and  field-hospitals. 


SANITARY  SERVICE  101 

When  the  fight  begins  the  wounded  able  to  walk 
go  by  themselves  to  the  battalion  medical  post. 
There  their  wounds  are  dressed  and  the  doctor  gives 
a  diagnosis  about  their  case.  The  men  then  go  to 
the  regimental  dressing-station,  which  is  farther  to 
the  rear,  and  there  those  that  are  but  slightly 
wounded  are  kept;  their  wounds  are  properly 
dressed,  and  on  the  next  day  they  will  be  sent  again 
to  the  firing-line.  Big  panels  indicate  where  the 
dressing-posts  are  and  which  road  the  wounded  are 
to  take.  The  more  seriously  wounded  pass  further 
to  the  rear  and  there  a  car  takes  them  and  carries 
them  swiftly  to  field-hospitals.  Each  wounded 
man  carries  a  note  of  a  different  color,  which  shows 
whether  he  is  slightly  wounded  or  not.  There  the 
doctor  examines  their  case  again,  and  if  they  are 
but  slightly  wounded  and  able  to  return  in  a  few 
days  they  will  be  kept  near  the  front.  If  their 
wounds  are  more  severe  and  they  have  no  chance 
to  recover  by  a  certain  time  they  are  attended  to  in 
field-hospitals  and  then  taken  into  sanitary  trains 
which  transport  them  into  the  interior  of  the  coun- 
try, where  they  will  be  cared  for.  These  sanitary 
trains  have  places  for  the  slightly  wounded  who 
can  sit,  and  beds  for  the  more  severely  injured. 

The  very  badly  wounded  lie  on  the  battle-field 
and  very  often  it  is  a  difficult  task  to  reach  them; 
but  sanitary  equips  go  with  stretchers  over  the 


102  PRESENT-DAY  WARFARE 

battle-field  and  take  up  the  wounded  as  best  they 
can.  It  is  a  very  difficult  task  and  really  requires 
extraordinary  courage  for  these  men  to  go  over  the 
battle-field  under  the  German  rifle,  machine-gun,  and 
shell  fire,  taking  up  the  wounded  and  walking  with- 
out being  able  to  take  any  cover  till  they  reach  the 
position  where  they  will  not  be  visible  to  the  Ger- 
mans; but  even  there  they  must  submit  to  strong 
artillery-fire.  Another  great  difficulty  is  presented 
by  the  awful  condition  of  the  ploughed-up  ground. 
This  ground,  which  is  constantly  blown  up  by 
shells  and  in  which  generally  there  is  a  tremendous 
amount  of  mud,  causes  the  stretcher-bearers  to 
slip,  yet  they  have  to  do  their  best  not  to  shake  the 
wounded  brothers-in-arms  lying  on  their  stretchers. 
They  carry  the  wounded  to  the  battalion  medical 
post.  From  this  the  wounded  are  transported  to 
the  regiment  dressing-station  and  to  the  point  where 
the  motor-cars  can  fetch  them. 

After  the  battle,  or  rather  after  the  assault,  and 
more  especially  during  the  night,  large  groups  of  the 
medical  corps  go  all  around  the  battle-field.  Dur- 
ing the  whole  night  they  are  a  great  active  body, 
trying  to  rescue  and  help  the  wounded  who  lie  all 
about  in  shell-holes,  in  holes,  helpless,  unable  to 
move  and  awaiting  rescue.  In  some  cases  it  is  im- 
possible to  do  anything  and  the  wounded  must  stay 
between  the  lines  without  attendance  on  account  of 


SANITARY  SERVICE  103 

the  fire  directed  by  the  enemy;  wounded  of  both 
armies  have  stayed  there  and  died  in  a  pitiful  con- 
dition. It  is  appalling  to  hear  in  the  night  the  cries 
of  the  wounded,  moaning  and  calling  for  help;  and 
it  is  always  a  difficult  job  to  get  at  them,  because 
after  an  attack  has  taken  place  rockets  are  con- 
stantly launched  and  illuminate  the  whole  battle- 
field and  very,  very  often  the  Germans  fire  at  any 
human  being  seen  moving  around  on  No  Man's 
Land.  The  medical  corps  makes  no  distinction  of 
nationality  in  taking  charge  of  the  wounded;  Ger- 
mans as  well  as  French  are  taken  on  stretchers,  and 
their  wounds  dressed  in  our  medical  posts,  but,  of 
course,  these  men  are  kept  as  prisoners. 

Another  thing,  then,  after  the  battle  is  to  take 
care  of  the  dead.  Their  papers  are  taken  from 
them,  their  identity  established,  and  the  papers  sent 
to  their  families.  The  bodies  are  buried  in  small 
cemeteries  close  to  the  firing-line;  often  it  is  impos- 
sible to  remove  them,  and  they  have  to  be  buried  in 
shell-holes  near  the  trenches.  It  is  often  impossible 
to  bury  the  dead  and  they  stay  for  days  and  weeks 
and  sometimes  years  between  the  lines,  and  can  only 
be  taken  care  of  if  a  new  offensive  is  started  so  that 
we  gain  ground. 

The  role  of  the  medical  service  of  the  first  line  is 
to  divide  and  diagnose  the  case  of  each  of  the 
wounded  and  dress  roughly  their  wounds.  It  is  not 


io4  PRESENT-DAY  WARFARE 

to  cure  the  wounded,  for  this  cannot  be  done,  there 
being  here  no  means  for  that,  partly  because  the 
stations  are  necessarily  placed  unfavorably,  gen- 
erally in  deep  dugouts  where  there  is  little  room. 
During  this  first  phase  little  can  be  done  to  heal 
them,  but  something  can  be  done  to  comfort  them; 
most  of  the  wounded  come  from  the  firing-line  in  a 
very  bad  condition,  tired  by  the  long  strain  they 
have  endured,  tired  by  the  loss  of  blood,  tired  by 
the  anguish  they  have  sustained  in  creeping  and 
crawling  from  the  position  where  they  have  been 
wounded  to  the  medical  post,  to  the  first  place  where 
they  feel  a  little  security.  They  are  feverish  most 
of  the  time  and  often  collapse  altogether  on  reach- 
ing the  medical  post;  they  are  most  of  the  time 
terribly  thirsty  on  account  of  loss  of  blood  and  they 
are  often  shivering  with  cold,  so  they  are  brought 
into  a  hot  place  where  they  get  hot  drinks,  are  com- 
forted, and  their  wounds  are  dressed,  and  then  they 
are  sent  to  the  field-hospitals,  where  better  care  can 
be  taken  of  them,  where  they  can  find  beds,  and  rest 
before  being  sent  to  the  rear. 

The  role  of  these  field-hospitals  is  to  evacuate  the 
men  as  quickly  as  possible.  Of  course,  speaking  of 
the  men  which  need  a  longer  treatment,  the  very 
severely  wounded  cannot  be  transported  as  a  gen- 
eral rule  and  have  to  be  taken  care  of  in  the  field- 
hospitals;  most  of  the  time  they  have  delicate  oper- 


SANITARY  SERVICE  105 

ations  to  undergo.  These  operations  can't  be  done 
in  the  medical  post  of  the  firing-line,  because  all 
the  necessary  commodities — operating-tables,  for  in- 
stance— cannot  be  got  into  such  places.  The  very 
severely  wounded  are  then  transported  to  the  field- 
hospitals,  where  they  are  operated  upon  as  quickly 
as  possible,  and  here  the  surgeons  have  an  enormous 
amount  of  work  during  all  the  period  of  every  opera- 
tion. The  most  difficult  and  daring  operations  are 
undertaken  by  skilful  surgeons:  limbs  are  ampu- 
tuted,  heads  are  trepanned,  etc;  but  as  soon  as 
the  men  get  better  they  are  sent  farther  to  the  rear, 
where  they  find  better  accommodations  and  more 
comfort. 

For  each  army  parts  of  the  territory  they  occupy 
are  assigned  for  evacuations  and  these  have  special 
lines  connected  with  them.  When  the  wounded  get 
into  better  condition,  if  they  are  not  disabled  for 
active  service,  they  return  at  the  end  of  their  leave 
to  the  garrisons  where  their  regiments  are  quartered 
in  peace-time.  There  they  are  drilled  again,  and 
then  are  sent  to  the  front  in  depots  close  to  the 
firing-line,  to  be  used  in  reinforcing  the  units  which 
have  sustained  losses. 

The  establishment  of  the  hospitals  requires  a 
great  amount  of  material,  not  only  for  the  field- 
hospitals  but  also  for  the  hospitals  at  the  rear: 
beds  for  the  men,  sheets,  blankets,  bandages,  medi- 


io6  PRESENT-DAY  WARFARE 

cines,  chirurgical  instruments.  On  the  front  they  are 
located  in  barracks  having  huge  red  crosses  in  order 
to  indicate  them  to  the  enemy  so  that  he  may  not 
fire  upon  them.  Very  often  this  has  proved  useless, 
for  the  Germans  take  no  consideration  of  hospitals 
but  fire  upon  them  and  drop  bombs  from  planes. 
Operation  orders  indicate  where  the  hospitals  are. 

The  medical  service  functions  also  when  no  active 
fighting  is  proceeding.  Of  course,  the  number  of 
doctors  at  the  rear  is  greatly  diminished  owing  to 
the  fact  that  there  are  not  many  patients;  the  med- 
ical service  must  take  care  of  the  few  wounded  who 
always  exist  even  in  the  quieter  sectors,  and  they 
are  evacuated  in  just  the  same  way  as  I  have  al- 
ready explained.  There  are  also  the  ailing  men  who 
must  go  to  the  doctor.  Care  must  be  taken  of  the 
men  so  that  their  illness  should  not  advance;  medi- 
cines are  given  to  them,  and  if  they  are  not  in 
good  condition  they  are  evacuated  or  placed  in  hos- 
pitals of  the  front  where  they  may  be  cared  for 
if  there  is  not  a  congestion  of  wounded.  It  is  also 
the  role  of  the  medical  service  to  supervise  the 
hygienic  conditions,  to  see  that  regulations  are  re- 
spected as  much  as  possible.  They  bury  the  dead 
bodies  and,  in  one  word,  try  to  keep  the  place  in  a 
healthy  condition. 

So  the  role  of  the  medical  corps  consists  in  trans- 
porting the  wounded,,  in  dressing  their  wounds,  and 


SANITARY  SERVICE  107 

preventing  them  from  getting  worse,  especially  pre- 
venting tetanus;  then  in  curing  them  so  as  to  render 
them  either  fit  for  civil  life  and  able  to  do  some  use- 
ful work  or  fit  to  fight  again. 


CHAPTER  IX 
TRANSPORTATION 

A  GREAT   problem  in   war  is   the   problem  of 
transportation.     It  is  one  of  the  most  impor- 
tant; all  means  of  transportation,  both  by  land  and 
sea,  must  be  examined. 

The  very  first  thing,  before  the  war  actually 
breaks  out,  is  the  mobilization  of  the  army.  A 
mobilization  of  an  army  like  the  French  or  the  Ger- 
man consists  in  mustering  a  great  number  of  men, 
who  will  be  formed  either  into  complete  units  or 
will  fill  the  gaps  of  the  regular  army  and  bring  the 
units  to  fighting  strength.  These  recruits  are  drawn 
from  all  parts  of  the  country  and  brought  to  the 
places  where  the  regiments  are  quartered.  This 
mobilization  does  not  comprise  only  transportation 
of  men,  but  also  all  the  transportation  of  the  neces- 
sary material  for  the  living,  clothing,  and  fighting  of 
these  men.  Stores  are  to  be  transported  containing 
food  and  equipment  and  uniforms  so  as  to  trans- 
form these  civilians  into  soldiers.  Wagons,  horses, 
and  trucks  are  mobilized  for  the  fighting  units  and 
are  transferred  to  the  place  where  these  units  are 
mobilized.  Not  only  existing  units  are  increased  in 
1 08 


TRANSPORTATION  109 

number  but  entirely  new  units  are  formed.  These 
also  must  be  provided  with  all  requirements. 

Mobilization  is  a  very  complete  task  and  a  very 
difficult  one,  and  has  to  be  studied  very  closely  in 
order  that  it  should  be  carried  out  very  quickly,  for 
the  idea  is  to  get  ready  at  least  as  quickly  as  the  en- 
emy. To  gain  one  day  in  mobilization  is  of  great 
advantage,  because  the  army  which  is  not  ready 
will  have  to  fall  back,  leaving  a  part  of  the  country 
in  the  hands  of  the  enemy  and  yielding  valuable  re- 
sources as  well  as  all  the  goods  which  cannot  be 
evacuated.  Time  has  an  immense  value,  so  every 
detail  must  be  closely  studied  and  calculated  and 
every  single  man  should  know  what  he  is  to  do  when 
the  mobilization  is  proceeding.  For  instance,  this 
man  should  know  that  on  the  first  day  he  must  re- 
port in  this  town;  this  other  man,  actually  serving, 
knows  that  at  the  first  hour  of  the  mobilization  he 
is  to  go  to  a  certain  street,  to  a  certain  house,  and 
there  take  a  cart  and  a  horse;  and  he  knows  ex- 
actly where  these  are  located;  he  has  been  there 
several  times,  so  no  time  is  lost.  The  time-table  of 
the  trains  must  also  be  calculated  so  that  the  num- 
ber might  be  greatly  increased  without  congestion. 

This  is  only  one  part  of  the  mobilization.  The 
second  part  is  the  concentration  of  this  army.  In 
Europe  all  these  operations  were  carried  out  per- 
fectly by  the  Allies  and  the  Germans.  The  war 


i  io  PRESENT-DAY  WARFARE 

was  declared  on  the  2d  of  August,  1914,  and  the 
first  big  battle  was  fought  on  the  2Oth  of  August. 
In  eighteen  days  both  French  and  German  armies 
had  been  mobilized,  concentrated,  and  brought  into 
action.  This  evidently  required  a  great  skill  in  the 
initial  preparation  and  the  carrying  out  of  the  plan 
of  transportation  of  these  huge  armies.  The  con- 
centration consists  in  taking  the  troops  from  points 
where  they  are  mobilized  and  bringing  them  to 
special  points  where  armies  are  mustered,  and  from 
there  they  will  be  moved  and  formed  in  order  to  be 
able  to  offer  fight. 

These  concentrations  not  only  comprise  the  trans- 
portation of  the  units  themselves,  but  also  the  con- 
centration of  all  means  necessary  to  fight  a  great 
battle;  namely,  transportation  of  millions  of  shells, 
of  millions  of  cartridges,  millions  of  grenades.  All 
this  must  be  studied  during  peace-times,  and  the 
plan  of  operation  is  drawn  according  to  them. 

Means  of  transportation  are  of  different  kinds: 
railroads,  boats,  trucks;  the  roads  are  utilized  by 
the  troops  marching  along  to  the  points  of  concen- 
tration. For  all  the  operations  in  the  beginning  of 
mobilization  and  concentration  railroads  are  used 
to  a  great  extent,  and  this  because  they  have  a  great 
capacity  of  transportation.  Therefore,  a  great 
amount  of  rolling  material  is  required.  An  in- 
fantry battalion  takes  a  whole  train.  We  generally 


TRANSPORTATION  in 

use  trains  following  each  other  at  intervals  of  a  few 
minutes  for  the  concentration.  The  return  of  this 
empty  material  must  also  be  contemplated,  and 
sanitary  trains  must  also  be  provided  for.  All  this 
has  to  be  studied  before  the  war  breaks  out,  so  that 
when  war  is  declared  it  is  only  necessary  to  refer  to 
the  time-tables  which  give  the  new  schedules. 

The  enemy  will  be  greatly  interested  in  disturbing 
or  hindering  transportation  of  troops,  and  spies  may 
be  sent  for  the  purpose  of  destroying  bridges  or  other 
vulnerable  parts  of  the  line.  All  these  parts  must 
therefore  be  provided  with  a  guard  in  order  to  be 
sure  that  no  mishap  will  take  place  and  that  the 
traffic  can  continue  safely.  Another  vital  point  of 
study  is  the  functioning  of  the  train  system  in  sta- 
tions in  order  to  prevent  congestion  there.  If  a 
station  gets  congested  it  is  quite  impossible  to  get 
trains  out  or  in,  and  that  station  forms  a  sort  of  wall 
which  renders  traffic  impossible  or,  at  any  rate,  de- 
lays greatly  all  the  trains  which  have  to  pass  through 
that  station.  This  was  a  very  difficult  problem  for 
us  to  solve  during  our  retreat,  when  everything  and 
everybody,  not  only  the  fighting  troops  but  also  the 
civilians,  the  goods  and  the  depots  and  the  hos- 
pitals, had  to  be  evacuated.  This  produced  an  un- 
usual traffic  which  had  not  been  taken  into  account. 

We  have  in  our  regulations  very  strict  rules  con- 
cerning the  transportation  of  units  in  trains;  the 


ii2  PRESENT-DAY  WARFARE 

guards  are  posted  and  the  men  enter  at  a  given 
signal  and  in  good  order.  All  this  is  done  for  the 
purpose  of  gaining  time.  Another  great  difficulty 
is  when  a  sufficient  number  of  trains  does  not  exist. 
This  may  occasion  very  long  delays,  and  not  only 
for  the  entrainment  of  a  particular  body  of  troops, 
for  this  delay  will  be  repercussed  on  following  trains. 
Another  thing  which  takes  also  a  long  time  is  the 
embarkation  of  the  wagons;  we  therefore  have 
specially  trained  parties  who  are  very  familiar 
with  methods  of  loading  and  packing  these  wagons. 
The  disembarkation  should  also  be  made  in  good 
order  and  according  to  special  rules;  the  units  are 
formed,  and  when  formed  they  march  off,  leaving 
place  to  another  train.  Animals,  and  especially 
horses,  prove  sometimes  very  difficult  in  entraining. 
They  are  afraid,  plunge  and  kick  wildly,  and  when 
they  are  brought  into  the  cars  they  continue  plung- 
ing and  kicking  for  a  while.  To  have  things  run 
smoothly  requires  parties  of  men  well  trained  in 
handling  both  animals  and  material. 

After  the  early  period  of  the  war  we  used  trains 
almost  exclusively  for  the  transportation  of  material, 
daily  supplies,  and  all  other  supplies.  Men  are 
transported  in  trains  as  a  rule  only  when  very  long 
trips  are  contemplated,  as,  for  instance,  when  my 
regiment  was  transported  from  Verdun  to  Chantilly, 
or  from  Champagne  to  Verdun.  We  more  often 


TRANSPORTATION  113 

use  trucks  in  moving  troops,  and  they  have  rendered 
us  very  valuable  service.  The  first  requirement  for 
obtaining  good  results  from  this  mode  of  trans- 
portation is  strict  discipline  on  the  road;  otherwise 
congestion  will  very  soon  occur  and  it  will  take 
hours  to  set  things  in  good  order  again.  Another 
requirement  is  a  sufficient  number  of  roads,  and 
good  roads.  To  properly  police  the  roads  we  have 
two  distinct  authorities:  first,  men  at  the  various 
branches  who  stop  a  convoy  or  order  another  to  go 
— in  one  word,  prevent  congestion  as  policemen  in 
a  city;  then  the  different  chiefs  of  the  convoy  itself, 
riding  in  speedy  motor-cars  so  as  to  be  able  to  pass 
quickly  from  one  end  to  another  of  the  convoy. 
There  is  always  one  officer  riding  in  front  and  show- 
ing the  direction  so  that  the  drivers  may  not  get 
lost;  others  pass  from  one  end  to  another  of  the  line 
and  see  that  things  are  in  proper  order.  The  con- 
voys are  divided  into  sections,  each  with  its  chief. 
Between  the  trucks  a  distance  of  about  seven  metres 
should  be  kept;  between  two  sections  a  greater 
distance.  These  distances  are  given  in  order  that 
the  whole  convoy  may  be  rendered  elastic  and  so 
that  if  one  of  the  trucks  for  some  reason  should  be 
obliged  to  diminish  its  speed,  this  incident  would  not 
be  felt  all  along  the  column. 

These  convoys  have  repairing-machines,  so  that  if 
an  accident  happens  to  one  of  the  trucks  it  can  be 


ii4  PRESENT-DAY  WARFARE 

repaired;  the  convoys  have  also  extra  cars,  so  that 
if  one  is  disabled  the  men  are  simply  shifted  to  an 
extra  car,  the  broken  car  being  repaired  if  possible 
by  one  of  the  repairing-cars. 

Troops  are  thus  very  quickly  shipped  from  one 
place  to  another  without  the  enemy  noticing  it,  as 
these  movements  can  be  carried  out  at  night. 
Trench  convoys  proved  of  immense  value  for  us 
during  the  battle  of  Verdun.  We  used  them  a 
great  deal  also  during  the  Somme  battle  for  the  re- 
lief and  for  the  purpose  of  bringing  new  troops  to 
the  battle.  We  used  them  because  as  a  great  amount 
of  troops  were  in  this  sector  all  the  rest-billets  close 
to  the  firing-line  were  crammed  with  troops  ready  to 
go  into  action,  and  thus  troops  needing  rest  were 
relieved  and  transported  very  far  to  the  rear  in 
order  to  rest  and  become  fit  again  for  new  opera- 
tions. 

This  work  is  a  very  tiring  one  for  the  drivers,  be- 
cause in  active  operations  when  big  movements  of 
troops  take  place  they  have  for  some  days  to  work 
day  and  night.  Artillery,  cavalry,  and  all  the 
wagons  of  the  infantry  have  to  utilize  the  roads,  and 
therefore  cannot  go  as  quickly  as  infantry,  but  if 
very  great  movements  are  not  contemplated  this 
doesn't  make  a  very  great  difference.  This  means 
of  transportation  offers  the  advantage  of  preventing 
the  road  from  being  filled  up  with  long  infantry 


TRANSPORTATION  115 

columns  which  would  delay  the  cavalry  and  ar- 
tillery columns  and  the  wagon-trains.  Besides,  long 
marches  are  very  tiring  for  infantry,  and  if  they  can 
be  avoided  the  men  come  in  much  better  shape  for 
action. 

The  trucks  not  only  transport  men  but  they  also 
transport  a  certain  amount  of  material,  as  ammuni- 
tion, cartridges,  grenades,  and  all  the  material  neces- 
sary for  the  trenches,  to  stations  close  to  the  lines. 
There  this  material  is  discharged  and  shipped  over 
on  narrow  railroads,  which  carry  it  as  near  as  possible 
to  the  lines,  and  from  there  fatigue-parties  transport 
it  to  the  first-line  trenches.  In  sectors  where  great 
traffic  takes  place,  the  roads  are  only  utilized  by 
trucks,  cars,  wagons,  and  artillery,  and  all  the 
neighboring  trails  are  exclusively  reserved  to  in- 
fantry, in  order  that  convoys  may  speed  on  without 
being  stopped  by  infantry  columns,  which  always  de- 
lay them  because  infantry  has  a  natural  tendency 
to  open  the  ranks  and  to  utilize  the  full  breadth  of 
the  road,  preventing  the  convoys  from  passing  till 
the  ranks  are  properly  formed  again. 

Special  trucks  are  also  used  for  the  transportation 
of  wounded.  These  are  the  so-called  sanitary  cars. 
Their  purpose  is  to  transport  the  wounded  quickly 
to  the  hospitals,  and  this  is  very  important,  because 
in  the  medical  posts  on  the  line  only  the  very  slightly 
wounded  can  be  properly  taken  care  of;  so  if  some- 


ii6  PRESENT-DAY  WARFARE 

thing  must  be  done  for  them  they  must  be  quickly 
sent  to  the  rear.  These  trucks  are  managed  in  such 
a  way  that  the  slightly  wounded  can  sit  and  the 
severely  wounded  can  lie  in  stretchers.  They  must 
be  well  suspended  in  order  not  to  shake  the  wounded 
inside. 

Troops  may  have  to  be  marched  on  roads,  and 
then  strict  discipline  should  be  enforced  so  as  to 
leave  one  side  of  the  road  free  for  easy  passage. 
In  France  infantry  marches  for  fifty  minutes  and 
then  gets  ten  minutes'  rest,  and  so  on  again.  If  the 
march  is  continued  for  a  whole  day  the  men  rest  for 
at  least  one  hour  for  their  meal.  A  certain  inter- 
val is  kept  between  units,  and  when  the  ten  minutes' 
rest  comes  these  intervals  are  taken  again;  these 
intervals  prove  very  useful,  for  when  a  check  takes 
place  at  the  head  of  the  column  they  prevent  the 
different  units  from  closing  on  each  other.  This  is 
particularly  annoying  when  it  takes  place  on  a  very 
long  column.  Experience  has  proved  that  when 
there  is  a  slight  obstacle,  as,  for  instance,  a  particu- 
larly muddy  place,  the  men  at  the  head  of  the  col- 
umn try  to  avoid  it  and  so  displace  themselves 
slightly,  and  this  occasions  at  the  rear  of  the  col- 
umn a  check  which  can't  be  understood.  It  is  very 
trying  when  such  checks  often  take  place.  To  pre- 
vent this  a  strong  discipline  must  be  observed,  and 
as  many  columns  formed  as  possible,  for  such  checks 


TRANSPORTATION  117 

cannot  be  avoided  if  huge  columns,  such  as  division 
columns,  are  in  line.  On  the  other  hand,  when  the 
movement  orders  are  issued  all  available  roads 
should  be  carefully  considered.  The  passing  of 
crossroads  by  two  columns  should  also  be  studied. 
The  staff  must  calculate  at  what  time  the  column 
is  to  leave  and  then  calculate  again  at  what  time 
the  column  will  arrive,  knowing  that  in  one  hour 
infantry  will  cover  four  kilometres,  this  hour  in- 
cluding the  ten  minutes'  rest.  Another  difficulty 
lies  in  forming  the  columns,  for  the  troops  are 
scattered  in  different  rest-billets;  a  special  hour 
should  be  given  for  each  unit  to  start  and  all 
watches  should  be  properly  regulated.  Then  the 
units  should  pass  a  given  point  at  a  given  hour,  each 
unit  at  a  different  time,  so  that  automatically  in 
passing  this  special  point,  called  the  initial  point, 
the  column  would  be  properly  formed. 

For  each  unit  there  should  be  designated  a  place 
of  assembly  and  all  the  units  in  the  same  rest-billets 
should  be  formed  in  one  column.  All  these  small 
columns  pass  at  one  initial  point  to  form  the  whole 
column.  Large  columns  should  be  avoided,  for  in 
large  columns  the  speed  of  the  march  is  much  less- 
ened and  it  is  much  more  tiring  for  the  men.  Of 
course,  the  formation  of  the  column  will  be  dictated 
by  tactical  and  strategical  reasons.  The  column 
breaks  up  in  the  same  way  that  it  was  formed. 


ii8  PRESENT-DAY  WARFARE 

After  a  certain  period  the  units  take  the  different 
roads  leading  to  their  respective  quarters. 

It  isn't  only  infantry  that  has  to  make  marches, 
but  all  the  different  arms:  cavalry,  artillery,  etc. 
These  form  separate  columns  and  they  should  never 
be  mixed  up,  otherwise  congestion  will  result  and 
occasion  great  delays.  The  marches  of  these  columns 
should  be  protected  in  open  warfare  by  vanguards — 
patrols  which  assure  the  security  of  the  whole 
column.  By  this  we  mean  that  they  are  pushed 
sufficiently  far  ahead  to  give  to  the  column  the  time 
to  deploy  and  make  ready  for  action.  The  longer 
the  column  is,  the  longer  the  time  required. 

In  trench  warfare  precautions  should  be  taken 
that  these  columns  shall  not  be  seen  by  the  enemy, 
therefore  the  roads  are  concealed  by  means  of 
camouflage  from  the  direct  sight  of  the  enemy,  and 
most  of  the  time  these  marches  can  only  be  carried 
out  at  night  or  at  dawn  on  a  misty  day  and  by 
small  columns  which  pass  at  given  intervals.  In 
every  case  the  columns  should  be  protected  from 
aerial  sights  and  attacks. 

Another  means  of  transportation  is  by  boats, 
either  on  rivers  or  on  the  sea.  On  rivers  or  canals 
special  boats  are  used,  boats  with  a  flat  bottom,  and 
these  boats  are  pushed  by  trawlers.  In  these  boats 
ammunition  and  also  some  goods  can  be  carried, 
but  men  as  a  rule,  except  wounded,  are  not  so  trans- 


TRANSPORTATION  119 

ported,  for  it  is  a  very  slow  way.  In  some  of  these 
boats  hospitals  or  resting-stations  have  been  put  up 
and  in  these  the  wounded  are  very  well  attended  to 
and  can  be  very  well  taken  care  of  while  being  trans- 
ported. 

Sea  transports  carry  men  and  material.  They 
are  used  for  the  armies  overseas,  as,  for  instance,  the 
Allied  armies  in  Saloniki  or  for  the  transportation 
of  men  and  goods  from  America.  A  great  problem 
to  solve  in  sea  transportation  is  the  submarine 
menace.  Since  this  war  began  a  quantity  of  men 
and  material  have  been  transported  by  our  navy 
and  comparatively  with  very  slight  losses. 


CHAPTER  X 
FOOI>-SUPPLY 

TO  have  an  army  fight  well  it  is  necessary  to 
feed  it  well.  It  is  not  an  easy  problem  to 
transport  everything  required  for  the  keeping  up  of 
the  huge  armies  which  are  now  in  the  field.  The 
men  get  either  rations  (food  kept  in  tin  boxes)  or 
food  delivered  by  the  "food-supply."  Each  man 
has  two  days  rations,  this  being  supplied  in  order 
that  he  may  be  sure  of  nourishment  should  there  be 
no  supplies  for  two  days.  This  is  especially  the 
case  during  active  operations  when  the  supply  be- 
comes irregular  on  account  of  the  heavy  shelling, 
which  closes  all  the  ways  leading  from  the  rear  to 
the  front.  In  the  food-depots  still  more  reserve 
rations  are  stored  in  order  to  be  able  to  feed  the 
men  should  the  daily  supply  not  arrive.  These 
rations  consist  of  corned  beef,  dried  vegetables, 
sugar,  coffee,  and  condensed  soup,  and  in  some  armies 
chocolate  is  added.  The  idea  is  to  get  the  greatest 
amount  of  food  in  the  smallest  possible  volume. 
These  rations  are  constantly  carried  by  the  men  in 
their  packs,  but  they  are  not  allowed  to  eat  them 
except  when  ordered. 


FOOD-SUPPLY  121 

During  offensive  operations  the  supply  is  very  ir- 
regular and  the  men  and  officers  mostly  live  on 
rations,  but  this  is  not  the  usual  food.  They  get 
meat,  which  comes  frozen  up  from  America  and 
which  is  brought  in  meat-trucks  (formerly  the  busses 
of  Paris)  from  the  station  where  all  supplies  are 
brought  in,  and  the  meat  is  then  distributed  to  the 
regimental  wagons,  which  bring  it  to  the  different 
battalions,  from  which  each  company  gets  it.  It 
is  cooked  in  the  field-kitchen,  but  the  men  do  not 
always  eat  conserved  meat;  they  get  fresh  meat  as 
cattle  are  kept  in  the  rear  and  well  looked  after. 
They  are  then  brought  to  slaughter,  and  the  meat 
sent  to  the  troops.  The  other  supplies,  such  as 
vegetables  and  jams  are  also  brought  in  trucks  and 
then  distributed  to  the  different  units.  There  is  a 
daily  supply-train  which  brings  in  all  the  supplies 
necessary  for  one  day.  Bread  is  not  brought  from 
the  rear  or  from  the  interior,  but  is  made  by  the 
military  bakers  attached  to  the  different  units. 
The  most  difficult  part  of  the  task  of  supplying  the 
troops  is  the  distribution.  Fatigue-parties  leave  the 
lines  (in  arms,  of  course),  go  to  the  rear,  and  wait 
there  for  the  field-kitchens,  which  in  active  sectors 
move  every  night  and  come  as  close  as  possible  to 
the  lines.  There  the  men  take  them  in  charge  and 
bring  them  up  to  the  front.  It  is  very  tiring  for 
them,  because  they  are  heavily  laden  and  when 


122  PRESENT-DAY  WARFARE 

shells  hurtle  over  them  they  cannot  drop  everything 
in  order  to  attend  to  their  own  safety — they  would 
not  be  welcomed  by  their  comrades  if  they  did  so. 

Of  the  supplies,  one  of  the  most  popular  items  is 
undoubtedly  the  wine,  and  the  men  are  careful  not 
to  lose  a  drop  of  it.  When  we  were  in  the  Somme, 
the  night  after  the  attack  of  the  25th  of  September, 
some  fatigue  parties  were  sent  to  bring  up  supplies. 
One  of  the  men  came  back  and  told  me  that  "these 
Boches  were  really  beasts."  I  asked  him  how  he 
happened  to  have  discovered  that  and  he  answered 
that  "they  didn't  respect  anything,  not  even  the 
supply  of  wine,  and  that  a  splinter  from  one  of 
their  shells  had  pierced  his  only  bottle  so  that  all 
the  precious  liquor  had  been  lost!" 

It  is  quite  an  easy  task  to  bring  up  supplies  in  a 
quiet  sector  because  the  communication-trenches 
are  in  good  condition  and  far  to  the  rear,  so  that  it 
is  not  very  dangerous  for  the  fatigue-parties  to  make 
the  trip,  as  most  of  the  time  the  shelling  is  not  very 
dense.  But  in  offensive  sectors  this  is  not  the  case, 
where  the  rows  are  kept  a  great  distance  to  the 
rear  and  where  no  communication-trenches  lead 
from  the  first  shell-hole  line  to  the  places  where  the 
field-kitchens  come.  In  such  sectors  the  enemy  is 
shelling  the  whole  time  and  very  often  curtain  fire 
of  guns  and  machine-guns  is  let  loose.  The  zones 
which  these  fatigue-parties  have  to  traverse  are 


FOOD-SUPPLY  123 

quite  difficult  ones  on  account  of  the  number  of 
shell-holes,  besides  which  they  find  great  difficulty 
in  finding  their  way  back  to  the  shell-holes  they 
originally  left.  In  these  sectors  we  often  use  little 
Arabian  donkeys,  which  greatly  help  the  men. 
When  in  an  offensive  sector,  it  is  impossible  to  send 
many  men  to  the  rear,  for  fear  the  enemy  might 
launch  an  attack;  so  a  few  men  have  to  carry  all  the 
supplies  for  the  whole  party,  and  this,  added  to  the 
difficulties  we  have  already  pointed  out,  makes  the 
whole  question  of  food-supply  very  difficult  and 
complicated. 


CHAPTER  XI 
LIFE  IN  THE  TRENCHES 

TO  gain  a  proper  idea  of  the  life  in  the  trenches 
it  is  necessary  to  realize  what  trenches  really 
are.  They  are  narrow  excavations,  about  four  feet 
broad  and  six  feet  eight  inches  deep.  The  em- 
bankment on  the  side  toward  the  enemy  is  called 
the  parapet  and  that  at  the  rear  of  the  trench  is 
called  parados.  In  order  to  allow  the  men  to  fire 
special  steps  are  made  called  "firing-steps."  They 
are  at  a  depth  of  about  four  feet,  eight  inches.  The 
bottom  of  the  trench  is  only  three  feet  wide.  Two 
men  can  pass  each  other  in  the  trench,  one  being  on 
the  firing-step  and  the  other  in  the  trench  itself. 
These  trenches  do  not  form  straight  lines  but  fol- 
low the  contours  of  the  terrain  in  order  to  afford  a 
good  field  of  fire.  They  go  zigzagging,  form  salients 
and  re-entrants,  and  thus  allow  the  use  of  cross-fire. 
In  field-intrenchments  it  was  necessary  to  have  a 
good  field  of  fire  at  long  ranges,  but  in  the  present 
form  of  intrenching  this  does  not  appear  so  neces- 
sary because  the  trenches  are  quite  close  to  those  of 
the  enemy  and  are  protected  by  an  amount  of 
barbed  wire,  which  prevents  the  enemy  from  enter- 
124 


LIFE  IN  THE  TRENCHES  125 

ing  them.  Trenches  are  located  in  such  position  in 
order  to  enable  the  garrison  to  fire  effectively  and 
annihilate  the  enemy's  assaulting  waves  while  cross- 
ing No  Man's  Land. 

The  front  lines  are  very  often  badly  chosen  from 
a  tactical  point  of  view.  This  is  because  we  had  to 
stop  and  dig  trenches  during  the  fight,  either  dur- 
ing the  pursuit  after  the  battle  of  the  Marne  or  in 
the  big  offensives  which  we  launched  afterward, 
namely,  Verdun,  Somme,  Aisne,  and  Flanders. 
These  first  lines  have  behind  them  other  trenches, 
which  are  called  support-parallels.  Some  of  them 
are  on  the  counter-slope  of  hills  or  ridges.  The 
positions  on  the  counter-slopes  are  very  favorable, 
because  when  the  enemy  appears  at  the  crest  all 
the  fire-power  is  used  and  the  bullets  which  do  not 
reach  the  first  waves  will  reach  the  others  which  are 
at  the  crest.  If  the  bullets  go  too  far  they  will  go 
over  the  crest  and  may  by  chance  hit  some  of  the 
enemy  who  are  behind  it.  These  positions  in  order 
to  be  useful  must  be  provided  with  observation- 
points  at  the  crest.  All  the  trenches  have  means 
of  communication  with  the  rear,  so-called  boyaux, 
or  communication-trenches.  These  communication- 
trenches  are  merely  trenches  going  from  the  front 
to  the  rear  and  generally  without  any  firing-steps, 
although  in  some  cases  they  are  provided  with  some. 
This  is  done  in  order  that  the  men  may  be  able  to 


126  PRESENT-DAY ,  WARFARE 

fire  on  any  enemy  who  may  have  gained  a  foothold 
in  the  first  lines.  They  are  used  for  the  purpose 
of  dividing  the  ground  into  different  sectors,  able  to 
resist  by  themselves  should  the  neighboring  ones 
fall  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy.  Naturally  such 
communication-trenches  are  protected  on  both  flanks 
with  wire  entanglements. 

Any  position  forms  a  veritable  network  which 
covers  the  ground  with  trenches,  boyaux,  and  works 
of  different  kinds.  This  net  would  appear  quite 
useless  to  the  eye  of  the  layman,  but  looking  at  it 
with  more  attention  you  become  aware  that  some 
parts  of  these  trenches  are  so  called  "active"  parts; 
that  is  to  say,  parts  in  which  there  is  a  garrison  and 
which  has  a  fire-power,  while  others,  called  "pas- 
sive*' parts,  have  trenches  serving  merely  as  means 
of  communication  and  are  not  provided  with  a  gar- 
rison. They  are  defended  in  front  by  barbed  wire 
and  by  flanking  fire  from  the  active  parts.  In  this 
net  of  trench-works  there  are  so-called  centres  of 
resistance,  little  strongholds  which  are  improved 
very  much  and  in  which  there  is  a  garrison,  some- 
times a  platoon,  at  other  times  a  battalion. 

To  grasp  fully  how  the  defensive  is  organized  in 
trench  warfare  it  must  not  be  imagined  that  we 
defend  parallel-lines  of  trenches  and  that  after 
having  taken  one  line  of  trenches  we  take  another 
and  so  on.  This  would  give  quite  a  false  idea  of 


LIFE  IN  THE  TRENCHES  127 

this  warfare.  Actually  the  defense  is  composed  of 
series  of  strongholds  which  can  protect  each  other 
by  strong  cross-fire  in  order  to  prevent  the  assault- 
ing forces  from  taking  the  whole  position  and  to 
prevent  them  from  rolling  on  like  waves.  These 
strongholds  are  as  piers  in  a  bridge  which  divide 
the  assaulting  waves  into  a  series  of  groups  that  can 
have  no  connection  one  with  another,  are  separated 
by  centres  of  resistance  and  submitted  to  strong 
cross-fire  from  these  strongholds.  On  the  other 
hand,  as  the  defender  knows  perfectly  where  the 
enemy's  assaulting  waves  will  be  allowed  to  pro- 
gress a  stupendous  shelling  can  destroy  the  daring 
foe  who  gains  a  foothold  in  the  positions.  You  can 
realize  how  difficult  the  task  of  the  attacking  troops 
is.  If  they  want  to  proceed,  their  forces  must  not  be 
shattered,  their  front  of  attack  must  not  be  broken, 
and  they  must  be  able  to  push  ahead  as  a  powerful 
tide  which  sweeps  everything  before  it.  It  must  not 
only  sweep  everything  before  it  but  must  also  oc- 
cupy the  ground  which  it  has  attacked.  The  role 
of  the  trenches  is  to  prevent  this  from  happening, 
and  the  whole  life  in  the  trenches  has  but  one  sole 
aim,  to  be  ready  to  meet  the  enemy  and  hold  him 
at  bay.  Fighting  does  not  always  occur,  and  most 
of  the  time  the  men  have  to  be  ready  to  fight,  but 
the  attack  does  not  come. 

If  we  want  our  soldiers  to  be  fit  for  fighting  at 


128  PRESENT-DAY  WARFARE 

any  moment  it  is  necessary  that  they  should  be  in 
good  physical  condition.  For  this  it  is  essential 
that  they  be  sheltered  from  bad-weather  conditions 
and  get  good  food.  To  shelter  them,  dugouts 
and  shelters  are  built.  They  serve  for  a  double 
purpose,  namely,  to  protect  the  men  from  the  en- 
emy's missiles  and,  secondly,  to  provide  them  with 
as  comfortable  resting-places  as  possible.  The  deep 
dugouts  are  underground,  with  generally  a  staircase 
leading  from  the  trench,  and  are  constructed  on  the 
side  of  the  trench  toward  the  enemy  in  order  to 
prevent  a  shell  from  entering  the  opening  to  the 
dugout.  The  flight  of  stairs  has  usually  from 
twenty  to  forty  or  more  steps,  and  they  reach  to  a 
depth  of  at  least  five  and  sometimes  eight  and  ten 
yards  in  order  to  afford  protection  from  heavy  shells. 
At  the  bottom  of  this  staircase  there  is  a  long  gal- 
lery, perpendicular  to  the  stairs  and  at  the  other 
end  of  the  gallery  there  is  another  flight  of  steps 
leading  up  to  the  trench.  Each  dugout  always  has 
at  least  two  entrances,  sometimes  more.  In  this 
gallery,  which  connects  the  two  entrances,  are  beds 
of  heavy  wire  screen  and  there  the  men  rest.  This 
wire  screen  is  held  up  on  four  poles  and  has  a  wooden 
frame. 

In  the  trenches  the  men  generally  have  to  suffer 
more  from  other  enemies  than  from  the  real  one,  the 
Germans.  Among  the  most  terrible  are  bad-weather 


LIFE  IN  THE  TRENCHES  129 

conditions — rain  and  frost  wear  and  melt  away  the 
trenches,  forming  a  liquid  mud,  and  little  by  little 
the  parapet  and  parados  crumble.  In  the  trench 
itself  it  is  not  rare  to  find  mud  as  high  as  the  knee 
and  often  even  higher.  In  Eparges,  in  February, 
1915,  several  men,  slightly  wounded,  could  not  be 
transported  and  died,  buried  in  this  mud,  which 
swallowed  them  up.  On  the  Somme,  near  Bou- 
chavesnes,  I  recall,  on  the  i8th  of  November,  1916, 
finding  two  men  of  the  6yth  Regiment  who  were 
buried  as  high  as  their  chests  and  we  were  obliged  to 
haul  them  out  with  ropes.  To  avoid  this  mud  is  a 
daily  and  constant  task,  but  it  is  very  difficult  be- 
cause the  trenches  form  canals  in  which  the  water 
gathers  naturally.  So,  first,  we  must  protect  the 
parapet  and  parados  of  the  trenches  and  prevent 
them  from  falling,  and,  secondly,  we  must  try  to 
keep  the  bottom  of  our  trench  dry. 

To  prevent  the  parapet  and  parados  of  our  trenches 
from  falling  down,  revetements  are  constructed. 
These  revetements  are  of  various  kinds.  Some  are 
made  with  wire  screen  placed  against  the  walls  of 
the  trench  and  held  with  stakes,  some  with  sand- 
bags or  with  gabions  or  with  hurdles.  The  hurdles 
are  made  of  four  or  five  pickets  pointed  vertically, 
with  flexible  brushwood  woven  around  these  up- 
rights. 

The  most  difficult  task  is  to  get  rid  of  the  mud  in 


130  PRESENT-DAY  WARFARE 

the  trenches.  For  this  ditches  are  made  in  order  to 
collect  the  water  and  direct  it  into  little  shallow 
wells,  called  sumps.  The  bottoms  of  the  trenches 
are  mostly  covered  with  latticework,  but  much  of 
the  time  this  does  not  suffice  and  the  men  are 
obliged  to  throw  the  mud  out  of  the  trenches  with 
shovels  and  scoops.  When  it  is  cold  or  damp  it  is 
very  trying  for  the  watchers  to  stay  motionless  dur- 
ing the  two  hours  they  are  on  post  and  always  watch 
the  enemy.  They  must  be  warmly  clad,  and  wear 
sheepskins  over  their  coats  and  use  water-proof 
boots. 

In  the  dugouts  it  is  necessary  to  fight  against  the 
rats  and  mice  which  swarm  around  and  steal  away 
all  the  food.  They  have  to  be  poisoned  and  some- 
times dogs  and  cats  are  kept  in  dugouts  for  the  pur- 
pose of  killing  them.  In  summer-time  swarms  of 
flies  are  in  the  trenches,  and  it  is  very  difficult  to 
destroy  them,  for  there  is  such  a  great  number  of 
dead  all  around  and  this  is  a  source  of  perpetual 
danger.  It  is  sometimes  impossible  to  remove  the 
dead,  who  are  in  No  Man's  Land. 

The  men  have  to  work  very  hard  even  when 
they  are  in  so-called  quiet  sectors,  because  in  these 
sectors  the  garrison  is  but  a  small  one  to  hold  a 
very  big  stretch  of  ground.  This  stretch  of  ground 
has  to  be  kept  in  good  condition,  so  the  men  must 
work,  and  this  is  generally  possible  only  during  the 


German  Trenches  No  Man's  Land         French  Trenche 

A  VIEW  OF  FRENCH  AND  GERMAN  TRENCHES 


LIFE  IN  THE  TRENCHES  131 

night.  At  night  men  do  not  sleep.  They  set  to 
work  at  eight  o'clock  and  work  all  through  the  night 
until  dawn,  sleeping  during  the  daytime.  In  day- 
time they  also  have  to  do  the  fatigue-work  in  the 
trenches  and  keep  them  in  good  condition,  besides 
furnishing  the  watchers. 

In  most  dugouts  there  are  observation-posts  from 
which  by  the  aid  of  periscopes  the  enemy  is  watched, 
and  this  is  especially  essential  when  a  heavy  bom- 
bardment takes  place  and  the  enemy  is  liable  to 
launch  an  attack. 

There  are  but  very  few  troops  in  the  first  line. 
Quite  close  to  the  enemy  there  is  a  line  called  "Line 
of  Outposts."  These  outposts  are  small  elements 
of  trenches  communicating  by  means  of  boyaux 
with  the  first-line  trench.  In  these  outposts  are 
generally  a  corporal  and  three  men.  The  outposts 
and  communication-trenches  leading  to  the  first- 
line  trenches  are  protected  with  barbed  wire.  In 
the  first  line  itself  there  are  but  few  men  and  no 
dugouts.  Then  comes  the  line  of  resistance,  so-called 
main  parallel.  This  line  of  resistance  is  occupied 
by  a  stronger  garrison,  and  there  is  also  a  line  of 
support  for  this  resistance-line  and  at  a  distance  a 
line  of  strongholds  where  there  are  some  reserves.  At 
a  distance  behind  there  is  the  intermediary  parallel, 
that  is  to  say,  a  line  of  trenches  protecting  the  posi- 
tions of  the  guns.  Then  at  last  the  emplacements 


i32  PRESENT-DAY  WARFARE 

for  the  batteries.  These  lines  may  be  doubled  and 
have  several  support-lines,  but  this  is  the  form  on 
which  the  so-called  position  is  built.  There  are 
at  least  two  positions  and  generally  three  and  four 
and  often  more.  The  positions  at  the  rear  are  but 
half  occupied  if  they  are  at  all,  but  there  are  always 
troops  at  rest-billets  who  know  which  of  these  posi- 
tions they  are  to  occupy  in  case  of  emergency.  In 
the  resistance-line  there  are  about  two-thirds  of 
the  garrison  occupying  the  position  from  the  lis- 
tening-posts to  the  line  of  strongholds.  Out  of  these 
two-thirds  about  a  little  less  than  one-fourth  oc- 
cupies the  first  line  and  the  listening-posts.  This 
makes  clear  the  great  echelonment  in  depth. 

It  is  very  striking  and  interesting  to  stroll  along 
in  the  trenches  during  the  daytime.  It  really  seems 
as  if  they  were  deserted,  only  when  from  space  to 
space  you  find  a  man  who  watches,  and  that  is  only 
in  the  first  lines.  In  the  other  lines  most  of  these 
watchers  are  in  dugouts  and  observation-posts  and 
are  not  to  be  seen.  At  night  it  is  quite  a  different 
thing.  Life  begins  again  and  constantly  the  ground 
is  illuminated  by  rockets,  sent  up  by  both  French 
and  Germans,  which  fly  up  in  the  air  and  make  a 
ghastly  white  light.  This  lasts  but  a  few  seconds, 
and  then  again  rockets  are  sent  up  so  that  watchers 
may  see  what  is  going  on.  Thus  the  whole  line  is 
illuminated  and  one  can  easily  make  out  the  shape 


LIFE  IN  THE  TRENCHES  133 

of  the  lines  by  this  illumination.  From  time  to 
time  rockets  of  different  colors,  green,  red,  and 
rockets  with  different  streaks  fly  up  into  the  air,  and 
these  have  a  special  signification.  Most  of  the  time 
they  are  signals  for  the  turning  loose  of  a  curtain  of 
fire.  Very  often  a  nervous  enemy  asks  for  a  curtain- 
fire  fearing  an  attack  when  that  which  alarmed  him 
was  only  a  rat  that  made  some  noise  in  the  barbed 
wire  or  in  the  tin  box  of  rations.  The  watcher  must 
be  constantly  on  the  alert  and  see  and  hear  every- 
thing that  is  going  on.  If  he  hears  the  Germans 
working  in  their  trenches  the  commanding  officers 
calculate  as  exactly  as  possible  on  their  maps  the 
place  where  the  German  fatigue-parties  are,  and 
send  this  information  to  the  artillery,  asking  them 
to  fire  upon  them.  This  is  also  done  when  it  is  heard 
that  the  Germans  are  having  traffic  on  their  roads. 
Of  course,  this  depends  upon  the  direction  of  the 
wind.  If  the  wind  is  favorable  every  noise  is  plainly 
heard.  From  time  to  time  artillery  fires  on  special 
points,  often  without  warning  to  its  infantry. 
These  points  are  called  sensitive  points,  for  we  know 
that  the  Germans  are  obliged  to  pass  by  them. 
Most  of  the  time  in  these  so-called  quiet  sectors 
during  the  whole  night  the  rattling  of  the  machine- 
guns  and  the  cracking  of  rifles  is  heard.  The  Ger- 
man sentries  are  ordered  to  fire  from  time  to  time. 
Also  the  machine-guns  send  occasional  showers  of 


134  PRESENT-DAY  WARFARE 

bullets  in  order  to  sweep  the  ground,  and  prevent 
any  traffic  or  to  hinder  our  fatigue-parties. 

At  night  patrolling  is  very  active.  Each  com- 
pany sends  a  patrol  at  a  certain  time  out  in  No  Man's 
Land  in  order  to  ascertain  if  the  Germans  are  pre- 
paring for  some  mischief  or  to  get  a  closer  view  of 
their  first  lines,  and  see  what  new  works  they  have 
begun.  Sometimes  French  and  German  patrols 
encounter  each  other  in  No  Man's  Land,  and  at 
such  times  they  generally  have  a  hand-grenade 
fight.  Often  when  a  patrol  has  some  difficult  mis- 
sion to  accomplish  the  men  crawl  out  with  only  a 
rifle  or  a  bayonet,  and  with  their  pockets  full  of 
hand-grenades,  but  it  is  necessary  to  have  the  patrol 
strong  enough  to  meet  any  emergency.  It  is  rather 
difficult  to  afford  our  patrol  any  help  if  it  is  fighting 
with  a  German  patrol,  because  if  we  fire  from  our 
first  lines  there  is  a  great  risk  of  hitting  our  own 
men.  Artillery  can  be  of  no  use  in  this  case.  The 
hours  at  which  the  patrols  go  out  are  given  to  the 
artillery  so  that  the  guns  will  not  fire  at  that  time. 
A  very  great  difficulty  in  this  patrolling  is  to  find 
one's  way  and  to  appreciate  the  distance  which 
has  been  covered,  for  the  time  seems  very  long  to 
the  men  on  patrol,  and  most  of  the  time  they  make 
gross  mistakes  in  appreciating  the  distance  they 
have  covered.  They  must  be  specially  well-trained 
men,  have  very  good  eyesight  and  be  able  to  dis- 


LIFE  IN  THE  TRENCHES  135 

tinguish  well  in  the  darkness.  Every  man  is  not 
able  to  do  this.  Then  there  is  the  great  difficulty 
in  finding  one's  own  way  back,  and  this  may  seem 
a  very  easy  task,  but  practically  it  is  not,  because  in 
No  Man's  Land  it  is  quite  impossible  to  find  a  partic- 
ular point  to  assist  in  keeping  the  right  direction. 

While  some  of  the  men  are  watching  and  others 
patrolling,  the  rest  are  working  hard  to  dig  new 
positions  or  to  construct  new  defenses.  The  work 
has  been  planned  during  the  daytime  by  the  officers 
and  non-commissioned  officers  who  have  seen  ex- 
actly what  they  are  to  do,  and  they  place  white 
tapes  on  the  ground  so  that  when  the  men  work  at 
night  they  have  only  to  dig  according  to  the  direc- 
tion afforded  by  the  white  streaks.  This  also  is 
very  important  because  it  is  nearly  impossible  to 
give  proper  directions  at  night.  One  has  great  dif- 
ficulty in  finding  his  way,  and  very  often  serious 
errors  of  direction  are  made.  I  remember  in  the 
Somme  near  the  wood  of  Saint-Pierre-Vaast  we  were 
preparing  an  attack  in  the  beginning  of  November, 
1916,  and  I  ordered  some  pioneers  of  my  battalion 
to  dig  jumping-off  trenches  which  were  to  have  a 
general  direction  facing  to  the  north.  One  of  the 
officers  had  not  prepared  the  work  during  the  day- 
time, and  the  jumping-off  trench  which  he  and  his 
men  dug  was  constructed  facing  to  the  west  and 
had  to  be  dug  again  the  next  day. 


136  PRESENT-DAY  WARFARE 

A  great  amount  of  war  material  is  required  for 
the  maintenance  and  the  building  up  of  the  posi- 
tions— barbed  wire,  posts,  iron  stakes,  concrete, 
wooden  frames,  planks,  nails,  steel  observatories, 
steel  shields,  sand-bags,  etc.  All  this  is  transported 
as  near  as  possible  to  the  first  lines  by  narrow-gauge 
railroads,  and  then  on  trucks  or  on  railroad-cars 
drawn  by  horses  or  mules.  Finally  the  men  are 
obliged  to  carry  all  supplies  to  the  points  where 
they  are  to  be  used  on  their  shelters.  It  is  really 
very  trying  to  see  the  poilus  in  the  narrow  trenches 
and  boyaux  dodging  along  heavily  laden,  often  two 
or  more  soldiers  staggering  along  with  some  article 
of  too  great  weight  for  a  single  carrier.  Also  there 
are  supply-parties  which  bring  food  from  the  rear. 
The  company  kitchens  are  brought  at  night  as  close 
to  the  lines  as  possible,  and  then  the  men  carry  the 
food  in  to  the  troops  who  occupy  the  trenches.  Of 
course,  there  is  no  regular  time  when  the  troops 
will  get  their  food,  because  that  quite  depends  on 
the  enemy.  If  the  enemy  is  nervous  and  constantly 
shelling  the  rear,  the  convoys  cannot  approach  the 
lines,  and  when  they  do  reach  the  lines  the  supply- 
parties  often  cannot  go  ahead,  being  stopped  by 
a  heavy  barrage  fire;  so  most  of  the  time  the  food 
comes  at  a  late  hour  to  the  dugouts  and  the  men 
will  not  eat  until  the  next  morning,  heating  their 
food  by  means  of  alcohol-burners.  ;  The  dugouts 


LIFE  IN  THE  TRENCHES  137 

in  winter  are  heated  with  little  stoves,  and  outside 
of  the  trenches  the  watchers  often  have  braseros. 

The  working-parties  always  go  to  work  armed 
with  their  rifles  and  ammunition  in  order  to  be  able 
to  meet  any  emergency.  At  night  units  which  are 
billeted  at  the  rear  come  and  work  to  repair  the 
positions.  In  the  offensive  sectors,  where  the  troops 
in  reserve  are  billeted  close  to  the  lines,  these  troops 
come  every  night  to  work  and  prepare  the  positions 
from  which  they  are  to  start  on  the  day  they  will 
attack.  Thus  they  get  accustomed  to  the  ground 
on  which  they  are  to  fight. 

Officers  make  the  rounds  of  the  trenches  at  night 
to  ascertain  whether  every  man  is  watchful.  Gen- 
erally in  each  platoon  there  are  two  corporals  and 
one  non-commissioned  officer  on  duty,  and  for  the 
company  one  officer  is  on  duty.  For  the  battalion 
one  company  commander  is  always  on  duty.  All 
these  officers  and  non-commissioned  officers  make 
the  rounds  of  the  sectors  occupied  by  the  units  they 
are  on  duty  with;  every  incident  is  noted,  and  is 
reported  next  morning  to  the  battalion  commander, 
who  sends  his  report  each  morning  to  the  colonel. 
The  reports  go  to  the  battalion  headquarters  at 
about  four  o'clock  in  the  morning,  and  the  major 
or  the  captain  who  is  second  in  command  of  the 
battalion  reads  them  over  and  sends  the  report  for 
the  whole  battalion  to  the  colonel's  command  post. 


138  PRESENT-DAY  WARFARE 

If  any  event  of  importance  should  occur  it  would, 
of  course,  be  reported  immediately. 

The  working-parties  who  are  in  the  sectors  of 
other  units  are  required  to  put  themselves  under 
the  orders  of  officers  in  command  of  the  sectors 
should  the  enemy  attack.  In  Verneuil,  on  the  Aisne 
front,  in  January,  1917,  where  we  were  preparing 
to  start  our  big  offensive  of  May,  1917,  one  night 
there  was  in  the  sector  of  my  battalion  a  battalion 
of  Morocco  troops  and  another  battalion  of  French 
troops  when  the  enemy  launched  an  attack  on  the 
front  of  my  battalion.  These  two  other  battalions 
gave  us  valuable  assistance. 

The  troops  cannot  stay  continuously  in  the 
trenches.  They  must  be  relieved  in  order  to  get 
some  rest,  for,  as  it  has  been  explained,  this  life  in 
the  trenches,  even  in  the  so-called  quiet  sectors,  is 
a  trying  one,  and  also  it  is  necessary  that  the  men 
be  supplied  with  a  change  of  clothing  and  be  able 
to  bathe.  This  naturally  cannot  be  done  in  the 
front-line  trenches. 

The  length  of  time  which  units  remain  in  the 
trenches  varies  according  to  the  amount  of  fatigue 
and  the  losses  sustained  by  the  troops  occupying 
the  sectors.  In  lively  sectors  reliefs  take  place  more 
often  than  in  quiet  ones.  Should  the  weather  condi- 
tions be  very  bad,  reliefs  occur  more  frequently  than 
otherwise.  Changes  should  not  be  too  frequent, 


LIFE  IN  THE  TRENCHES  139 

because  relieving  the  troops  is  a  very  difficult  opera- 
tion, and  during  the  night  of  the  relief  the  work 
cannot  be  done  as  it  is  ordinarily.  As  a  general 
rule,  men  remain  in  the  front-line  trenches  at  least 
four  or  five  days,  and  sometimes  they  stay  a  fort- 
night or  more.  The  relief  is  complicated  on  ac- 
count of  the  difficulty  in  finding  one's  way,  each 
communication-trench  being  like  the  others.  As 
reliefs  can  usually  be  accomplished  only  at  night, 
because  the  enemy  would  become  aware  of  this 
unusual  movement  in  daytime  and  open  a  barrage 
fire,  it  is  necessary  to  send  forth  guides  from  each 
unit  to  take  in  charge  the  relieving  units  at  the  en- 
trance of  the  trenches.  The  guide  for  each  platoon 
reports  to  the  leader  of  the  platoon  and  walks  ahead, 
then  the  whole  platoon  follows,  one  man  behind 
the  other  in  the  trenches,  and  on  they  go  until  they 
arrive  at  their  positions.  There  the  platoon  leader 
sees  and  talks  the  matter  over  with  the  platoon 
leader  he  is  to  relieve.  He  gets  acquainted  with 
all  the  peculiarities  of  the  sector,  and  then  the  men 
are  relieved.  The  corporal  of  the  unit  which  is  to 
be  relieved  takes  his  mate  over  the  sector  and  shows 
him  where  the  outposts  are,  and  both  go  and  re- 
lieve the  men.  As  a  matter  of  fact  we  have  adopted 
the  custom  of  sending  the  officers  in  before  the  relief 
takes  place.  At  least  the  colonels,  the  majors,  and 
the  captains  are  sent  one  day  ahead  in  order  to 


140  PRESENT-DAY  WARFARE 

become  thoroughly  acquainted  with  the  sector. 
They  learn  how  to  find  their  way  about  and  also 
they  find  out  what  are  the  habits  of  the  enemy. 
There  they  wait  until  their  men  arrive,  but  the  offi- 
cer who  is  relieved  does  not  go  away — captains  and 
majors  and  colonel  stay  one  day  with  the  officers 
who  have  relieved  them  in  order  to  give  them  all 
information  which  could  be  useful.  Thus,  the  offi- 
cer who  is  to  take  in  charge  this  new  sector  stays 
forty-eight  hours  with  the  officer  whom  he  relieves, 
and  it  is  supposed  that  after  this  time  he  knows  all 
peculiarities,  and  can  manage  the  defense  alone. 

In  all  organized  sectors  the  operation  of  relief 
is  long,  but  is  not  much  more  difficult  in  offensive 
sectors  than  in  quiet  sectors.  In  offensive  sectors 
one  great  difficulty  consists  in  finding  out  one's 
way,  because  there  are  no  more  communication- 
trenches,  only  a  zone  of  shell-holes  in  which  even 
the  guides  are  not  able  to  find  their  way.  This  is 
easy  to  understand,  because  they  are  unable  to  find 
any  special  point  which  could  attract  the  notice, 
and  assist  them  in  helping  them  out.  Sometimes 
such  stupendous  shelling  takes  place  within  a  very 
short  time  that  the  aspect  of  the  landscape  is  soon 
changed,  and  this  increases  the  great  difficulty  of 
finding  the  way  to  some  special  point.  Of  course, 
the  aid  of  a  compass  enables  one  to  find  the  general 
direction,  but  it  is  impossible  to  find  the  special  dug- 


LIFE  IN  THE  TRENCHES  141 

out  looked  for,  or  more  generally  the  special  shell- 
hole  which  you  want  to  reach.  Maps  are  of  but 
little  use,  because  they  show  you  villages  and  woods 
which  seem  to  offer  very  good  points  of  direction. 
When  you  come  where  they  are  supposed  to  be,  little 
trace  of  either  woods  or  villages  is  found.  Woods 
are  but  a  few  blackened  stumps  which  extend  their 
shattered  arms  toward  the  sky,  and  the  villages 
seem  to  have  been  completely  wiped  off  the  ground. 
For  instance,  of  the  Vaux  village  near  Verdun  there 
remains  only  crushed  stone  and  it  is  a  hue  lighter 
than  the  ground.  This,  of  course,  cannot  be  per- 
ceived at  night.  In  the  Somme,  I  was  once  at  a 
place  called  Marecourt  with  the  general  command- 
ing my  brigade.  Wishing  to  find  out  where  the 
church  had  been,  we  asked  one  of  the  soldiers  where 
Marecourt  church  was,  and  the  man  answered: 
"You  are  standing  upon  it." 

To  give  an  idea  how  difficult  it  is  to  conduct  a  re- 
lief in  an  offensive  sector,  I  will  tell  you  of  a  relief 
on  the  Somme  on  the  igth  of  September,  1916.  We 
were  billeted  about  twenty  miles  from  the  lines. 
From  there  the  major  and  the  captains  were  taken 
in  automobiles  as  near  as  possible  to  the  lines. 
Then  they  met  guides  and  went  to  get  in  touch  with 
the  officers  whom  they  were  to  relieve,  after  which 
they  came  back  to  Suzanne,  which  lies  some  seven 
or  eight  miles  from  the  lines.  The  men  were  taken 


i42  PRESENT-DAY  WARFARE 

in  trucks  to  Suzanne,  arriving  there  about  three 
o'clock  in  the  afternoon.  At  four  o'clock  the  major 
and  the  captains  returned  and  the  whole  battalion 
started  on  the  march  at  five  o'clock.  We  reached 
the  first  lines  at  eight  o'clock.  Marching  was  very 
tiring,  because  the  roads  were  in  bad  condition  and 
cut  up  by  shells,  these  roads  having  been  in  German 
hands  and  taken  by  us  in  the  last  drives.  All  the 
companies  marched  on  with  their  guides,  the  major 
at  their  head,  and  he  directed  me  to  go  with  the  last 
unit,  that  is  to  say,  the  machine-gun  company. 
This  machine-gun  company  had  walked  only  for 
about  a  quarter  of  an  hour  before  the  Germans  put 
down  a  barrage  with  gas-shells,  and  the  men  and 
officers  were  obliged  to  put  on  their  gas-masks.  It 
was  most  difficult  to  proceed  from  shell-hole  to 
shell-hole  with  masks  on,  and  especially  as  the  ma- 
chine-gunners were  heavily  loaded  with  their  ma- 
chine-guns. After  we  had  walked  for  some  time 
the  captain  commanding  the  company,  who  had 
just  come  from  the  lines,  asked  the  guides  if  they 
had  not  made  a  mistake.  The  guides  assured  him 
that  they  knew  their  way  perfectly  and  that  they 
were  on  the  right  track.  After  a  while  they  became 
rather  uneasy  and  said  that  they  did  not  know 
where  they  were.  We  then  encountered  a  carrying- 
party  which  was  proceeding  forward.  I  asked  the 
non-commissioned  officer  in  command  of  this  party 


LIFE  IN  THE  TRENCHES  143 

if  he  knew  the  location  of  the  brigade  headquarters, 
where  I  wanted  to  go  first.  That  man  told  me  that 
he  was  going  there  and  that  he  knew  the  way  per- 
fectly, so  I  ordered  the  machine-gun  company  to 
follow  this  carrying-party.  But  after  a  while  I 
heard  some  of  the  men  of  this  carrying-party  mutter 
that  the  non-commissioned  officer  had  misled  them 
and  that  he  was  going  the  wrong  way.  I  asked  him 
if  he  knew  his  way.  He  said  he  thought  he  knew  it, 
but  was  not  perfectly  sure  and  it  appeared  after  a 
while  that  we  were  completely  lost.  It  was  now 
half  past  two  in  the  morning  and  we  did  not  know 
how  far  we  were  from  the  lines  we  were  to  occupy, 
so  I  ordered  the  company  to  stop  in  the  shell-holes 
and  with  the  guides  and  the  captain  proceeded 
along  in  order  to  try  to  find  the  brigade  head- 
quarters we  were  seeking.  After  a  time  we  did  ar- 
rive at  a  brigade  headquarters,  but  this  brigade  was 
three  brigades  south  of  the  place  which  we  wished 
to  reach,  but  they  gave  us  the  right  direction.  We 
then  had  to  find  our  machine-gunners,  and  this  was 
not  an  easy  task.  At  last  we  mustered  our  men  to- 
gether, and  when  we  did  arrive  at  our  destination  it 
was  half  past  three  in  the  morning.  We  had  been 
walking  practically,  without  stopping,  since  five 
o'clock  of  the  previous  afternoon. 

When  the  units  are  relieved  they  march  back  to 
their  rest-billets,  each  platoon  proceeding  by  itself 


i44  PRESENT-DAY  WARFARE 

to  the  rear  of  the  lines,  where  at  an  indicated  place 
the  captain  assembles  his  company,  marches  it  to  the 
battalion  rendezvous,  and  then  the  whole  battalion 
proceeds  to  the  billets,  where  the  men  spend  their 
time  of  rest.  It  is  directed  in  the  relief  orders  that 
some  communication-trenches  will  be  used  only  by 
the  relieving  troops  and  others  by  the  troops  which 
are  relieved.  This  has  to  be  done,  for  if  the  two 
units  encountered  each  other  in  the  communication- 
trenches,  which  are  very  narrow,  it  would  take  a 
very  long  time  indeed  to  effect  a  relief,  and  as  the 
men  carry  their  full  packs,  they  are  not  able  to  pass 
each  other. 


CHAPTER  XII 
THE  DEFENSIVE  BATTLE 

IN  speaking  of  defensive  battles  I  refer  to  great 
encounters  such  as  the  struggle  at  Verdun  in 
1916,  which  was  a  defensive  battle  for  the  French, 
the  battle  of  Picardy  in  1918,  and  the  actions  in 
Flanders,  where  the  Germans  were  on  the  defensive. 
Raids  of  more  or  less  importance,  even  though 
many  troops  take  part  in  them  at  times,  are  not 
considered  as  battles. 

I  shall  try  to  make  clear  to  you,  first,  how  we  be- 
come aware  that  the  enemy  is  about  to  launch  an 
offensive,  and,  next,  to  explain  the  measures  which 
are  taken  to  meet  the  enemy  and  to  hold  him  at  bay. 

When  an  offensive  is  being  planned  by  the  enemy 
a  large  amount  of  constructive  work  must  be  un- 
dertaken by  him,  not  only  at  the  front  but  also  at 
the  rear.  To  begin  with,  all  means  of  communica- 
tion must  be  placed  in  the  very  best  condition  in 
order  to  accommodate  the  greatly  increased  traffic 
which  they  will  be  called  upon  to  bear,  and  new 
means  of  communication  must  be  created,  for  na- 
turally there  exist  only  those  which  are  necessary 
for  the  ordinary  existence  in  the  trenches,  which 
145 


146  PRESENT-DAY  WARFARE 

are  quite  insufficient.  New  railroads  are  built,  new 
roads  for  guns  and  trails  for  infantry  must  be  ar- 
ranged for,  and  positions  have  to  be  prepared  in  the 
front  line  for  the  artillery  which  is  to  prepare  the 
attack.  Many  requirements  must  be  met  for  in- 
fantry dugouts  and  sufficient  shelters  to  cover  the 
assaulting  troops  before  they  go  over  the  top,  and 
numbers  of  dumps  have  to  be  provided  for  the 
storing  of  the  great  masses  of  war  material  which 
will  be  required.  Much  of  the  work  cannot  be 
concealed,  particularly  that  pertaining  to  roads  and 
railroads.  Our  airplanes  locate  the  new  works  im- 
mediately and  they  are  made  prominent  on  the  aerial 
photographs  taken  by  the  aviators.  There  is  also 
an  unusual  amount  of  traffic  on  the  roads  behind 
the  enemy's  lines  which  will  be  noticed  by  the  planes, 
and  in  the  lines  it  will  be  noticed  that  the  Germans 
are  more  actively  at  work  than  usual.  Another 
thing  which  announces  an  attack  is  the  attitude  of 
the  enemy's  artillery  and  the  activity  of  his  ait 
service. 

All  these  signs  give  the  alarm  to  our  High  General 
Staff  which  thus  becomes  aware  that  something  is 
about  to  happen.  An  effort  will  be  made  to  esti- 
mate correctly  the  intentions  of  the  enemy,  to  de- 
cide where  and  on  which  front  he  will  attack,  and  to 
calculate  his  available  resources.  This  is,  of  course, 
no  easy  task,  for  the  enemy  will  always  try  to  se- 


THE  DEFENSIVE  BATTLE  147 

cure  the  advantages  of  a  surprise  and  will  use  all 
possible  means  to  deceive  us.  On  different  parts  of 
the  front  he  will  erect  works  which  have  an  offen- 
sive character,  and  the  available  divisions  which 
have  been  kept  in  reserve  will  be  brought  close  to 
some  places  where  there  will  never  be  an  attack, 
this  being  done  with  the  object  of  deceiving  the 
inhabitants  and  the  secret  agents  which  we  may  have 
within  the  lines  of  the  enemy.  False  reports  are 
spread  by  means  of  the  newspapers.  A  good  ex- 
ample of  this  was  offered  by  the  Germans  in  the 
beginning  of  1917  when  they  concentrated  troops 
at  the  Swiss  frontier  and  the  newspapers  published 
stones  to  the  effect  that  Switzerland  was  to  be  in- 
vaded. The  enemy  did  this  with  a  view  to  forcing 
us  to  send  troops  to  the  frontier  to  meet  the  possible 
invasion,  and  in  that  way  compel  us  to  postpone  our 
offensive  of  April,  1917,  on  the  Aisne. 

It  is  a  very  difficult  task  for  our  staff  to  acquire 
the  information  which  is  needed  in  order  to  take 
appropriate  measures  for  meeting  the  enemy's 
offensive.  For  this  purpose  secret  agents  are  con- 
stantly on  the  lookout  for  all  possible  clews  relat- 
ing to  the  enemy's  movements  and  his  prospective 
actions.  Planes  are  active  in  reconnoitring  and 
taking  photographs.  These  photographs  are  com- 
pared with  the  ones  previously  taken  and  all  changes 
noted.  Raids  are  ordered  on  all  the  fronts  in  order 


i48  PRESENT-DAY  WARFARE 

to  secure  exact  information  concerning  the  number 
and  the  identity  of  the  divisions  holding  the  front. 
Information  is  secured  by  the  Allies,  who  report 
which  divisions  are  on  their  front.  The  prisoners 
are  questioned  about  the  number  of  divisions  which 
are  at  rest-billets.  In  this  way  it  is  possible  to  learn 
how  many  divisions  are  holding  the  front  and  how 
many  are  in  reserve  behind  the  front.  If  the  num- 
ber increases  the  enemy  may  have  offensive  purposes, 
particularly  if  we  have  not  started  an  offensive. 
Then,  little  by  little,  we  learn  that  the  density  of 
the  troops  in  some  sector  has  augmented,  that 
numerous  troops  are  at  rest-billets  training  for  an 
offensive,  such  troops  being  either  close  to  the 
sectors  from  which  the  enemy  is  to  start  his  attack 
or  in  close  proximity  to  places  well  served  by  rail- 
roads and  roads  which  will  provide  speedy  trans- 
portation to  the  front. 

All  this  information  is  collected  by  the  General 
Staff,  which  controls  the  various  sources  of  intelli- 
gence and  which  then  takes  measures  accordingly. 
But  it  is  always  very  difficult  to  locate  exactly  where 
and  on  which  front  the  attack  will  take  place,  or, 
rather,  where  the  principal  attack  will  take  place,  for 
very  often  other  attacks  take  place  which  are  merely 
demonstrations.  For  instance,  before  the  Germans 
started  their  attack  on  Verdun  they  first  attacked 
on  various  parts  of  the  front  in  the  north,  in  Cham- 


THE  DEFENSIVE  BATTLE  149 

pagne,  and  in  Lorraine.  It  was  impossible  to  shift 
all  available  troops  to  Verdun,  although  we  knew 
that  we  should  be  attacked  there.  But  we  also 
knew  that  we  should  be  attacked  on  different  parts 
of  the  line  and  we  could  not  determine  just  what 
importance  these  other  attacks  would  assume.  So, 
when  it  appears  that  the  enemy  will  launch  an  at-* 
tack  the  High  General  Staff  is  obliged  to  take  special 
action.  The  first  measure  is  to  assemble  a  number 
of  troops  who  are  kept  in  reserve  to  meet  any  emer- 
gency. The  number  of  troops  assembled  will,  of 
course,  vary  according  to  the  general  situation  and 
to  the  supposed  strength  of  the  enemy's  attack. 
These  troops  will  not  be  placed  in  the  trenches 
which  we  believe  are  to  be  attacked,  but  in  a  place 
affording  every  facility  for  rapid  transportation  to 
different  parts  of  the  front,  either  by  trucks  or  by 
railroads.  This  is  done  to  avoid  a  possible  mistake 
in  the  dispositions,  for  it  takes  a  much  longer  time 
to  shift  large  units  kept  in  reserve  close  to  the  line  to 
another  part  of  the  front  than  to  transport  them  to 
any  part  of  the  line  from  a  well-selected  rest-billet 
zone. 

Next,  the  staff  arranges  for  the  assembly  of  all  the 
war  material  necessary,  especially  many  guns  of  all 
calibres  and  ammunition  in  great  quantity  to  feed 
them,  for  the  guns  are  big  eaters.  The  ground  on 
which  the  battle  is  to  be  fought  is  considered  with 


ISO  PRESENT-DAY  WARFARE 

great  care.  Defenses  are  bettered  and  new  positions 
are  created  at  the  rear,  that  a  stanch  and  spirited 
resistance  may  be  offered,  and  also  to  afford  shelter 
for  the  reserve  troops. 

The  first  position  is  studied  and  all  possible  im- 
provements are  made  in  the  existing  positions,  the 
work  beginning  at  the  rear  positions,  for  the  very 
first  lines  are  doomed  to  utter  destruction.  Every 
effort  is  made  to  conceal  in  a  network  of  trenches 
all  important  points  of  defense,  including  the  strong- 
holds, points  which  are  favorable  for  the  develop- 
ment of  flanking  fire,  and  machine-gun  emplacements, 
the  latter  screened  by  camouflage.  All  possible  steps 
are  taken  to  prevent  the  enemy  from  knowing  ex- 
actly which  are  the  important  points,  and  if  he  does 
not  literally  destroy  everything  he  may  have  uncom- 
fortable experiences. 

It  is  nearly  always  necessary  to  change  completely 
all  the  positions  when  an  attack  is  expected,  be- 
cause the  enemy  is  thoroughly  acquainted  with  all 
the  details  of  our  lines.  So  machine-gun  emplace- 
ments are  changed  and  the  new  ones  are  never  used 
prior  to  the  actual  attacks,  in  order  not  to  betray 
them. 

The  local  staffs  determine  where  the  enemy  is  to 
attack  and  which  portions  of  the  ground  he  will 
cover.  The  ground  is  prepared  so  as  to  break  up 
the  enemy's  assaulting  waves,  to  force  them  to  pro- 


THE  DEFENSIVE  BATTLE  151 

ceed  in  separate  columns  in  special  zones,  these 
columns  being  isolated  from  each  other  by  strong- 
holds. The  isolated  columns  then  reach  the  special 
areas  where  we  are  ready  to  meet  and  destroy  them, 
either  by  deadly  artillery  barrage  or  by  infantry 
and  machine-gun  cross-fire.  The  enemy's  plan  is 
to  succeed  in  occupying  our  entire  position,  and  this 
must  be  prevented  at  any  rate.  We  must  be  able 
to  retain  a  foothold  in  the  positions  which  are  nearly 
entirely  destroyed  or  occupied  by  the  enemy.  We 
will  have  some  strongholds,  or  centres  of  resistance, 
which  are  still  occupied  by  our  troops,  who  will 
afford  valuable  assistance  when  we  start  the  counter- 
attack. So,  you  see,  the  defense  of  the  ground  is  not 
only  a  frontal  one  but  also  a  lateral  one.  That  is 
to  say,  the  ground  is  divided  into  a  certain  number 
of  zones  or  localities  which  are  independent  of  each 
other  and  which  are  able  to  hold  firm  even  when  the 
neighboring  sectors  have  succumbed  to  the  enemy's 
power.  Of  course,  if  the  enemy  has  such  a  menace 
on  one  flank  his  advance  will  be  stopped,  or  if  he 
continues  his  advance  we  will  have  an  opportunity 
to  deliver  strong  counter-attacks  on  this  salient 
which  his  men  form,  and  we  will  also  be  able  to 
bring  great  concentration  of  artillery-fire  on  this 
particular  spot.  Every  man,  every  officer,  every 
leader,  knows  that  in  the  defensive  battle  he  must 
cling  to  the  ground  and  die  where  he  stands.  He 


152  PRESENT-DAY  WARFARE 

is  never  to  retreat,  even  if  his  neighbors  have  fallen 
back,  because  in  resisting  they  are  given  time  to 
regain  the  lost  ground.  On  the  2jd  of  June,  1916, 
at  the  Bois  Fumin  my  regiment  did  not  retreat, 
although  the  regiments  on  both  flanks  had  fallen 
back,  and  by  our  holding  on  the  French  troops  were 
able  to  deliver  a  victorious  counter-attack  which 
gained  back  nearly  all  the  ground  which  had  been 
lost. 

Very  strong  centres  of  resistance  are  created, 
shelters  made  of  concrete  or  deep  dugouts  afford 
cover  to  the  men  during  the  enemy's  bombardment, 
and  flanking  positions  are  selected  with  the  utmost 
care.  The  men  are  well  acquainted  with  these,  but 
they  are  never  used  beforehand,  in  order  that  the 
enemy  may  not  become  aware  of  their  existence. 
All  these  important  parts  of  the  line  are  concealed 
by  camouflage.  Quantities  of  barbed  wire  are  used 
as  a  means  of  defense  for  the  first  lines.  These 
measures  are  taken  in  order  to  force  the  enemy  to 
shell  the  entire  first  position  if  he  wishes  to  gain  a 
foothold,  but  the  utmost  care  is  given  to  the  last 
lines  of  the  first  position,  and  more  especially  to  the 
second  position. 

Observation-points  are  carefully  selected,  for  in  the 
defensive  battle  if  we  want  our  men  to  man  the 
parapet  it  is  necessary  that  they  should  know  the 
moment  when  the  enemy  will  attack.  This  is, 


THE  DEFENSIVE  BATTLE  153 

indeed,  very  difficult,  because  the  shelling  is  so  in- 
tense that  nobody  can  hear  anything  and  the  smoke 
and  the  dust  prevent  one  from  seeing.  At  Verdun, 
when  I  was  there,  the  artillery  could  not  see  the 
rockets  we  sent  on  account  of  the  smoke  and  the 
dust,  which  formed  a  dense  cloud  surrounding  all 
our  lines. 

The  enemy's  infantry  starts  its  attack  so  sud- 
denly and  follows  its  creeping  barrage  so  closely 
that  very  often  the  assailants  reach  the  lines  before 
the  garrison  is  aware  of  it.  This  can  only  be  avoided 
by  the  selection  of  well-chosen  points  of  observation, 
not  only  in  the  first  lines  but  also  at  the  rear,  which 
are  capable  of  furnishing  information  for  the  loosen- 
ing of  our  curtain  fire  and  giving  time  and  notice  to 
our  infantry. 

Another  matter  which  requires  painstaking  at- 
tention is  the  disposition  of  our  forces.  They  must 
be  echelonned  in  depth.  In  our  first  lines  we  have 
hardly  anybody  except  watchers,  the  main  body 
of  our  troops  being  at  the  rear  in  well-sheltered  dug- 
outs. The  first  lines  will  be  destroyed,  but  our  troops 
who  are  at  the  rear  will  have  time  to  encounter 
the  enemy  before  he  reaches  this  latter  position,  and 
the  foe  will  have  been  obliged  to  expend  an  enormous 
quantity  of  shells  in  destroying  the  first-line  works 
and  in  killing  a  very  few  men.  The  intention  of 
the  defense  is  not  to  prevent  the  enemy  from  gain- 


154  PRESENT-DAY  WARFARE 

ing  possession  of  some  parts  of  the  position  but  to 
hold  our  lines.  Experience  has  proved  that  it  was 
much  easier  and  much  less  costly  to  force  him  out 
of  the  trenches  captured,  by  an  immediate  counter- 
attack, than  to  try  to  prevent  him  from  entering 
our  first  lines  by  cramming  them  with  troops.  In 
doing  the  latter  we  would  only  augment  our  casual- 
ties without  any  benefit,  for  men  are  not  able  to 
resist  this  avalanche  of  fire. 

Another  detail  which  must  be  taken  care  of  is 
the  condition  of  the  means  of  communication.  New 
roads  and  paths  for  the  infantry  will  be  prepared 
which  allow  the  reinforcing  troops  to  go  quickly 
to  the  lines.  All  means  of  liaison  must  be  improved 
whilst  we  have  time,  and  especially  the  main  tele- 
phone-lines, which  should  be  buried  at  a  depth  of 
at  least  two  yards. 

A  very  sure  sign  that  the  enemy  is  to  start  an 
offensive  is  when  he  begins  registering  fire  with  his 
artillery  with  more  intensity  and  with  greater  care 
than  usual,  also  when  the  air  service  conducts  a 
great  number  of  raids.  Before  the  battle  of  Ver- 
dun the  Germans  made  many  raids  over  the  French 
front  trying  to  destroy  our  railway-stations  and 
other  points  of  importance.  Of  course,  our  aviators 
encounter  the  enemy's  flying-parties,  and  we  also 
carry  on  raids,  in  order  to  interfere  to  the  greatest 
possible  extent  with  the  enemy's  offensive  opera- 


THE  DEFENSIVE  BATTLE  155 

tions.  The  foe  will  order  infantry  raids  in  order 
to  ascertain  which  troops  and  how  many  of  them 
are  in  front  of  him,  and  also  to  learn  how  many 
divisions  have  been  brought  to  the  rear  of  the  sector 
he  intends  to  attack. 

At  last  the  enemy's  artillery  preparation  will 
begin,  pounding  our  lines  and  destroying  our 
trenches.  Our  artillery  will  answer  and  will  open 
fire  upon  the  enemy's  artillery  and  upon  his  lines, 
causing  much  havoc  in  his  jumping-off  trenches. 
Not  all  of  our  batteries  will  fire,  as  it  is  desired  that 
they  do  not  reveal  their  location.  They  will  only 
fire  on  the  day  when  the  enemy  actually  launches 
the  attack,  in  this  way  causing  him  great  annoyance, 
as  he  will  not  be  able  to  do  counter-battery  work, 
owing  to  his  failure  in  locating  all  the  emplacements 
of  our  artillery  in  advance.  The  staffs  of  the  rein- 
forcing troops  will  be  allotted,  and  they  will  proceed 
to  their  commanding  posts  in  advance  of  their  troops 
in  order  to  follow  the  progress  of  the  battle,  and  to 
become  well  acquainted  with  all  the  peculiarities 
of  the  ground.  The  local  commanding  officer  will 
have  a  plan  of  counter-attack,  and  will  not  have  to 
wait  for  special  orders  for  launching  this  counter- 
attack. As  soon  as  the  enemy  has  attacked,  the 
reserve  troops  will  counter-attack  without  further 
orders,  and  the  sooner  the  better.  The  battle  for 
the  enemy  will  thus  consist  of  two  different  phases. 


1 56  PRESENT-DAY  WARFARE 

First,  he  will  have  to  fight  with  the  garrison  of  the 
first  lines;  after  he  has  secured  those  lines  and  is 
trying  to  organize  them  he  will  then  be  speedily 
attacked  by  troops  coming  out  of  their  shelters  un- 
hurt by  his  bombardment.  The  roles  will  be  re- 
versed, and  he  will  be  attacked  and  will  have  to 
defend  himself. 

During  the  artillery  preparation  is  a  very  trying 
time  for  every  one,  as  all  are  aware  that  the  attack 
will  come,  but  one  never  knows  just  when  it  will 
come,  and  to  live  under  such  conditions  is  most 
terrible.  The  supplies  cannot  be  brought  up,  the 
shelling  is  intense,  it  is  nearly  impossible  to  have 
any  communication  with  anybody,  the  wounded 
lie  where  they  fall  and  cannot  be  taken  away,  and 
the  dead  cannot  be  buried.  Officers  and  men  under- 
go a  severe  nervous  strain,  for  one  must  be  in  readi- 
ness to  encounter  the  enemy  at  any  minute,  and  to 
die  if  necessary  where  one  is.  Reinforcements  must 
not  be  expected  and  there  must  be  no  falling  back 
except  in  compliance  with  written  orders,  even 
though  the  enemy  is  on  our  flank.  From  time  to 
time  the  enemy's  artillery-fire  increases  to  a  "drum 
fire,"  the  ordinary  shelling  continuing  day  and  night, 
and  you  may  be  sure  that  this  ordinary  shelling  is 
terrible.  This  awful  shelling  has  a  very  curious 
effect  on  one.  It  makes  one  very  sleepy  and  it  be- 
comes quite  hard  to  keep  awake.  At  Verdun  I  saw 


THE  DEFENSIVE  BATTLE  157 

men  who  fell  asleep  in  shell-holes  under  the  most 
intense  shelling. 

In  a  very  short  time  the  aspect  of  the  whole  posi- 
tion is  changed.  All  the  defenses,  all  the  trenches, 
all  the  communication-trenches  disappear  as  if  they 
had  been  swallowed  up,  and  there  remains  only  a 
field  of  craters,  in  which  there  may  remain  some 
dugouts  which  have  resisted.  Then,  at  last,  the 
enemy's  barrage  moves  on,  a  creeping  barrage  which 
the  hostile  infantry  follow  in  a  wave  formation. 
All  the  power  of  the  artillery  will  be  concentrated 
on  our  second  position  and  all  our  means  of  com- 
munication will  be  kept  under  a  terrific  fire.  Fleets 
of  planes,  flying  low,  accompany  the  creeping  bar- 
rage and  the  infantry.  High  in  the  skies  squadrons 
of  planes  form  an  aerial  barrage  to  prevent  our  planes 
from  passing.  When  this  happens  fire  from  all  points 
will  be  turned  on  the  enemy  in  the  sky.  Our  ar- 
tillery, with  all  its  power,  will  turn  loose  a  barrage 
to  protect  our  infantry,  and  batteries  from  new  posi- 
tions will  open  fire  as  rapidly  as  possible  against  the 
enemy's  artillery.  Our  infantry,  machine-guns,  and 
automatic-rifle  men  will  be  firing  into  the  enemy's 
assaulting  waves,  trying  to  break  them  down  by 
the  violence  of  their  fire.  Then  hand-to-hand  fights 
will  occur  in  isolated  shell-holes.  But  the  mass  of 
the  enemy  will  roll  on  to  some  particular  point  where 
they  will  try  to  establish  themselves.  Hardly  will 


158  PRESENT-DAY  WARFARE 

they  have  reached  this  point  when,  in  skirmishing 
order,  French  troops  appear,  and  under  the  pro- 
tection of  a  creeping  barrage  endeavor  to  throw 
back  the  adversary.  If  they  don't  succeed  in  re- 
gaining all  of  the  lost  ground,  at  least  the  enemy 
will  have  paid  a  very  high  price  for  his  new  acquisi- 
tion, and  will  not  be  able  to  pursue  his  advantage. 

In  the  defensive  one  must  gain  time.  The  troops 
which  hold  the  line  are  only  there  to  gain  time  to 
bring  up  the  reserves  which  are  at  a  distance  in 
the  rear.  When  the  Germans  attacked  Verdun  on 
the  2ist  of  February,  1916,  the  divisions  which  held 
the  first  line  resisted  bravely  during  three  days. 
The  resistance  of  these  divisions  gave  us  time  to 
bring  up  troops  who  delivered  a  victorious  counter- 
attack. 

Thus  the  defensive  battle  proceeds.  The  losses 
by  attrition  will  be  high  for  the  enemy,  while  the 
battle  rages  on  until  his  offensive  capacity  is  broken 
down.  Then  we  will  launch  a  counter-offensive 
and  reconquer  the  lost  ground. 


CHAPTER  XIII 
THE  OFFENSIVE  BATTLE 

IN  planning  for  the  offensive  battle  the  first 
question  to  be  decided  is  the  location  of  the 
sector  where  the  offensive  is  to  take  place.  This 
decision  will  be  made  by  the  general  in  command 
of  the  army.  It  is  not  as  easy  a  question  as  would 
appear  at  first,  for  many  considerations  must  enter 
into  the  choice  of  the  sector,  which  must  be  one 
that  will  allow  all  branches  of  the  service  to  par- 
ticipate in  the  battle,  that  is  to  say,  the  configura- 
tion of  the  ground  should  be  favorable  so  as  to 
permit  of  the  deployment  of  great  masses  of  men. 
Some  sectors,  such  as  the  Argonne,  being  very 
hilly  and  very  abrupt,  are  not  favorable  ones  for  an 
attack.  The  sector  must  be  one  which  is  of  im- 
portance to  the  enemy,  so  that  its  loss  would  place 
him  in  an  awkward  position.  Often  this  sector  will 
be  chosen  because  it  is  a  great  centre  of  communica- 
tion and  thus  forms  a  vital  part  of  the  enemy's 
lines. 

The   offensive   sector   having   been   chosen,   the 
work  of  the  staff  will  then  begin,  and  its  task  will 
159 


160  PRESENT-DAY  WARFARE 

be  a  very  long  and  difficult  one,  for  the  most  care- 
ful consideration  must  be  given  to  the  many  de- 
tails, which  are  of  the  gravest  importance.  This 
war  is  a  war  of  details.  The  side  which  has  planned 
most  accurately,  without  omitting  anything,  will 
have  great  chances  of  being  victorious.  The  staff 
must  also  draw  to  the  greatest  extent  on  the  imagi- 
nation, in  order  to  visualize  what  is  likely  to  happen 
and  to  be  able  to  realize  what  certain  means  will 
produce  under  certain  circumstances.  It  must  be 
able  to  realize  what  is  humanly  possible,  and  it 
must  not  count  on  superhuman  achievements, 
which,  although  sometimes  accomplished  by  gal- 
lant troops,  should  not  be  reckoned  with  as  a  prob- 
ability. 

The  preparatory  work  of  the  staff  will  be  em- 
bodied in  written  orders  called  the  "Plan  of  Opera- 
tions." This  plan  is  issued  a  long  time  before  the 
actual  offensive,  generally  about  two  months  be- 
fore the  battle  begins.  In  it  are  indicated  all  the 
means  which  will  be  used  for  the  purpose  of  the 
offensive  and  the  results  which  are  desired.  The 
staff  must  calculate  how  many  guns,  how  many 
men,  and  how  much  ammunition,  both  for  artillery 
and  infantry,  will  be  necessary  to  attain  the  desired 
results.  These  calculations  completed,  the  prac- 
tical work  begins  and  takes  shape  in  the  following 
way:  first,  the  preparation  of  the  offensive  sector, 


THE  OFFENSIVE  BATTLE  161 

and,  second,  the  relief  and  training  of  both  troops 
and  staffs  which  are  to  play  a  part  in  this  battle. 

The  preparation  of  the  ground  can  be  divided 
into  several  parts:  first,  the  making  ready  of 
means  of  communication;  second,  the  digging  of 
the  works  necessary  for  the  troops  who  are  to  go 
over  the  top,  which  include  jumping-off  trenches, 
command  posts,  and  so  on;  third,  the  creation  of 
dumps,  both  at  the  rear  and  in  the  lines,  for  the 
storage  of  ammunition  and  material;  fourth,  the 
organization  of  the  means  of  liaison. 

The  perfecting  of  the  means  of  communication  is  a 
long  task  and  has  to  be  planned  with  especial  care. 
These  means  of  communication  include  the  build- 
ing of  ordinary  railroads,  narrow-gauge  (twenty- 
four-inch)  railroads,  and  those  which  will  be  used 
for  the  railroad  artillery;  wagon-roads,  which  must 
be  put  in  good  condition  and  often  newly  built,  and 
trails  for  the  infantry  which  will  be  used  only  by 
the  men  and  are  not  intended  for  vehicles.  All  of 
the  above  must  be  arranged  according  to  a  compre- 
hensive plan  in  order  that  each  unit  may  have 
quick  means  of  transportation,  so  that  the  troops 
will  not  have  to  wait  too  long  before  reaching  their 
emplacements  for  the  fight.  It  is  clear  that  if  the 
means  of  communication  are  insufficient  for  even 
one  part  of  the  front  there  will  be  congestion  in 
this  particular  place.  This  must  be  avoided,  be- 


162  PRESENT-DAY  WARFARE 

cause  it  causes  great  fatigue  to  the  men,  who  march 
one  behind  the  other  carrying  full  packs,  and  who, 
if  obliged  to  wait  for  a  long  time,  become  very  tired, 
which  puts  them  in  poor  physical  condition  for  the 
big  drive.  Should  there  be  congestion  as  we  near 
the  zone  of  fire,  these  men,  crammed  together,  make 
a  certain  amount  of  noise,  which  might  attract  the 
enemy's  attention  and  result  in  an  immediate 
shelling  which  would  cause  great  havoc. 

The  first  thing  to  be  started  is  the  construction 
of  railroads,  for  that  is  the  work  which  will  require 
the  longest  time.  Often  new  stations  and  railroad- 
yards  have  to  be  built,  and  stations  which  already 
exist  must  be  put  in  condition  to  handle  the  tre- 
mendous traffic  which  will  soon  follow.  As  you 
may  realize,  our  railroads  were  constructed  in 
peace  time  to  meet  the  requirements  of  commerce 
and  industry,  and  they  are  not  adapted  to  the 
special  uses  of  war,  so  great  stations  are  built  as 
depots  for  the  big  units,  and  here  the  war  material 
is  unloaded  and  kept  in  special  storehouses.  From 
these  stations  there  branch  off  narrow-gauge  rail- 
roads, which  run  near  the  front  and  which  bring 
war  material  to  the  dumps.  From  these  dumps 
there  are  still  other  lines  of  narrow-gauge  railroads, 
but  the  rolling-stock  consists  of  trucks  which  use 
animal  traction. 

The  existing  roads  are  improved   and  widened. 


THE  OFFENSIVE   BATTLE  163 

They  are  generally  six  to  eight  yards  wide  and  are 
so  built  that  very  intense  traffic  can  run  over  them. 
Sign-boards  are  put  up  at  many  points,  indicating 
the  villages  and  places  to  which  the  roads  lead. 
This  last  is  important  because  it  saves  time  which 
otherwise  would  be  lost  in  studying  maps,  and  pre- 
vents possible  errors.  New  roads  have  to  be  con- 
structed because  those  built  in  times  of  peace  were 
intended  merely  for  ordinary  traffic  between  towns 
and  villages,  and  much  of  the  time  they  do  not  meet 
the  demands  of  the  present  conditions.  Horse- 
men and  infantry  are  forbidden  to  use  the  main 
road,  as  it  is  especially  used  by  the  heavy  artillery, 
and  by  the  cars  and  trucks  which  run  from  places 
at  the  rear  to  dumps  and  to  headquarters.  But 
there  are  paths  on  either  side  of  this  main  road  re- 
served for  their  use. 

For  the  use  of  infantry,  which  has  to  take  the 
nearest  way  to  the  lines,  trails  are  built.  On  each 
trail  are  sign-boards  indicating  the  names  of  the 
trenches  to  which  it  leads  and  giving  also  the  name 
of  the  place  which  can  be  reached  by  following  it 
to  the  rear.  Wire  is  stretched  along  the  side  of  the 
trail  so  that  when  you  have  to  go  to  the  lines  at 
night  you  don't  get  lost.  On  these  sign-boards  is 
also  indicated  which  troops  are  to  follow  which 
trails.  It  will  seem  queer  that  such  precautions  are 
needed  to  prevent  the  troops  from  getting  lost,  but 


164  PRESENT-DAY  WARFARE 

one  can  never  take  enough  precautions,  for  it  must 
be  borne  in  mind  that  often  the  attacking  troops 
have  come  into  their  sector  only  a  few  hours  before 
the  attack  is  to  take  place,  and  if  they  should  get 
lost,  it  would  create  a  great  disturbance  in  the  plan 
of  attack.  Another  reason  for  the  sign-boards  is 
to  avoid  useless  tiring  of  the  men. 

Before  we  started  the  Aisne  offensive  my  regi- 
ment left  its  rest-billets  at  eight  o'clock  one  night  in 
order  to  take  up  its  position  that  same  night  and 
to  start  the  attack  next  morning.  It  was  pitch- 
dark  and  a  terrible  storm  came  up,  making  it  im- 
possible to  see  a  man  at  a  distance  of  three  yards. 
In  order  not  to  get  lost  each  man  had  to  put  one 
hand  on  the  shoulder  of  the  man  in  front  of  him; 
the  officers  held  the  wire  in  their  hands  so  as  to  be 
able  to  find  their  way.  In  one  place  the  wire  had 
been  torn  away  by  shells,  the  column  could  not  go 
on,  and  we  lost  about  half  an  hour  endeavoring  to 
find  our  way  to  the  lines.  It  must  be  realized  that 
at  night  there  is  no  perceptible  difference  between 
the  trail  and  the  ground  around.  It  took  us  a  very 
long  time  to  reach  our  position,  although  we  had  a 
wire  to  guide  us  and  guides  to  show  the  way. 

All  these  various  means  of  communication  are 
built  by  groups,  the  men  of  which  have  specialized 
in  this  sort  of  work.  One  very  important  part  of 
the  task  is  the  building  of  railroads  for  the  railroad 


THE  OFFENSIVE  BATTLE  165 

artillery.  These  lines  branch  from  the  main  rail- 
road-lines, and  run  to  places  selected  as  offering  the 
greatest  facilities  for  the  firing  of  special  guns.  Of 
course,  several  of  these  branch  lines  have  to  be  built 
in  order  to  use  these  guns  in  different  places.  There 
is  very  often  a  line  of  railroad  which  is  connected 
with  the  main  line  in  the  rear,  running  parallel  to 
the  trench-lines.  On  this  parallel  line  the  guns 
and  railroad-cars  are  transported,  and  it  provides 
means  for  the  later  transportation  of  stores  and 
supplies. 

The  digging  of  the  works  necessary  for  the  troops 
who  are  to  go  over  the  top  is  rather  a  difficult  task. 
The  location  of  such  works  is  selected  according 
to  tactical  requirements.  They  are  situated  so  as 
to  shelter  the  assaulting  waves,  being  very  deep,  yet 
affording  them  every  facility  for  going  over  the 
top.  They  consist  of  jumping-off  trenches.  These 
differ  from  fire-trenches  in  that  they  have  no  fire- 
steps.  They  are  only  about  six  feet  deep,  and  every 
now  and  then  there  are  traverses.  To  allow  of 
the  men  going  over  the  top  the  trenches  have  either 
"jumping-off"  steps  which  are  staircases  made  of 
fascines,  or  individual  steps  which  each  man  digs 
with  his  intrenching  tool.  The  latter  are  perhaps 
better  than  the  former  because  the  men  debouch 
in  skirmishing  order,  whereas  if  jumping-off  steps 
are  used  the  troops  leave  the  trench  in  columns, 


166  PRESENT-DAY  WARFARE 

and  are  obliged  to  deploy  as  skirmishers  afterward, 
which  takes  more  time  and  is  less  satisfactory. 

The  jumping-off  trenches  must  be  echelonned 
in  depth  in  order  to  have  the  attacking  units  properly 
placed.  They  must  also  be  provided  with  shelters 
and  dugouts  in  case  the  enemy  during  the  bombard- 
ment feels  inclined  to  answer  our  artillery-fire  by 
a  fire  of  counter-preparation,  that  is  to  say,  a  de- 
structive fire,  upon  our  jumping-off  trenches  and 
our  first  lines.  There  must  be  not  only  dugouts 
for  the  men  but  also  command  posts  for  the  dif- 
ferent staffs,  for  on  the  day  of  attack  they  are  all 
pushed  ahead,  the  regimental  staffs  being  in  the 
first-line  trenches.  There  must  also  be  shelters  for 
the  ammunition  and  for  the  supplies  which  are  stored 
up  in  the  lines,  in  order  to  avoid  as  far  as  possible 
their  being  blown  up.  Of  course,  there  must  be 
communication-trenches  to  connect  these  new  lines 
with  the  rear,  as  those  already  provided  in  the  sec- 
tor are  insufficient  for  the  number  of  troops  to  be 
found  in  the  lines  a  few  hours  before  an  attack  is 
made.  If  we  should  use  them,  there  would  be  such 
a  congestion  and  such  a  mixture  of  different  units 
that  it  would  not  be  possible  to  have  all  the  units 
in  good  order  before  the  attack  starts.  Besides, 
the  more  communication-trenches  we  have  the 
quicker  the  troops  will  be  in  position. 

All  these  new  works  are  carried  on  principally 


THE  OFFENSIVE  BATTLE  167 

by  troops  other  than  those  holding  the  sector,  who 
will  also  labor  in  the  offensive  works  but  who  are 
not  sufficiently  numerous  to  do  all  that  is  to  be  done. 
Generally  the  troops  which  are  to  attack  are  bil- 
leted at  the  rear  close  to  the  lines,  and  every  night 
they  go  to  the  front  and  work  at  their  jumping- 
off  trenches.  Before  we  started  our  offensive  on 
the  Aisne  we  worked  in  one  sector  where  we  were 
to  attack  from  January  to  the  middle  of  March. 
In  having  the  work  performed  in  this  manner  the 
attacking  troops  become  familiar  with  all  details 
of  the  ground  on  which  they  are  to  fight  the  offensive 
battle.  Usually  the  infantry  digs  all  the  trenches 
and  boyaux,  and  the  pioneers  and  engineers  con- 
struct the  shelters.  All  these  works  are  prepared  in 
the  daytime  by  the  officers  commanding  the  work- 
ing-parties. During  daylight  they  are  able  to  ob- 
serve all  the  peculiarities  of  the  ground.  They  mark 
the  lines  of  the  works  with  white  tape  and  at  night 
the  troops  do  the  digging,  the  tape  furnishing  a 
guide  which  is  visible  in  the  darkness.  Each  man 
is  assigned  a  certain  task  for  the  night,  or  a  definite 
task  is  given  to  the  unit,  which  stays  at  the  work 
until  this  task  is  finished.  For  night  work  we  gen- 
erally calculate  that  one  yard  of  trench  entirely 
completed  is  to  be  done  by  each  man,  so  if  we  have 
a  platoon  of  fifty  men,  the  platoon  will  not  leave 
its  work  until  the  fifty  yards  of  trenches  are  dug. 


i68  PRESENT-DAY  WARFARE 

The  digging  of  these  works  is  supervised  by  the 
staff-officers,  who  see  that  the  task  is  properly  per- 
formed. 

We  must  not  only  create  depots  for  ammunition 
but  also  depots  for  material  and  water-supply.  It 
is  very  important  that  the  enemy  does  not  become 
aware  of  the  location  of  the  jumping-off  trenches, 
because  should  he  know  it  he  would  get  the  proper 
range  and  might  be  able  to  concentrate  artillery 
fire  upon  our  jumping-off  trenches;  therefore,  all 
works  should  in  every  case  be  concealed  from 
his  view  by  means  of  camouflage.  Sometimes  there 
is  no  way  of  preventing  the  trenches  from  being 
seen  as  soon  as  the  daylight  appears,  so  very  often 
jumping-off  trenches  of  the  first  line  are  dug  the 
night  before  the  attack.  The  troops  forming  the 
first  wave  are  brought  there  a  few  hours  before  the 
attack,  and  they  have  to  dig  in  before  the  day  breaks; 
and  as  each  man  knows  that  it  is  for  himself  that 
he  digs,  I  assure  you  that  they  are  very  keen  on 
their  task.  They  know  very  well  that  if  at  dawn 
they  have  not  dug  a  trench  they  will  be  shot  down 
by  the  enemy.  This  was  done  by  my  battalion  for 
one  attack  which  was  carried  out  on  the  Somme. 
We  were  to  attack  the  Epine  de  Malassise  near 
Peronne  on  the  morning  of  the  I5th  of  October, 
1915.  The  battalion  arrived  at  nine  o'clock  in  the 
evening  of  the  I4th  of  October,  and  the  men  were 


THE  OFFENSIVE  BATTLE  169 

told  that  next  morning  they  would  storm  the  Ger- 
man position.  They  were  halted  at  a  place  that 
was  in  front  of  our  line  and  which  was  nothing  but 
shell-holes,  and  consequently  were  obliged  to  dig 
jumping-off  trenches  that  very  night. 

The  organization  of  the  means  of  liaison  is  carried 
out  according  to  a  "plan  of  liaison."  This  includes 
instructions  concerning  all  the  means  of  liaison  we 
have  at  our  disposal,  the  principal  work  being  for 
the  protection  of  the  telephone-lines,  which  will 
have  to  be  buried  to  a  depth  of  two  yards,  and  this 
must  be  done  from  the  very  first  lines  to  well  back 
in  the  rear,  so  as  to  avoid  the  enemy's  shelling,  which 
would  cut  the  lines.  Observation-points  have  to 
be  selected  with  particular  care,  for  during  the  of- 
fensive battle  the  commanding  officers  must  be 
able  to  watch  and  see  for  themselves  what  is  going 
on.  These  observation-points  must,  of  course,  be 
well  protected.  They  are  usually  built  of  concrete, 
or  are  steel  observatories  brought  to  the  lines  in 
sections.  The  principal  means  of  protection  is 
always  the  camouflage  which  prevents  their  being 
seen  by  the  enemy.  All  these  observation-points 
are  connected  by  telephone  with  headquarters,  and, 
besides,  each  command  post  is  provided  with  an 
observatory  close  at  hand.  All  the  other  means  of 
liaison  are  studied  v.ery  closely,  but  do  not  require 
special  works.  The  officers  in  charge  of  them  will 


170  PRESENT-DAY  WARFARE 

often  visit  the  offensive  section  to  select  the  best 
places  for  their  purpose. 

Thus  by  continuous  work  the  preparation  of  the 
ground  proceeds,  but  it  really  is  very  difficult  to 
make  clear  to  you  what  an  enormous  amount  of 
work  is  required  for  a  big  drive.  For  the  Aisne  of- 
fensive the  work  began  four  months  before  the 
attack  and  great  numbers  of  troops  were  employed. 

Another  part  of  the  preparation  which  must  be 
worked  out  with  particular  care  is  the  training  of 
the  units  that  are  to  play  a  part  in  the  offensive 
battle.  The  very  first  thing  is  to  select  the  troops 
who  are  to  make  the  attack,  have  them  relieved, 
and  brought  in  to  rest-billets.  These  rest-billets 
should  be  chosen  so  as  to  offer  all  necessary  facilities 
for  the  training,  including  large  open  spaces  which 
are  not  ploughed  and  where  there  are  no  crops.  The 
units  should  not  be  too  much  scattered,  for  if  they 
were  the  supervision  of  the  instruction  would  be 
very  difficult,  and  it  would  not  be  convenient  to 
assemble  the  larger  units  such  as  battalions  or  divi- 
sions, which  must  be  done,  for  the  battle  will  be 
fought  by  large  units. 

The  rest-billets  ought  to  be  pleasant  and  the 
troops  at  ease,  for  we  wish  them  to  forget  all  the 
hardships  they  have  endured;  we  want,  in  short,  a 
moral,  a  physical,  and  a  technical  training.  But 
one  of  these  cannot  take  the  place  of  the  other — they 


THE  OFFENSIVE  BATTLE  171 

all  depend  upon  one  another.  A  well-trained  or- 
ganization will  prove  useless  on  the  battle-field  if 
it  has  not  a  fine  morale,  that  is  to  say,  if  it  does  not 
desire  to  prove  its  efficiency,  and  if  it  is  not  animated 
with  a  stubborn  will  to  secure  victory  at  any  cost. 
On  the  other  hand,  if  the  troops  have  the  most 
splendid  morale  but  are  not  well  trained  they  will 
not  be  able  to  accomplish  results,  for  being  igno- 
rant of  the  correct  methods  of  combat,  their  morale 
will  only  bring  appalling  losses  upon  them,  and 
they  will  be  mown  down  before  being  able  to  reach 
the  enemy.  Again,  let  us  assume  that  a  unit  is  well 
acquainted  with  actual  methods  of  fighting  but  the 
men  composing  it  are  in  bad  physical  condition; 
they  will  not  be  able  to  endure  the  fatigue  which 
they  will  have  to  undergo.  So  we  must  take  measures 
to  insure  that  our  attacking  troops  attain  a  high 
morale,  that  their  technical  training  is  satisfactory, 
and  that  they  are  in  good  health,  strong,  sound, 
and  vigorous. 

Good  rest-billets  must  be  selected,  where  the 
men  have  sufficient  room  with  plenty  of  straw  to 
sleep  on.  If  possible,  beds  are  to  be  provided  for 
them.  They  should  have  all  facilities  for  personal 
cleanliness  and  for  the  cleaning  of  their  uniforms. 
The  food  ought  to  be  plentiful  and  well  prepared, 
so  that  the  men  will  like  it  and  eat  heartily.  Plenty 
of  sleep,  agreeable  temperature,  and  good  food  will 


172  PRESENT-DAY  WARFARE 

soon  restore  the  men  to  good  physical  condition, 
while  games  and  gymnastics  improve  their  form. 

In  order  to  raise  the  morale  of  the  men,  it  is  de- 
sirable to  make  them  forget  all  the  hardships  they 
have  endured,  to  help  them  forget  the  horrors  of 
war.  Being  in  good  physical  condition,  their  morale 
will  soon  become  very  good  and  then  we  try  to  amuse 
them,  all  officers  striving  to  discover  something 
new  for  their  units.  Some  have  plays,  others  chal- 
lenge their  comrades  to  football-games  or  to  grenade- 
throwing  matches,  all  of  which  has  also  a  very  good 
effect  in  developing  that  esprit  de  corps  which  is 
so  important.  The  esprit  de  corps  makes  every 
man  feel  proud  to  belong  to  his  unit,  for  he  proclaims 
that  this  unit  is  the  best  of  all  in  the  French  armies 
and  that  all  men  of  this  unit  are  a  fine  lot.  That 
esprit  de  corps  will  make  them  perform  wonderful 
achievements  in  order  to  outdo  neighboring  units. 
But  the  exaltation  of  the  morale  is  really  the  work 
of  the  officers;  they  are  in  close  touch  with  the  men 
and  have  their  confidence.  They  will  point  out  to 
them  the  reasons  why  they  fight,  they  will  tell  them 
why  they  must  be  confident  of  success,  they  will  give 
them  some  indications  as  to  how  the  next  battle 
will  be  fought  and  the  reasons  why  a  success  is  ex- 
pected, namely,  the  great  superiority  in  guns,  in 
ammunition,  in  infantry,  and  in  morale  that  we 
shall  have  in  this  particular  sector.  Then  as  the 


THE  OFFENSIVE  BATTLE  173 

training  goes  on  the  men  will  feel  and  realize  their 
superiority  over  the  enemy. 

Another  sentiment  which  must  be  inculcated 
into  every  fighter  is  a  strong  hate  for  the  Boche,  a 
strong  desire  to  meet  him,  to  fight  him,  and  to  beat 
him.  They  become  familiar  with  the  thought  that 
they  will  fight  the  enemy  at  a  certain  time  under 
certain  conditions.  All  this  will  not  form  a  very 
formal  part  of  the  instruction,  but  daily  the  officers 
will  talk  with  their  men,  read  to  them  articles  from 
newspapers  and  books,  and  tell  them  of  the  high 
deeds  accomplished  by  their  organization.  In  this 
way  they  will  make  their  men  feel  as  they  do,  and 
all  of  the  unit,  from  the  leader  to  the  private,  will 
form  one  body,  one  soul,  animated  with  one  single, 
almighty  desire,  to  kill  the  Boche  and  drive  him 
back  to  his  country.  All  this  training  for  the 
strengthening  of  the  morale  takes  place  daily,  on 
every  possible  occasion,  and  its  results  are  proven 
on  the  battle-field.  To  see  the  men  fight  more  gal- 
lantly than  they  ever  did  is,  for  the  officers,  the 
greatest  of  all  rewards,  and  such  moments  cannot 
be  forgotten.  As  an  example,  on  the  25th  of  Sep- 
tember, 1916,  on  the  Somme,  my  battalion  in  going 
over  the  top  had  to  cross  a  barrage  of  machine-gun 
fire,  and  they  marched  forward  in  the  most  splen- 
did style,  singing  the  "Marseillaise." 

Let  us  see  how  the  technical  instruction  is  carried 


174  PRESENT-DAY  WARFARE 

on  before  the  attack.  We  must  at  first  train  the 
number  of  specialists  we  want,  then  drill  the  group 
of  specialists,  and  afterward  have  all  the  specialists 
work  together.  The  specialists  who  have  been 
selected  are  thoroughly  taught  all  details  of  the 
specialty  which  they  go  in  for.  Next  the  specialists' 
teams  will  work  out,  the  bombers'  team  being  taught 
how  to  fight  in  trenches  and  in  shell-holes,  either  in 
defensive  or  in  offensive,  and  the  automatic-rifle 
team  will  be  taught  the  tactical  use  of  their  weapon 
in  offensive  and  defensive.  At  last  the  use  of  all 
specialties,  the  fight  of  the  whole  platoon,  is  prac- 
tised. From  time  to  time  the  individual  training 
will  have  to  be  resumed,  but  daily  the  whole  platoon 
works  together.  This  is  done  in  order  to  co-ordinate 
the  training  of  the  different  specialists,  which  would 
not  be  possible  were  they  always  left  to  work  by 
themselves.  The  men  are  trained  and  practised 
in  the  use  of  all  their  weapons,  including  hand  and 
rifle  grenades,  machine-guns,  and  automatic  rifles. 
They  must  become  good  bayonet  fighters  and  marks- 
men. Other  men  than  those  qualified  are  also  taught 
the  use  of  the  specialties  in  order  to  be  able  to  re- 
place the  specialists  in  case  of  emergency. 

Not  only  the  men  have  to  work  out  but  the  of- 
ficers and  non-commissioned  officers  also,  for  many 
of  them  have  been  recently  commissioned  or  pro- 
moted, and  the  conditions  of  each  battle  are  dif- 


THE  OFFENSIVE  BATTLE  175 

ferent  from  those  of  the  previous  battle.  In  every 
battle  we  use  new  material,  new  methods;  our  tactics 
are  not  like  dogmas,  unchangeable,  and  we  take 
advantage  of  all  that  has  been  learned  in  previous 
encounters.  It  is  but  fair  that  the  living  should 
learn  the  lesson  of  the  dead  and  secure  greater  suc- 
cess with  fewer  losses,  so  that  the  sacrifice  of  dead 
comrades  will  not  have  been  useless,  their  sacrifice 
will  not  have  been  in  vain.  The  officers  and  non- 
commissioned officers  need  to  become  thoroughly 
acquainted  with  all  improvements  which  have  taken 
place,  and  they  are  required  to  practise  all  new 
methods,  not  only  on  the  map  but  also  on  the  ground, 
and  must  learn  to  solve  tactical  problems.  They 
should  become  thoroughly  familiar  with  all  of  the 
methods,  which  have  been  found  to  be  successful 
in  offensive  battles,  and  with  the  handling  of  units 
in  close  connection  with  each  other. 

The  staffs  which  are  to  participate  in  this  battle 
meanwhile  practise  on  tactical  problems  analogous 
to  those  they  will  actually  have  to  solve,  and  in 
manoeuvring  with  the  troops,  putting  them  in  posi- 
tions which  are,  as  nearly  as  possible,  identical  with 
those  which  they  will  occupy  during  the  attack. 
Then  the  troops  will  go  over  this  attack  on  a  se- 
lected ground  which  closely  resembles  the  one  on 
which  they  are  going  to  fight,  the  German  positions 
being  very  carefully  reproduced.  The  end  in  view 


176  PRESENT-DAY  WARFARE 

is  to  have  every  man,  every  officer,  know  exactly 
what  he  has  to  do  on  the  day  the  battle  will  be  fought. 
This  is  extremely  important  in  order  that  confusion 
and  disorder  on  the  battle-field  may  be  avoided. 
The  men  must  be  prepared  for  many  deadly  tricks, 
and  great  dangers  will  await  them  at  a  turning  of 
a  traverse  or  at  the  entry  of  some  dugout,  which 
can  only  be  avoided  if  each  one  knows  exactly  where 
he  is  to  go  and  what  he  is  to  do.  The  mechanism 
of  the  attack  and  the  liaison  with  the  artillery  require 
a  very  close  study  and  will  not  be  learned  in  a  short 
time.  All  this  can  be  compared  to  a  play  which 
before  being  presented  requires  much  rehearsal  in 
all  the  details  by  its  actors,  each  one  of  whom  will 
go  over  his  own  role  individually  and  then  rehearse 
with  his  associates. 

At  the  proper  time  the  troops  and  different  ser- 
vices will  be  placed  in  position.  First  the  aviation 
service  and  artillery,  then  the  infantry.  The  avia- 
tion service  and  the  artillery  work  in  close  connec- 
tion, for  one  cannot  conceive  nowadays  an  artillery 
force  operating  without  the  help  of  the  aviation 
service — which  is  the  eye  of  artillery.  The  first  ob- 
ject to  be  attained  is  to  gain  the  mastery  of  the  air 
in  this  offensive  sector.  To  accomplish  this  the 
chasers  will  try  to  bring  down  the  German  planes 
in  order  that  the  observation-planes  may  fly  for 
the  purpose  of  helping  the  artillery  in  registering. 


THE  OFFENSIVE   BATTLE  177 

Aerial  raids  are  carried  on  to  destroy  the  principal 
centres  of  communications  at  the  enemy's  disposal. 
The  railroad-stations  are  visited  by  planes  which 
hurl  tons  of  explosives,  while  bridges,  viaducts, 
important  dugouts,  cantonments,  and  barracks 
are  also  attacked. 

After  having  prepared  the  emplacements  for  the 
batteries  the  artillery  will  begin  registering,  and 
then  the  artillery  preparation  will  commence.  The 
first  position  of  the  enemy  will  be  destroyed  by  the 
guns  which  have  a  shorter  range,  more  especially 
by  the  trench-mortars.  The  very  big  guns  take  un- 
der their  fire  the  Germans'  deep  dugouts,  such  as 
the  tunnels  of  Mont  Cornillet  in  Champagne  or  on 
the  Chemin  des  Dames,  which  are  to  be  destroyed 
because  there  the  enemy  has  sheltered  the  very  im- 
portant reserves.  The  means  of  communication 
of  the  enemy  are  kept  under  the  fire  of  guns  and 
machine-guns.  Every  minute  tons  of  explosives 
are  hurled  upon  the  Germans'  lines.  In  one  of  our 
latest  offensives  we  fired  over  four  tons  of  steel  upon 
each  yard  of  the  German  trenches.  This  terrific 
shelling  destroys  everything  and  the  enemy's  lines 
simply  melt  away.  All  defenses  are  blown  away, 
the  trenches  no  longer  exist,  and  many  dugouts  are 
either  ruined  or  have  the  entrances  destroyed  so 
that  the  garrison  is  blockaded  and  will  usually  be 
buried  alive.  You  may  imagine  what  the  feelings 


178  PRESENT-DAY  WARFARE 

of  the  Boche  must  be.  They  were  in  a  sector  which 
was  well  organized,  which  possessed  strong  defenses, 
and  which  seemed  impregnable,  the  defense  being 
carefully  arranged  after  two  or  three  years  of  hard 
and  constant  labor.  In  so  short  a  time  by  this  ap- 
palling bombardment  everything  is  destroyed,  and 
in  place  of  the  well-planned  trenches  there  remain 
but  a  few  dugouts  amidst  a  field  of  craters.  Add 
to  this  the  terrible  noise  which  goes  on  by  day  and 
night,  the  smoke,  the  heavy  losses  sustained  by 
the  garrison,  and  you  will  clearly  understand  that 
the  enemy  must  possess  very  strong  nerves  not  to 
have  a  shaken  morale.  Every  minute  an  attack  is 
feared;  the  constant  strain  wears  the  men  down 
very  quickly,  and  most  of  the  time  no  supply,  no 
relief,  no  transportation  of  the  wounded  is  possible. 
From  time  to  time  the  violence  of  the  artillery-fire 
increases  into  a  drum  fire.  The  enemy's  artillery 
is  constantly  kept  under  heavy  fire,  and  is  espe- 
cially subjected  to  gas-shells.  Thus  the  first  act 
of  the  battle  rages  on. 

The  artillery  preparation  being  well  under  way, 
the  infantry  which  is  to  deliver  the  assault  is  brought 
up  to  the  positions  from  which  it  will  deliver  the 
assault.  The  placing  of  the  units  in  position  is  not 
an  easy  task  and  caution  must  be  observed  not  to 
be  lost,  as  has  been  pointed  out.  Officers  and  non- 
commissioned officers  make  reconnoissances,  then 


THE  OFFENSIVE   BATTLE  179 

guides  taken  from  units  holding  the  line  are  sent 
to  show  the  way  to  the  incoming  troops  and  bring 
them  to  the  places  they  are  to  occupy.  Of  course, 
these  guides  do  not  go  back  very  far;  they  generally 
wait  for  the  arriving  units  at  the  outskirts  of  the 
first  position,  and  up  to  that  point  the  troops  have 
to  find  their  own  way. 

In  the  last  months  mustard-gas  has  made  it 
possible  to  have  a  shorter  preparation  of  artillery 
and  thus  to  take  the  enemy  by  surprise.  These 
gas-shells,  when  they  explode,  sprinkle  all  over  the 
ground  little  drops  of  a  liquid  which  volatilizes  into 
a  gr.3  called  mustard-gas.  These  emanations  last  for 
several  days  and  may  oblige  the  defender  to  yield 
temporarily  the  ground.  When  the  men  stay  for 
several  hours  on  a  sector  gassed  by  mustard-gases 
they  are  strongly  upset,  but  only  if  they  stay  several 
hours.  This  allows  the  assailant  to  cross  a  zone 
bombarded  with  gas-shells  without  any  danger, 
whilst  the  defender  is  obliged  to  evacuate  the  posi- 
tion. A  few  hours  before  the  attack  is  to  take 
place  a  strong  shelling  gasses  the  garrison  of  the 
first  lines  and  a  strong  counter-battery  by  gas  will 
extinguish  the  personnel.  This  artillery  prepara- 
tion will  last  a  few  hours  only,  thus  giving  the  en- 
emy little  time  to  muster  his  reserves. 

The  infantry  which  is  to  take  part  in  the  offensive 
battle  having  been  brought  to  the  first  line,  oc- 


i8o  PRESENT-DAY  WARFARE 

cupies  all  the  jumping-off  trenches.  Very  often 
this  relief  is  effected  during  the  night  before  the  at- 
tack, but  this  is  only  the  case  for  the  troops  which 
form  the  first  waves  of  the  attack.  Before  this  re- 
lief takes  place  the  troops  occupying  the  offensive 
section  will  have  made  several  raids  in  order  to 
capture  prisoners  and  get  better  information  as  to 
the  morale  and  the  strength  of  the  Germans.  Recon- 
noitring-parties will  also  be  sent  to  ascertain  if  the 
work  of  the  artillery  has  been  sufficient.  The  day 
before  the  attack  on  the  Chemin  des  Dames  a  pla- 
toon of  my  regiment  entered  into  the  German  first 
line  and  carried  away  forty-seven  prisoners  and  a 
machine-gun.  This  was  done  in  daylight,  but  our 
shelling  was  so  terrific  that  the  Germans  were  quite 
unable  to  do  anything  to  prevent  us  from  carrying 
out  this  successful  raid. 

On  the  night  before  the  attack  the  artillery  will 
finish  its  work  and  the  fire  will  increase  in  violence 
and  prevent  all  movements  of  the  enemy  from  the 
rear.  During  that  same  night  our  machine-guns 
will  be  most  active,  and  all  night  long  machine-gun 
companies  will  keep  under  fire  all  the  rear  of  the 
enemy's  lines  and  all  the  means  of  communication 
in  order  to  isolate  them.  Our  troops  and  our  officers 
know  that  the  attack  will  take  place  the  next  day, 
but  they  don't  know  at  what  hour.  Some  time  in 
the  night  or  early  in  the  morning  the  staffs  send  to 


THE  OFFENSIVE  BATTLE  181 

the  lines  an  order  stating  that  the  attack  will  take 
place  at  a  given  hour  and  all  the  watches  are  syn- 
chronized. In  the  operation  orders  the  day  of  the 
attack  is  called  day  "D"  and  the  hour  is  called 
hour  "H";  so  the  staff  at  the  proper  time  informs 
all  the  troops  that  day  "D"  means,  for  instance,  the 
5th  of  May  and  hour  "H"  is  nine  o'clock.  During 
the  hours  just  before  the  attack  our  artillery  makes 
a  supreme  effort  and  the  shell-fire  is  frightful,  the 
enemy's  batteries  being  under  the  most  violent  fire. 

At  the  hour  "H"  the  creeping  barrage  is  put  on 
the  enemy's  territory,  moving  along  at  a  slow  rate. 
On  the  rear  of  the  enemy's  lines  a  very  heavy  barrage 
is  placed,  and  the  hostile  batteries  are  subjected  to  a 
still  more  violent  fire.  The  enemy's  second  line  is 
heavily  shelled,  all  the  guns  which  do  not  take  part 
in  forming  the  creeping  barrage  concentrating  their 
fire  upon  those  lines  so  as  to  permit  our  advance  and 
to  crush  every  tentative  counter-attack.  An  en- 
caging curtain  fire  is  put  on  both  wings  of  the  at- 
tack so  that  the  enemy  cannot  flee  either  to  the 
rear  or  to  the  flank,  and  can  only  await  the  French 
bayonets  advancing  steadily  toward  him.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  creeping  barrage  prevents  the  en- 
emy from  getting  out  of  his  dugouts,  and  when  the 
last  shells  have  fallen  the  front-line  infantrymen  are 
there. 

At  the  same  hour  "H,"  along  miles  of  the  front, 


182  PRESENT-DAY  WARFARE 

waves  of  horizon-blue  come  out  of  the  trenches  and 
advance  at  a  uniform  pace  toward  the  enemy, 
while  batteries  of  machine-guns  pour  forth  a  shower 
of  bullets  forming  a  curtain  fire  in  front  of  the 
troops.  From  all  the  jumping-off  trenches  lines  of 
French  soldiers  march  on  in  good  order.  Behind 
the  waves  are  the  moppers-up,  who  have  the  special 
duty  of  seizing  the  entrances  of  the  dugouts  and 
making  prisoners  of  the  Germans  who  occupy  them. 
Over  the  heads  of  the  assaulting  waves  swarms  of 
planes  fly  at  a  very  low  altitude,  firing  with  their 
machine-guns  at  every  German  who  tries  to  make 
a  stand.  High  in  the  air  squadrons  of  planes  pre- 
vent any  enemy  plane  from  crossing  the  line,  in 
this  way  rendering  the  enemy's  artillery  blind. 
Other  squadrons  have  passed  over  the  enemy's  lines 
to  the  rear  and  attacked  the  reserves,  which  are 
hurried  up  by  the  German  staff  to  try  to  check  our 
advance. 

The  assaulting  waves  protected  by  the  barrage 
advance  steadily,  marching  as  closely  as  possible 
to  this  barrage.  They  go  on  to  a  designated  point, 
but  no  farther,  and  then  immediately  begin  to^or- 
ganize  the  conquered  ground,  that  is  to  say,  they 
dig  themselves  in  and  form  a  line  of  trenches  out  of 
the  shell-holes  in  which  they  are.  Next  they  en- 
deavor to  build  communication-trenches.  Immedi- 
ately after  they  have  stopped,  the  planes  fly  over 


THE  OFFENSIVE  BATTLE  183 

them  and  ask  them  to  mark  the  line.  At  this  sig- 
nal the  infantry  spreads  its  panels  on  the  ground,  the 
plane  takes  a  photograph  and  flies  back  to  division 
headquarters,  where  the  photograph  is  developed, 
and  in  less  than  two  hours  after  the  photograph  has 
been  taken  the  general  knows  exactly  where  the 
men  of  his  division  are.  During  that  time  other 
planes  fly  over  the  line  and  pay  great  attention  to 
all  signals  which  may  be  sent  by  the  infantry,  which 
asks  for  everything  it  is  in  need  of — for  instance, 
artillery-fire,  longer  range,  etc.  The  planes  also 
warn  the  infantry  of  any  counter-attack  which  the 
enemy  may  plan. 

Of  course,  most  of  the  time  the  attack  doesn't 
succeed  in  taking  all  the  positions  without  a  fight, 
as  there  remain  some  parts  of  the  enemy's  lines 
which  resist,  either  because  the  artillery  has  not 
quite  demolished  them  or  because  the  garrison 
hasn't  been  sufficiently  shaken  by  the  shelling.  In- 
fantry then  has  to  conquer  these  strongholds.  They 
will  do  it  by  besieging  them  very  closely,  and  if  the 
infantry  by  its  own  means  doesn't  succeed  in  carry- 
ing them,  the  artillery  has  to  resume  the  work. 
Often  tanks  (a  type  of  armored  cars,  like  cater- 
pillars, able  to  progress  on  any  ground  and  armed 
with  guns  and  machine-guns)  are  in  front  of  the 
infantry  and  protect  it  by  fire-power.  They  also 
prove  very  useful  in  reducing  the  strongholds 


184  PRESENT-DAY  WARFARE 

which  may  prevent  the  infantry's  advance.  They 
cannot  take  the  place  of  the  artillery  barrage, 
but  as  an  addition  to  it  they  are  of  great  assist- 
ance. 

The  great  difficulty  is  not  in  conquering  the 
ground  but  in  holding  it.  To  go  over  the  top  is 
nothing,  for  in  a  well-prepared  attack  the  losses  are 
but  very  slight  during  the  assault.  In  the  Aisne  of- 
fensive on  the  5th  of  May,  in  my  battalion  there 
was  only  one  officer  slightly  wounded,  one  man 
killed,  and  twelve  men  wounded.  Three  battalions 
of  Chasseurs  a  pieds  carried  the  important  position 
of  the  Croix-Sans-Tete  with  only  three  wounded  and 
one  killed,  and  there  they  took  eighteen  German 
guns.  The  assault  in  itself  is  not  costly  in  human 
lives,  but  the  holding  of  the  ground  results  in  many 
casualties. 

After  a  few  hours  the  enemy's  artillery  reaction 
becomes  more  violent  and  accurate,  and  intense 
shell-fire  is  directed  upon  our  new  line.  As  the 
men  have  no  dugouts  and  the  trenches  are  not  well 
made,  losses  are  more  severe  than  in  an  organized 
sector.  There  is  no  general  rule  as  to  when  the 
enemy  will  begin  to  direct  his  fire  against  our  in- 
fantry. During  the  Aisne  offensive  we  attacked 
at  nine  o'clock  and  the  first  German  shell  was  fired 
at  9.35  upon  the  rear  of  our  line.  During  an  at- 
tack we  made  on  the  Somme  on  the  I5th  of  Octo- 


THE  OFFENSIVE  BATTLE  185 

ber  the  enemy's  artillery  began  shelling  a  few 
minutes  before  we  started  the  attack.  So  the  im- 
portant occupation  of  all  will  be  the  organization 
and  consolidation  of  the  conquered  ground.  Before 
the  attack  is  launched,  orders  will  have  been  issued 
explaining  to  every  one  how  the  conquered  ground 
is  to  be  organized,  and  all  try  to  realize  this  organiza- 
tion as  quickly  as  possible  and  in  accordance  with 
the  written  orders.  The  organization  of  the  ground 
is  made  in  depth,  and  reserves  are  immediately 
brought  up  so  that  they  may  be  able  to  counter- 
attack should  the  enemy  succeed  in  reaching  our 
line.  Several  lines  of  trenches  will  be  provided  for, 
and  in  each  of  these  lines  dumps  for  ammunition 
will  be  located.  Fatigue-parties  will  bring  up  on 
the  new  lines  the  material  and  supplies  for  the  or- 
ganization of  the  position  including  ammunition, 
rations,  and  water.  The  assaulting  troops  will  try 
to  have  good  liaison  with  the  rear  so  that  they  can 
report  what  is  going  on  and  to  indicate  what  they 
need.  Artillery  will  get  the  proper  range  for  the 
new  positions,  and  be  ready  to  let  the  curtain  fire 
loose  in  a  few  seconds.  Fatigue-parties  and  terri- 
torials (troops  composed  of  older  men — will  follow 
the  assaulting  waves  at  a  specified  distance  to  es- 
tablish means  of  communication,  to  make  trails,  and 
to  lay  bridges  made  of  fascines.  The  roads  which 
are  close  to  the  former  front  lines  are  immediately 


i86  PRESENT-DAY  WARFARE 

repaired,  for  now  they  can  be  used  by  the  wagons, 
the  lines  being  further  away. 

At  this  stage  of  the  attack  the  infantry  works 
more  with  the  pick  and  shovel  than  it  fights,  and 
while  some  local  encounter  is  going  on  for  the  re- 
duction of  strongholds  or  centres  of  resistance  still 
capable  of  putting  up  a  fight,  fatigue-parties  and 
most  of  the  assaulting  troops,  under  the  protection 
of  strong  outposts,  dig  and  work  without  losing 
a  minute.  There  one  sees  the  truth  of  the  state- 
ment, "time  is  blood."  Crowds  of  prisoners  stream 
toward  the  rear.  By  every  staff  they  are  questioned, 
only  briefly  by  the  staffs  of  the  attacking  troops, 
but  more  in  detail  at  the  division  and  the  army- 
corps  headquarters.  Very  often  the  prisoners  are 
immediately  used  for  work  in  the  repairing  of  roads 
at  the  rear.  When  it  can  be  done  the  wounded  are 
transported  to  the  rear,  but  often  this  is  an  impos- 
sible task  during  the  day,  and  we  have  to  wait  till 
the  night  falls  for  our  stretcher-bearers  to  bring 
out  the  wounded,  because  the  enemy  fires  every 
time  he  sees  a  living  being  move  over  the  conquered 
crater-field.  You  will  easily  imagine  what  a  difficult 
task  it  is  for  the  stretcher-bearers  to  move  in  this 
upturned  ground,  amidst  exploding  shells  and 
whizzing  bullets — searching  for  their  wounded  com- 
rades, putting  them  on  the  stretchers,  and  then, 
under  the  same  conditions  carrying  them  several 


THE  OFFENSIVE  BATTLE  187 

miles  to  the  rear.  Quite  often  the  bearers  sustain 
severe  casualties.  The  wounded  are  carried  to  the 
first-aid  stations,  where  their  wounds  are  dressed, 
and  they  are  sent  further  to  the  rear,  where  am- 
bulances await  to  transport  them  to  the  field-hos- 
pitals. The  wounded  who  can  do  so,  walk  back 
to  the  dressing-stations,  often  in  groups  of  two  or 
three,  helping  each  other  to  get  out  of  the  dangerous 
zone.  This  evacuation  is  more  or  less  difficult  ac- 
cording to  the  enemy's  actions. 

If  the  attack  succeeded  very  well,  and  it  is  noted 
that  the  enemy's  lines  are  shattered,  the  success 
will  be  exploited,  and  other  objectives  stormed,  but 
this  will  only  be  done  by  order  of  the  staff.  Most 
of  the  time  the  staff  keeps  in  hand  the  reserve  troops, 
which  will  be  engaged  in  carrying  other  objectives 
and  pursuing  the  retreating  enemy.  This  can  only 
be  done  should  the  enemy's  line  be  pierced  on  a 
sufficient  front  and  should  the  troops  give  way. 
The  pursuit  must  then  be  very  quick  so  that  the 
enemy  can  have  no  time  to  recover,  and  so  that  his 
reserves  will  be  carried  away  in  a  wild  panic  and 
be  unable  to  fulfil  their  role — that  is,  to  hold  the 
ground  and  counter-attack  in  order  to  regain  the 
lost  positions.  As  soon  as  the  assaulting  infantry 
gets  out  of  the  crater  zone,  the  cavalry  passes  the 
infantry  and  speeds  on,  forcing  the  enemy  to  a  hasty 
retreat.  The  defeat  may  then  turn  into  a  disaster 


1 88  PRESENT-DAY  WARFARE 

for  him.  The  guns  are  moved  on,  pursuing  the 
enemy  with  their  shells.  The  roads  are  quickly 
repaired,  trucks  carry  infantry  ahead  so  as  to  be 
at  the  heels  of  the  enemy,  who  will  have  no  time 
to  save  or  even  to  destroy  his  material,  his  guns, 
or  his  ammunition.  Hundreds  of  guns,  thousands 
of  prisoners  will  be  the  booty  of  the  victory.  A 
sufficient  number  of  troops  and  guns  brought  into 
action  will  force  the  enemy  to  retreat  over  large 
spaces  of  country.  The  enemy  will  have  but  one 
chance  to  recover  and  that  will  be  to  occupy  new 
lines  far  back  to  the  rear,  to  occupy  them  with  fresh 
troops  who  have  not  been  under  the  influence  of 
the  defeat,  well  supplied  with  guns  and  ammuni- 
tion, and  having  at  their  head  an  energetic  leader. 
During  this  time  the  retreating  armies  will  have 
to  fight  in  order  to  gain  time  and  to  allow  the  con- 
centration and  the  organization  of  these  new  forces. 
The  role  of  the  pursuer  will  be  to  crush  down  rapidly 
every  resistance,  keeping  at  the  heels  of  the  enemy's 
main  forces,  so  that  they  can  make  no  stop  at  the 
lines  which  they  intend  to  defend.  On  great  areas 
of  country  open  warfare  will  be  resumed,  and  a  big 
battle  must  be  fought  if  the  pursuer  is  to  be  stopped. 
During  this  pursuit  the  air  service  will  not  be  in- 
active. Squadrons  will  fly  over  the  retreating  col- 
umns in  order  to  locate  them  and  also  for  the  pur- 
pose of  attacking  them,  obliging  them  to  scatter 


THE  OFFENSIVE  BATTLE  189 

themselves  or  to  take  cover,  and  delaying  them  in 
their  retreat.  They  will  be  able  to  give  the  proper 
range  to  the  pursuing  artillery,  and  the  object  of 
the  beaten  enemy  will  be  to  gain  time  at  any  cost. 
The  pursuer  will  have  but  one  idea,  one  sole  aim — 
to  crush  every  resistance,  to  get  at  the  main  force 
and  give  the  enemy  no  time  to  rest  or  to  recover. 


CHAPTER  XIV 
CONCLUSION 

AJL  the  battles  in  trench  warfare  have  not  been 
fought  under  the  same  conditions  and  in  some 
the  objectives  were  widely  different.  Some  battles 
were  fought  with  the  idea  of  piercing  the  enemy's 
front.  To  effect  this  it  is  necessary  to  push  ahead 
quickly  and  steadily  in  order  to  get  to  the  positions 
at  the  rear  before  the  enemy  has  had  time  to  hurl 
troops  into  them  for  the  purpose  of  defending  them. 
The  troops  must  not  only  push  ahead  quickly  on 
a  small  front,  but  they  must  do  it  along  a  large  front, 
so  that  the  collapse  of  the  line  will  become  general, 
and  so  that  it  will  be  quite  impossible  for  the  enemy 
to  fill  the  great  gap  driven  in  his  line. 

Such  a  battle  should,  of  course,  only  be  fought 
with  sufficient  material  and  human  means  at  the 
disposal  of  the  general  in  command  because  it  must 
be  borne  in  mind  that  he  must  not  only  win  the 
battle  but  he  must  be  able  to  pursue  his  opponent, 
and  compel  a  general  retreat.  It  mustn't  be  for- 
gotten that  the  enemy  will  have  at  his  disposal  quan- 
tities of  reserves  which  will  be  hurled  into  the  battle 
190 


CONCLUSION  191 

or  which  will  fight  later  on.  This  battle  is  not  a 
last  effort,  but  the  first,  surely  the  decisive  one  of 
a  series  of  efforts  which  have  in  view  the  breaking 
down  of  the  enemy's  force  of  resistance.  To  do 
this  the  commanding  chief  must  not  only  have  the 
means  with  which  to  fight  and  win  this  battle,  but 
he  must  be  prepared  for  the  emergencies  which  will 
follow.  He  must  have  sufficient  troops,  sufficient 
guns,  sufficient  ammunition. 

The  battle  with  limited  objectives  is  fought  in 
quite  a  different  spirit.  There  we  do  not  intend  to 
pierce  the  enemy's  front.  Our  only  aim  is  to  kill 
as  many  Germans  as  possible  while  we  lose  as  few 
men  as  possible.  The  idea  is  to  wear  down  the  en- 
emy by  the  stupendous  losses  which  he  will  sustain. 
The  ground  he  occupies  is  pounded  in  such  a  way 
that  no  human  being  can  stand  it;  the  attacking 
troops  must  take  the  objectives  assigned  to  them, 
and  no  more.  To  fight  such  a  battle  it  is  necessary 
to  possess  an  overwhelming  superiority  in  material. 
It  is  necessary  to  be  master  of  the  air,  and  to  have 
much  more  powerful  artillery  than  the  enemy. 
Should  the  enemy  be  able  to  muster  the  same  means 
as  ours  then  the  object  of  this  battle  will  not  be 
attained,  because  he  could  reply  efficiently  and  we 
should  lose  as  much  as  he  does. 

The  recent  offensives  in  the  Flanders,  known  as 
the  battle  of  the  Flanders,  are  types  of  battles  with 


192  PRESENT-DAY  WARFARE 

limited  objectives.  These  battles  forced  the  enemy 
to  engage  all  his  reserves,  and  even  to  bring  into 
the  fray  twice  and  sometimes  three  times  the  same 
divisions. 

The  conditions  of  battle  have  changed  since  the 
beginning  of  trench  warfare.  At  one  time  we  had  a 
series  of  lines,  now  we  have  a  series  of  nests.  Now 
we  use  a  series  of  centres  of  resistance  sometimes 
connected  by  underground  galleries  at  a  great  depth. 
The  effects  of  artillery  have  been  so  terrible  that  it 
seems  useless  to  build  any  sort  of  defense,  because 
the  stronger  it  is  the  worse  its  destruction.  The 
idea  is  to  keep  the  strongholds  unknown  to  the 
enemy.  For  instance,  a  shell-hole  in  which  a  ma- 
chine-gun is  placed  without  the  knowledge  of  the 
enemy  forms  a  stronghold.  Very  often  we  develop 
underground  communications  with  these  shell-holes 
which  cannot  be  detected  by  the  aerial  photos.  The 
Germans  used  them,  for  instance,  at  the  Cornillet 
in  Champagne. 

The  form  toward  which  this  warfare  slowly  drifts 
is  that  of  a  defense  organized  at  such  a  depth  that 
a  main  position  cannot  be  easily  destroyed  by  the 
guns;  and  such  positions  are  protected  in  front  by 
several  miles  of  shell-holes,  mostly  defended  by 
material  served  by  a  few  men.  A  very  difficult  job 
for  the  assailant  is  to  get  quickly  through  these 
positions,  for  if  he  does  not  push  ahead  quickly, 


CONCLUSION  193 

strong  reserves  will  bar  the  way.  There  will  be  a 
great  echelonment  in  depth,  for  the  mechanical 
means  of  destruction  are  so  powerful  that  it  seems 
quite  impossible  to  escape  annihilation.  The  best  de- 
fense is  always  camouflage,  for  if  the  enemy  does  not 
know  the  location  of  his  opponent  he  will  not  fire. 
The  enemy  has  organized  new  lines  at  a  great 
distance  from  the  places  where  he  is  fighting  now, 
and  should  we  pierce  his  present  lines  his  main  ob- 
ject will  be  to  delay  us  in  order  to  give  time  for  the 
retreating  troops  to  muster,  and  shelter  themselves 
behind  these  new  positions;  and  open  fighting  would 
take  place  in  the  spaces  which  separate  two  posi- 
tions. Our  object  would  then  be  to  gain  on  the 
enemy  by  speed,  and  therefore  to  manreuvre  so 
as  to  cover  the  intervening  distance  quickly:  thus 
it  would  become  possible  to  prevent  him  from  re- 
organizing under  the  protection  of  these  new  lines. 
If  he  were  able  to  cover  his  flanks  and  guard  them 
with  strong  obstacles  he  might  be  able  to  form  a 
new  line  and  keep  a  new  position;  so  the  object 
of  the  assailant  will  be  to  reach  his  flanks,  and  thus 
prevent  the  organization  of  this  new  position.  The 
main  difficulty  will  be  that  of  clinging  closely  to 
him  and  of  outflanking  him. 

I  have  tried  in  this  book  to  give  an  idea  of  what 
modern  warfare  is,  and  it  is  essential  fully  to  grasp 


194  PRESENT-DAY  WARFARE 

the  meaning  of  this  term.  I  have  used  the  words 
trench  and  open  warfare,  meaning,  in  the  first 
case,  fighting  to  attack  or  defend  a  system  of 
trenches,  and,  by  open  warfare,  combat  between 
two  positions  where  there  are  no  trenches.  But  it 
would  be  quite  wrong  to  believe  that  these  two  forms 
of  the  battle  are  entirely  different.  There  are  some 
great  principles  which  are  always  true,  but  their 
application  differs  with  the  conditions  of  the  fight. 
For  instance,  a  formation  very  effective  in  one  coun- 
try would  not  be  suitable  in  another.  It  would  be 
equally  absurd  to  pretend  that  there  is  never  fight- 
ing in  the  open,  or  that  after  a  certain  phase  is  ended 
we  shall  never  encounter  trenches.  As  a  matter  of 
fact,  when  two  opponents  halt,  voluntarily  or  not, 
and  want  to  keep  a  close  contact  they  are  obliged 
to  settle  down  in  an  extensive  system  of  trenches. 
To  hold  the  ground  it  is  absolutely  necessary  to 
organize  it  in  order  to  reinforce  the  strength  of  a 
natural  position.  In  attacking,  the  idea  is  always 
to  shatter  the  enemy's  armies,  to  break  down  all 
organization.  Therefore,  actually  it  is  necessary 
on  the  Western  front  to  break  through  the  system 
of  trenches,  and  the  result  to  be  attained  is  to  hurl 
the  enemy  back  in  disorder,  and  quickly,  in  order 
neither  to  give  him  time  to  occupy  the  positions 
prepared  long  ago  at  the  rear  nor  to  cling  to  the 
ground  and  hold  it  by  means  of  field-fortification. 


CONCLUSION  195 

On  the  other  hand,  every  time  one  of  the  opponents 
stops  hie  organizes  the  ground.  The  period  in  which 
the  fight  is  carried  on  in  the  open  is  then  very  lim- 
ited both  in  time  and  in  space. 


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